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This CVE record has been updated after NVD enrichment efforts were completed. Enrichment data supplied by the NVD may require amendment due to these changes.
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl
build_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() derive a DACL pointer from a
server-supplied dacloffset and then use the incoming ACL to rebuild the
chmod/chown security descriptor.
The original fix only checked that the struct smb_acl header fits before
reading dacl_ptr->size or dacl_ptr->num_aces. That avoids the immediate
header-field OOB read, but the rewrite helpers still walk ACEs based on
pdacl->num_aces with no structural validation of the incoming DACL body.
A malicious server can return a truncated DACL that still contains a
header, claims one or more ACEs, and then drive
replace_sids_and_copy_aces() or set_chmod_dacl() past the validated
extent while they compare or copy attacker-controlled ACEs.
Factor the DACL structural checks into validate_dacl(), extend them to
validate each ACE against the DACL bounds, and use the shared validator
before the chmod/chown rebuild paths. parse_dacl() reuses the same
validator so the read-side parser and write-side rewrite paths agree on
what constitutes a well-formed incoming DACL.
Metrics
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New CVE Received from kernel.org5/01/2026 10:16:20 AM
Action
Type
Old Value
New Value
Added
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl
build_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() derive a DACL pointer from a
server-supplied dacloffset and then use the incoming ACL to rebuild the
chmod/chown security descriptor.
The original fix only checked that the struct smb_acl header fits before
reading dacl_ptr->size or dacl_ptr->num_aces. That avoids the immediate
header-field OOB read, but the rewrite helpers still walk ACEs based on
pdacl->num_aces with no structural validation of the incoming DACL body.
A malicious server can return a truncated DACL that still contains a
header, claims one or more ACEs, and then drive
replace_sids_and_copy_aces() or set_chmod_dacl() past the validated
extent while they compare or copy attacker-controlled ACEs.
Factor the DACL structural checks into validate_dacl(), extend them to
validate each ACE against the DACL bounds, and use the shared validator
before the chmod/chown rebuild paths. parse_dacl() reuses the same
validator so the read-side parser and write-side rewrite paths agree on
what constitutes a well-formed incoming DACL.
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