Title: core-rs-albatross de nimiq, Description: nimiq/core-rs-albatross es una implementación en Rust del protocolo Nimiq Proof-of-Stake basado en el algoritmo de consenso Albatross. Antes de la versión 1.3.0, el gestor de descubrimiento acepta un límite controlado por el par durante el handshake y lo almacena sin cambios. La ruta inmediata de HandshakeAck entonces respeta límite = 0 y devuelve cero contactos, lo que hace que la sesión parezca benigna. Más tarde, después de que la misma sesión alcanza el estado Establecido, la ruta de actualización periódica calcula self.peer_list_limit.unwrap() como usize - 1. Con límite = 0, eso se ajusta a usize::MAX y luego en rand 0.9.2, choose_multiple() intenta inmediatamente Vec::with_capacity(amount), lo que provoca un pánico determinista por desbordamiento de capacidad. Este problema ha sido parcheado en la versión 1.3.0.

{"timestamp":"2026-04-06T13:19:23.883699Z","id":"CVE-2026-33184","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"yes"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}

[{"vendor":"nimiq","product":"core-rs-albatross","versions":[{"version":"< 1.3.0","status":"affected"}]}]

OR
     *cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:core-rs-albatross:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:* versions from (including) 1.2.2

OR
     *cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:* versions from (including) 1.2.2

OR
          *cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:core-rs-albatross:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:* versions up to (including) 1.2.2

GitHub, Inc.: https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/commit/8f60a2d75b74b55764ecf34bd4435f4961630595 Types: Patch

GitHub, Inc.: https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3664 Types: Patch

GitHub, Inc.: https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.3.0 Types: Release Notes

GitHub, Inc.: https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/security/advisories/GHSA-5rm9-893q-vmhm Types: Vendor Advisory

nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.3.0, the discovery handler accepts a peer-controlled limit during handshake and stores it unchanged. The immediate HandshakeAck path then honors limit = 0 and returns zero contacts, which makes the session look benign. Later, after the same session reaches Established, the periodic update path computes self.peer_list_limit.unwrap() as usize - 1. With limit = 0, that wraps to usize::MAX and then in rand 0.9.2, choose_multiple() immediately attempts Vec::with_capacity(amount), which deterministically panics with capacity overflow. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.0.

AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

CWE-191

https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/commit/8f60a2d75b74b55764ecf34bd4435f4961630595

https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3664

https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.3.0

https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/security/advisories/GHSA-5rm9-893q-vmhm