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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clone_private_mnt(): make sure that caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the right userns
What we want is to verify there is that clone won't expose something
hidden by a mount we wouldn't be able to undo. "Wouldn't be able to undo"
may be a result of MNT_LOCKED on a child, but it may also come from
lacking admin rights in the userns of the namespace mount belongs to.
clone_private_mnt() checks the former, but not the latter.
There's a number of rather confusing CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks in various
userns during the mount, especially with the new mount API; they serve
different purposes and in case of clone_private_mnt() they usually,
but not always end up covering the missing check mentioned above.
Metrics
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OR
*cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:11.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Added
CPE Configuration
OR
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:5.14:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:5.14:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.13 up to (excluding) 6.15.3
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:5.14:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.7 up to (excluding) 6.12.40
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 5.16 up to (excluding) 6.1.147
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.2 up to (excluding) 6.6.100
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 4.14.244 up to (excluding) 4.15
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 4.19.204 up to (excluding) 4.20
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 4.4.281 up to (excluding) 4.5
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 4.9.280 up to (excluding) 4.10
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 5.10.59 up to (excluding) 5.11
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 5.13.11 up to (excluding) 5.14
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 5.14.1 up to (excluding) 5.15.190
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 5.4.141 up to (excluding) 5.5
Added
Reference Type
CVE: https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00008.html Types: Third Party Advisory
New CVE Received from kernel.org8/11/2025 12:15:30 PM
Action
Type
Old Value
New Value
Added
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clone_private_mnt(): make sure that caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the right userns
What we want is to verify there is that clone won't expose something
hidden by a mount we wouldn't be able to undo. "Wouldn't be able to undo"
may be a result of MNT_LOCKED on a child, but it may also come from
lacking admin rights in the userns of the namespace mount belongs to.
clone_private_mnt() checks the former, but not the latter.
There's a number of rather confusing CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks in various
userns during the mount, especially with the new mount API; they serve
different purposes and in case of clone_private_mnt() they usually,
but not always end up covering the missing check mentioned above.