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Change History

Runtipi is a personal homeserver orchestrator. In 4.10.0 and earlier, Runtipi accepts symbolic links from an attacker-controlled backup archive and copies them into live application paths during the backup restore flow. An authenticated attacker can plant user-config/app.env as a symlink to an arbitrary reachable path and then send PUT /api/user-config/demoapp3:_user with attacker-controlled appEnv content. FilesystemService.writeTextFile() follows the planted link, allowing content to be written outside the intended restore and user-config directory boundary with Runtipi process permissions. This issue is fixed in version 4.10.1.

AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

CWE-59

CWE-61

https://github.com/runtipi/runtipi/commit/df529a211b05f3a0007b209b6c337f8c1942619c

https://github.com/runtipi/runtipi/pull/2606

https://github.com/runtipi/runtipi/releases/tag/v4.10.1

https://github.com/runtipi/runtipi/security/advisories/GHSA-wcrf-g9p9-2wg7

[{"vendor":"runtipi","product":"runtipi","versions":[{"version":"< 4.10.1","status":"affected"}]}]