References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools

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Change History

Capstone is a disassembly framework. Prior to version 6.0.0-Alpha9, Capstone's public `cs_insn_name()` API forwards caller-supplied instruction IDs directly to the selected architecture backend. Most backends validate the ID before indexing instruction-name tables, but the M68K and RISCV backends have missing or incomplete bounds checks. On a Capstone handle opened for M68K or RISCV, a caller-controlled invalid instruction ID can trigger an out-of-bounds read and crash the process. The demonstrated impact is availability loss in applications or bindings that expose instruction-name lookup to untrusted IDs. No code execution or data disclosure was demonstrated. Version 6.0.0-Alpha9 patches the issue.

AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L

CWE-125

CWE-129

CWE-191

https://github.com/capstone-engine/capstone/blob/251c5bb4bc9bb92973e738ae3c5f4ef86f103356/ChangeLog#L102

https://github.com/capstone-engine/capstone/security/advisories/GHSA-jrw4-wj52-2vw8

[{"vendor":"capstone-engine","product":"capstone","versions":[{"version":"< 6.0.0-Alpha9","status":"affected"}]}]