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ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy
Assessment: Fully addressed.
When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker
for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc()
is
dispatched. JDK then calls the default
ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which
performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH
interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted
classes list .
ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in
readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes
Assessment: Fully addressed.
For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s
(static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an
attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the
developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies
com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many
real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers
Both issues have been fixed.
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Title: Apache MINA de Apache Software Foundation, Description: ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass no anulado - Omisión del filtro acceptMatchers mediante java.lang.reflect.Proxy
Evaluación: Completamente abordado.
Cuando el flujo serializado contiene un TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (el marcador para un java.lang.reflect.Proxy), se despacha ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() del JDK. El JDK luego llama a la implementación predeterminada de ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces), que realiza Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) para CADA nombre de interfaz y construye la clase proxy, omitiendo la lista de clases aceptadas.
ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) en readClassDescriptor activa el inicializador estático de clases en la lista de permitidos
Evaluación: Completamente abordado.
Para CUALQUIER clase en la lista de permitidos, la deserialización de un flujo que la nombra activa el (inicializador estático) de la clase ANTES de que se construya cualquier instancia. Esto significa que un atacante que proporciona un nombre de clase en la lista de permitidos (por ejemplo, el desarrollador escribió accept('com.myapp.*'), el atacante proporciona com.myapp.SomeClass) causa <clinit> de SomeClass, y muchas clases del mundo real tienen inicializadores estáticos con efectos secundarios.
Ambos problemas han sido solucionados.
Initial Analysis by NIST6/30/2026 3:02:02 PM
Action
Type
Old Value
New Value
Added
CPE Configuration
OR
*cpe:2.3:a:apache:mina:2.0.29:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:a:apache:mina:2.1.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:a:apache:mina:2.2.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
New CVE Received from Apache Software Foundation6/03/2026 7:16:19 AM
Action
Type
Old Value
New Value
Added
Description
ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy
Assessment: Fully addressed.
When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker
for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc()
is
dispatched. JDK then calls the default
ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which
performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH
interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted
classes list .
ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in
readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes
Assessment: Fully addressed.
For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s
(static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an
attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the
developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies
com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many
real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers
Both issues have been fixed.