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Description
LiamBindle MQTT-C through version 1.1.6 contains a heap-based out-of-bounds read and integer underflow in the mqtt_unpack_publish_response() function in src/mqtt.c that allows a remote unauthenticated attacker controlling an MQTT broker - or able to inject MQTT traffic into an unencrypted session - to crash a subscribed MQTT-C client and potentially disclose adjacent heap memory by sending a single crafted PUBLISH packet. The function validates only that the fixed-header remaining_length is at least 4, then reads the 16-bit topic_name_size field from the broker-controlled packet and advances the parse pointer by that value without verifying that topic_name_size plus the surrounding overhead fits within remaining_length; it subsequently computes application_message_size as remaining_length - topic_name_size - 2 (QoS 0) or - 4 (QoS greater than 0) in unsigned arithmetic, producing an integer underflow that is then passed to memmove(). A PUBLISH packet with topic_name_size = 0xFFFF and remaining_length = 7 advances the parse pointer 65535 bytes past the receive buffer (out-of-bounds read) and causes an application_message_size near 2^32, crashing the process when the resulting memmove() is executed.
Metrics
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Title: MQTT-C de LiamBindle, Description: LiamBindle MQTT-C hasta la versión 1.1.6 contiene una lectura fuera de límites basada en el heap y un desbordamiento negativo de enteros en la función mqtt_unpack_publish_response() en src/mqtt.c que permite a un atacante remoto no autenticado que controla un broker MQTT - o capaz de inyectar tráfico MQTT en una sesión no cifrada - provocar la caída de un cliente MQTT-C suscrito y potencialmente divulgar memoria adyacente del heap enviando un único paquete PUBLISH manipulado. La función solo valida que el remaining_length del encabezado fijo sea al menos 4, luego lee el campo topic_name_size de 16 bits del paquete controlado por el broker y avanza el puntero de análisis por ese valor sin verificar que topic_name_size más la sobrecarga circundante encaje dentro de remaining_length; posteriormente calcula application_message_size como remaining_length - topic_name_size - 2 (QoS 0) o - 4 (QoS mayor que 0) en aritmética sin signo, produciendo un desbordamiento negativo de enteros que luego se pasa a memmove(). Un paquete PUBLISH con topic_name_size = 0xFFFF y remaining_length = 7 avanza el puntero de análisis 65535 bytes más allá del búfer de recepción (lectura fuera de límites) y provoca un application_message_size cercano a 2^32, provocando la caída del proceso cuando se ejecuta el memmove() resultante.
Title: MQTT-C de LiamBindle, Description: LiamBindle MQTT-C hasta la versión 1.1.6 contiene una lectura fuera de límites basada en el heap y un desbordamiento negativo de enteros en la función mqtt_unpack_publish_response() en src/mqtt.c que permite a un atacante remoto no autenticado que controla un broker MQTT - o capaz de inyectar tráfico MQTT en una sesión no cifrada - provocar la caída de un cliente MQTT-C suscrito y potencialmente divulgar memoria adyacente del heap enviando un único paquete PUBLISH manipulado. La función solo valida que el remaining_length del encabezado fijo sea al menos 4, luego lee el campo topic_name_size de 16 bits del paquete controlado por el broker y avanza el puntero de análisis por ese valor sin verificar que topic_name_size más la sobrecarga circundante encaje dentro de remaining_length; posteriormente calcula application_message_size como remaining_length - topic_name_size - 2 (QoS 0) o - 4 (QoS mayor que 0) en aritmética sin signo, produciendo un desbordamiento negativo de enteros que luego se pasa a memmove(). Un paquete PUBLISH con topic_name_size = 0xFFFF y remaining_length = 7 avanza el puntero de análisis 65535 bytes más allá del búfer de recepción (lectura fuera de límites) y provoca un application_message_size cercano a 2^32, provocando la caída del proceso cuando se ejecuta el memmove() resultante.
CVE Translated by NIST7/23/2026 7:10:00 AM
Action
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Translation
Title: MQTT-C de LiamBindle, Description: LiamBindle MQTT-C hasta la versión 1.1.6 contiene una lectura fuera de límites basada en el heap y un desbordamiento negativo de enteros en la función mqtt_unpack_publish_response() en src/mqtt.c que permite a un atacante remoto no autenticado que controla un broker MQTT - o capaz de inyectar tráfico MQTT en una sesión no cifrada - provocar la caída de un cliente MQTT-C suscrito y potencialmente divulgar memoria adyacente del heap enviando un único paquete PUBLISH manipulado. La función solo valida que el remaining_length del encabezado fijo sea al menos 4, luego lee el campo topic_name_size de 16 bits del paquete controlado por el broker y avanza el puntero de análisis por ese valor sin verificar que topic_name_size más la sobrecarga circundante encaje dentro de remaining_length; posteriormente calcula application_message_size como remaining_length - topic_name_size - 2 (QoS 0) o - 4 (QoS mayor que 0) en aritmética sin signo, produciendo un desbordamiento negativo de enteros que luego se pasa a memmove(). Un paquete PUBLISH con topic_name_size = 0xFFFF y remaining_length = 7 avanza el puntero de análisis 65535 bytes más allá del búfer de recepción (lectura fuera de límites) y provoca un application_message_size cercano a 2^32, provocando la caída del proceso cuando se ejecuta el memmove() resultante.
New CVE Received from TuranSec6/14/2026 2:17:20 PM
Action
Type
Old Value
New Value
Added
Description
LiamBindle MQTT-C through version 1.1.6 contains a heap-based out-of-bounds read and integer underflow in the mqtt_unpack_publish_response() function in src/mqtt.c that allows a remote unauthenticated attacker controlling an MQTT broker - or able to inject MQTT traffic into an unencrypted session - to crash a subscribed MQTT-C client and potentially disclose adjacent heap memory by sending a single crafted PUBLISH packet. The function validates only that the fixed-header remaining_length is at least 4, then reads the 16-bit topic_name_size field from the broker-controlled packet and advances the parse pointer by that value without verifying that topic_name_size plus the surrounding overhead fits within remaining_length; it subsequently computes application_message_size as remaining_length - topic_name_size - 2 (QoS 0) or - 4 (QoS greater than 0) in unsigned arithmetic, producing an integer underflow that is then passed to memmove(). A PUBLISH packet with topic_name_size = 0xFFFF and remaining_length = 7 advances the parse pointer 65535 bytes past the receive buffer (out-of-bounds read) and causes an application_message_size near 2^32, crashing the process when the resulting memmove() is executed.
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