References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools

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Change History

better-auth versions greater than 1.3.34 and before 1.4.0 contain a vulnerability in the multi-session plugin's /sign-out after-hook, which trusts raw multi-session cookies and forwards extracted values to internalAdapter.deleteSessions without verifying the cookie signature (e.g., via getSignedCookie). An attacker can supply a forged _multi-* cookie to trigger deletion of arbitrary session tokens.

AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CWE-347

https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-wmjr-v86c-m9jj

https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/better-auth-before-session-revocation-via-forged-cookie

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