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This CVE record is not being prioritized for NVD enrichment efforts due to resource or other concerns.
Description
The Robo Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'Loading Label' setting in all versions up to, and including, 5.1.3. The plugin uses a custom `|***...***|` marker pattern in its `fixJsFunction()` method to embed raw JavaScript function references within JSON-encoded configuration objects. When a gallery's options are rendered on the frontend, `json_encode()` wraps all string values in double quotes. The `fixJsFunction()` method then strips the `"|***` and `***|"` sequences, effectively converting a JSON string value into raw JavaScript code. The Loading Label field (stored as `rbs_gallery_LoadingWord` post_meta) is an `rbstext` type field that is sanitized with `sanitize_text_field()` on save. While this strips HTML tags, it does not strip the `|***...***|` markers since they contain no HTML. When a user inputs `|***alert(document.domain)***|`, the value passes through sanitization intact, is stored in post_meta, and is later retrieved and output within an inline `<script>` tag via `renderMainBlock()` with the quote markers stripped — resulting in arbitrary JavaScript execution. The gallery post type uses `capability_type => 'post'`, allowing Author-level users to create galleries. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses a page containing the gallery shortcode.
Metrics
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Title: plugin Robo Gallery para WordPress, Description: El plugin Robo Gallery para WordPress es vulnerable a cross-site scripting almacenado a través de la configuración Loading Label en todas las versiones hasta, e incluyendo, la 5.1.3. El plugin utiliza un patrón de marcador personalizado '| ... |' en su método 'fixJsFunction()' para incrustar referencias de funciones JavaScript en bruto dentro de objetos de configuración codificados en JSON. Cuando las opciones de una galería se renderizan en el frontend, 'json_encode()' envuelve todos los valores de cadena entre comillas dobles. El método 'fixJsFunction()' luego elimina las secuencias "| y |" , convirtiendo efectivamente un valor de cadena JSON en código JavaScript en bruto. El campo Loading Label (almacenado como 'rbs_gallery_LoadingWord' post_meta) es un campo de tipo 'rbstext' que se sanitiza con 'sanitize_text_field()' al guardar. Si bien esto elimina las etiquetas HTML, no elimina los marcadores '| ... |' ya que no contienen HTML. Cuando un usuario introduce '| alert(document.domain) |', el valor pasa por la sanitización intacto, se almacena en post_meta, y luego se recupera y se muestra dentro de una etiqueta ' script ' en línea a través de 'renderMainBlock()' con los marcadores de comillas eliminados - lo que resulta en la ejecución arbitraria de JavaScript. El tipo de publicación de galería utiliza 'capability_type = post ', permitiendo a los usuarios con nivel de Autor crear galerías. Esto hace posible que atacantes autenticados, con acceso de nivel de Autor y superior, inyecten scripts web arbitrarios en páginas que se ejecutarán cada vez que un usuario acceda a una página que contenga el shortcode de la galería.
New CVE Received from Wordfence4/08/2026 6:16:01 AM
Action
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Old Value
New Value
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Description
The Robo Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'Loading Label' setting in all versions up to, and including, 5.1.3. The plugin uses a custom `|***...***|` marker pattern in its `fixJsFunction()` method to embed raw JavaScript function references within JSON-encoded configuration objects. When a gallery's options are rendered on the frontend, `json_encode()` wraps all string values in double quotes. The `fixJsFunction()` method then strips the `"|***` and `***|"` sequences, effectively converting a JSON string value into raw JavaScript code. The Loading Label field (stored as `rbs_gallery_LoadingWord` post_meta) is an `rbstext` type field that is sanitized with `sanitize_text_field()` on save. While this strips HTML tags, it does not strip the `|***...***|` markers since they contain no HTML. When a user inputs `|***alert(document.domain)***|`, the value passes through sanitization intact, is stored in post_meta, and is later retrieved and output within an inline `<script>` tag via `renderMainBlock()` with the quote markers stripped — resulting in arbitrary JavaScript execution. The gallery post type uses `capability_type => 'post'`, allowing Author-level users to create galleries. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses a page containing the gallery shortcode.