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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pstore/ram: fix buffer overflow in persistent_ram_save_old()
persistent_ram_save_old() can be called multiple times for the same
persistent_ram_zone (e.g., via ramoops_pstore_read -> ramoops_get_next_prz
for PSTORE_TYPE_DMESG records).
Currently, the function only allocates prz->old_log when it is NULL,
but it unconditionally updates prz->old_log_size to the current buffer
size and then performs memcpy_fromio() using this new size. If the
buffer size has grown since the first allocation (which can happen
across different kernel boot cycles), this leads to:
1. A heap buffer overflow (OOB write) in the memcpy_fromio() calls
2. A subsequent OOB read when ramoops_pstore_read() accesses the buffer
using the incorrect (larger) old_log_size
The KASAN splat would look similar to:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ramoops_pstore_read+0x...
Read of size N at addr ... by task ...
The conditions are likely extremely hard to hit:
0. Crash with a ramoops write of less-than-record-max-size bytes.
1. Reboot: ramoops registers, pstore_get_records(0) reads old crash,
allocates old_log with size X
2. Crash handler registered, timer started (if pstore_update_ms >= 0)
3. Oops happens (non-fatal, system continues)
4. pstore_dump() writes oops via ramoops_pstore_write() size Y (>X)
5. pstore_new_entry = 1, pstore_timer_kick() called
6. System continues running (not a panic oops)
7. Timer fires after pstore_update_ms milliseconds
8. pstore_timefunc() → schedule_work() → pstore_dowork() → pstore_get_records(1)
9. ramoops_get_next_prz() → persistent_ram_save_old()
10. buffer_size() returns Y, but old_log is X bytes
11. Y > X: memcpy_fromio() overflows heap
Requirements:
- a prior crash record exists that did not fill the record size
(almost impossible since the crash handler writes as much as it
can possibly fit into the record, capped by max record size and
the kmsg buffer almost always exceeds the max record size)
- pstore_update_ms >= 0 (disabled by default)
- Non-fatal oops (system survives)
Free and reallocate the buffer when the new size differs from the
previously allocated size. This ensures old_log always has sufficient
space for the data being copied.
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Title: Linux, Description: En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:
pstore/ram: corrige desbordamiento de búfer en persistent_ram_save_old()
persistent_ram_save_old() puede ser llamada múltiples veces para la misma persistent_ram_zone (por ejemplo, a través de ramoops_pstore_read -> ramoops_get_next_prz para registros PSTORE_TYPE_DMESG).
Actualmente, la función solo asigna prz->old_log cuando es NULL, pero actualiza incondicionalmente prz->old_log_size al tamaño de búfer actual y luego realiza memcpy_fromio() usando este nuevo tamaño. Si el tamaño del búfer ha crecido desde la primera asignación (lo que puede ocurrir en diferentes ciclos de arranque del kernel), esto lleva a:
1. Un desbordamiento de búfer de pila (escritura OOB) en las llamadas a memcpy_fromio()
2. Una lectura OOB posterior cuando ramoops_pstore_read() accede al búfer usando el old_log_size incorrecto (más grande)
El splat de KASAN se vería similar a:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds en ramoops_pstore_read+0x...
Lectura de tamaño N en la dirección ... por la tarea ...
Es probable que las condiciones sean extremadamente difíciles de alcanzar:
0. Fallo con una escritura de ramoops de menos de record-max-size bytes.
1. Reinicio: ramoops se registra, pstore_get_records(0) lee el fallo antiguo, asigna old_log con tamaño X
2. Gestor de fallos registrado, temporizador iniciado (si pstore_update_ms >= 0)
3. Ocurre un oops (no fatal, el sistema continúa)
4. pstore_dump() escribe el oops a través de ramoops_pstore_write() tamaño Y (>X)
5. pstore_new_entry = 1, se llama a pstore_timer_kick()
6. El sistema continúa ejecutándose (no es un oops de pánico)
7. El temporizador se activa después de pstore_update_ms milisegundos
8. pstore_timefunc() ? schedule_work() ? pstore_dowork() ? pstore_get_records(1)
9. ramoops_get_next_prz() ? persistent_ram_save_old()
10. buffer_size() devuelve Y, pero old_log es de X bytes
11. Y > X: memcpy_fromio() desborda la pila
Requisitos:
- existe un registro de fallo
OR
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.13 up to (excluding) 6.18.14
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.19 up to (excluding) 6.19.4
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.2 up to (excluding) 6.6.128
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.7 up to (excluding) 6.12.75
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:3.5:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 5.11 up to (excluding) 5.15.202
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 5.16 up to (excluding) 6.1.165
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 3.5.1 up to (excluding) 5.10.252
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:3.5:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:3.5:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:3.5:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:3.5:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pstore/ram: fix buffer overflow in persistent_ram_save_old()
persistent_ram_save_old() can be called multiple times for the same
persistent_ram_zone (e.g., via ramoops_pstore_read -> ramoops_get_next_prz
for PSTORE_TYPE_DMESG records).
Currently, the function only allocates prz->old_log when it is NULL,
but it unconditionally updates prz->old_log_size to the current buffer
size and then performs memcpy_fromio() using this new size. If the
buffer size has grown since the first allocation (which can happen
across different kernel boot cycles), this leads to:
1. A heap buffer overflow (OOB write) in the memcpy_fromio() calls
2. A subsequent OOB read when ramoops_pstore_read() accesses the buffer
using the incorrect (larger) old_log_size
The KASAN splat would look similar to:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ramoops_pstore_read+0x...
Read of size N at addr ... by task ...
The conditions are likely extremely hard to hit:
0. Crash with a ramoops write of less-than-record-max-size bytes.
1. Reboot: ramoops registers, pstore_get_records(0) reads old crash,
allocates old_log with size X
2. Crash handler registered, timer started (if pstore_update_ms >= 0)
3. Oops happens (non-fatal, system continues)
4. pstore_dump() writes oops via ramoops_pstore_write() size Y (>X)
5. pstore_new_entry = 1, pstore_timer_kick() called
6. System continues running (not a panic oops)
7. Timer fires after pstore_update_ms milliseconds
8. pstore_timefunc() → schedule_work() → pstore_dowork() → pstore_get_records(1)
9. ramoops_get_next_prz() → persistent_ram_save_old()
10. buffer_size() returns Y, but old_log is X bytes
11. Y > X: memcpy_fromio() overflows heap
Requirements:
- a prior crash record exists that did not fill the record size
(almost impossible since the crash handler writes as much as it
can possibly fit into the record, capped by max record size and
the kmsg buffer almost always exceeds the max record size