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Change History

EverOS is a memory runtime for agents. Prior to 1.0.1, EverOS is vulnerable to path traversal in the POST /api/v1/memory/add ingestion endpoint because the per-message sender_id field was not validated as a path-safe identifier, unlike app_id and project_id. During user-memory extraction, sender_id is used as owner_id and joined into the filesystem path where the extracted episode is persisted as a Markdown file, so a sender_id containing ../ sequences could direct writes outside the configured memory root and allow an unauthenticated caller to create or overwrite .md files at locations writable by the server process with partially attacker-influenced content. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.

AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

CWE-22

https://github.com/EverMind-AI/EverOS/commit/a10cdcd197747f371b7879a32c2cc3f77471e9c2

https://github.com/EverMind-AI/EverOS/releases/tag/v1.0.1

https://github.com/EverMind-AI/EverOS/security/advisories/GHSA-c795-2g9c-j48m

[{"vendor":"EverMind-AI","product":"EverOS","versions":[{"version":"< 1.0.1","status":"affected"}]}]