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This CVE record is not being prioritized for NVD enrichment efforts due to resource or other concerns.
Description
The MW WP Form plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Move/Read in all versions up to and including 5.1.1. This is due to insufficient validation of the $name parameter (upload field key) passed to the generate_user_file_dirpath() function, which uses WordPress's path_join() — a function that returns absolute paths unchanged, discarding the intended base directory. The attacker-controlled key is injected via the mwf_upload_files[] POST parameter, which is loaded into the plugin's Data model via _set_request_valiables(). During form processing, regenerate_upload_file_keys() iterates over these keys and calls generate_user_filepath() with the attacker-supplied key as the $name argument — the key survives validation because the targeted file (e.g., wp-config.php) genuinely exists at the absolute path. The _get_attachments() method then re-reads the same surviving keys and passes the resolved file path to move_temp_file_to_upload_dir(), which calls rename() to move the file into the uploads folder. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to move arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is moved (such as wp-config.php). The vulnerability is only exploitable if a file upload field is added to the form and the “Saving inquiry data in database” option is enabled.
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Title: MW WP Form de inc2734, Description: El plugin MW WP Form para WordPress es vulnerable a Movimiento/Lectura Arbitraria de Archivos en todas las versiones hasta la 5.1.1 inclusive. Esto se debe a una validación insuficiente del parámetro $name (clave del campo de carga) pasado a la función generate_user_file_dirpath(), que utiliza path_join() de WordPress - una función que devuelve rutas absolutas sin cambios, descartando el directorio base previsto. La clave controlada por el atacante se inyecta a través del parámetro POST mwf_upload_files[], que se carga en el modelo de Datos del plugin a través de _set_request_valiables(). Durante el procesamiento del formulario, regenerate_upload_file_keys() itera sobre estas claves y llama a generate_user_filepath() con la clave proporcionada por el atacante como argumento $name - la clave sobrevive a la validación porque el archivo objetivo (p. ej., wp-config.php) existe realmente en la ruta absoluta. El método _get_attachments() luego vuelve a leer las mismas claves supervivientes y pasa la ruta de archivo resuelta a move_temp_file_to_upload_dir(), que llama a rename() para mover el archivo a la carpeta de cargas. Esto hace posible que atacantes no autenticados muevan archivos arbitrarios en el servidor, lo que puede conducir fácilmente a la ejecución remota de código cuando se mueve el archivo correcto (como wp-config.php). La vulnerabilidad solo es explotable si se añade un campo de carga de archivos al formulario y la opción 'Guardar datos de consulta en la base de datos' está habilitada.
New CVE Received from Wordfence4/08/2026 5:17:01 PM
Action
Type
Old Value
New Value
Added
Description
The MW WP Form plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Move/Read in all versions up to and including 5.1.1. This is due to insufficient validation of the $name parameter (upload field key) passed to the generate_user_file_dirpath() function, which uses WordPress's path_join() — a function that returns absolute paths unchanged, discarding the intended base directory. The attacker-controlled key is injected via the mwf_upload_files[] POST parameter, which is loaded into the plugin's Data model via _set_request_valiables(). During form processing, regenerate_upload_file_keys() iterates over these keys and calls generate_user_filepath() with the attacker-supplied key as the $name argument — the key survives validation because the targeted file (e.g., wp-config.php) genuinely exists at the absolute path. The _get_attachments() method then re-reads the same surviving keys and passes the resolved file path to move_temp_file_to_upload_dir(), which calls rename() to move the file into the uploads folder. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to move arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is moved (such as wp-config.php). The vulnerability is only exploitable if a file upload field is added to the form and the “Saving inquiry data in database” option is enabled.