This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by the NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis which may result in further changes to the information provided.
Current Description
Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.
Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.
NVD Analysts use publicly available information to associate vector strings and CVSS scores. We also display any CVSS information provided within the CVE List from the CNA.
Note: The NVD and the CNA have provided the same score. When this occurs only the CNA information is displayed, but the Acceptance Level icon for the CNA is given a checkmark to signify NVD concurrence.
NVD Analysts use publicly available information to associate vector strings and CVSS scores. We also display any CVSS information provided within the CVE List from the CNA.
Note: NVD Analysts have published a CVSS score for this CVE based on publicly available information at the time of analysis. The CNA has not provided a score within the CVE List.
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https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj No Types Assigned
https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj Third Party Advisory
Changed
Reference Type
https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r02e467123d45006a1dda20a38349e9c74c3a4b53e2e07be0939ecb3f@%3Cdev.ranger.apache.org%3E No Types Assigned
https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r02e467123d45006a1dda20a38349e9c74c3a4b53e2e07be0939ecb3f@%3Cdev.ranger.apache.org%3E Mailing List, Third Party Advisory
Changed
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https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r490ca5611c150d193b320a2608209180713b7c68e501b67b0cffb925@%3Ccommits.servicecomb.apache.org%3E No Types Assigned
https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r490ca5611c150d193b320a2608209180713b7c68e501b67b0cffb925@%3Ccommits.servicecomb.apache.org%3E Mailing List, Third Party Advisory
Changed
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https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r57245853c7245baab09eae08728c52b58fd77666538092389cc3e882@%3Ccommits.servicecomb.apache.org%3E No Types Assigned
https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r57245853c7245baab09eae08728c52b58fd77666538092389cc3e882@%3Ccommits.servicecomb.apache.org%3E Mailing List, Third Party Advisory
Changed
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https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r6d32fc3cd547f7c9a288a57c7f525f5d00a00d5d163613e0d10a23ef@%3Ccommits.servicecomb.apache.org%3E No Types Assigned
https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r6d32fc3cd547f7c9a288a57c7f525f5d00a00d5d163613e0d10a23ef@%3Ccommits.servicecomb.apache.org%3E Mailing List, Third Party Advisory
Changed
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https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r7bb3cdc192e9a6f863d3ea05422f09fa1ae2b88d4663e63696ee7ef5@%3Cdev.ranger.apache.org%3E No Types Assigned
https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r7bb3cdc192e9a6f863d3ea05422f09fa1ae2b88d4663e63696ee7ef5@%3Cdev.ranger.apache.org%3E Mailing List, Third Party Advisory
Changed
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https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rb523bb6c60196c5f58514b86a8585c2069a4852039b45de3818b29d2@%3Ccommits.servicecomb.apache.org%3E No Types Assigned
https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rb523bb6c60196c5f58514b86a8585c2069a4852039b45de3818b29d2@%3Ccommits.servicecomb.apache.org%3E Mailing List, Third Party Advisory
