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This CVE record is not being prioritized for NVD enrichment efforts due to resource or other concerns.
Description
The Simple History – Track, Log, and Audit WordPress Changes plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authenticated (Subscriber+) account takeover in all versions up to, and including, 5.26.0 via the event reaction endpoints (react_to_event() / unreact_to_event()). The endpoints register get_items_permissions_check() as their permission_callback, which only verifies the requester is logged in and does not enforce the per-logger capability checks normally applied by Log_Query. As a result, a Subscriber-level user can POST to /wp-json/simple-history/v1/events/<id>/react with the _fields=context query parameter and read the full context of any Simple History event — including SimpleUserLogger entries that record the full password-reset email body (reset URL with the reset key) for any user. The attacker triggers a password reset for an administrator via the lost-password form, brute-forces recent event IDs through the reaction endpoint to read the resulting user_requested_password_reset_link event, extracts the reset key from context.message, and completes the password reset to take over the administrator account. Exploitation requires an administrator to have first enabled the experimental features option (simple_history_experimental_features_enabled), which is not the default.
Metrics
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Title: plugin de WordPress Simple History, Description: El plugin Simple History - Track, Log, and Audit WordPress Changes para WordPress es vulnerable a la toma de control de cuentas autenticadas (Suscriptor+) en todas las versiones hasta la 5.26.0, inclusive, a través de los endpoints de reacción a eventos (react_to_event() / unreact_to_event()). Los endpoints registran get_items_permissions_check() como su permission_callback, lo que solo verifica que el solicitante haya iniciado sesión y no aplica las comprobaciones de capacidad por registrador normalmente aplicadas por Log_Query. Como resultado, un usuario de nivel Suscriptor puede hacer una solicitud POST a /wp-json/simple-history/v1/events/<id>/react con el parámetro de consulta _fields=context y leer el contexto completo de cualquier evento de Simple History - incluyendo entradas de SimpleUserLogger que registran el cuerpo completo del correo electrónico de restablecimiento de contraseña (URL de restablecimiento con la clave de restablecimiento) para cualquier usuario. El atacante activa un restablecimiento de contraseña para un administrador a través del formulario de contraseña perdida, fuerza bruta los ID de eventos recientes a través del endpoint de reacción para leer el evento user_requested_password_reset_link resultante, extrae la clave de restablecimiento de context.message y completa el restablecimiento de contraseña para tomar el control de la cuenta del administrador. La explotación requiere que un administrador haya habilitado primero la opción de características experimentales (simple_history_experimental_features_enabled), lo cual no es la configuración predeterminada.
[{"vendor":"eskapism","product":"Simple History – Track, Log, and Audit WordPress Changes","defaultStatus":"unaffected","versions":[{"version":"0","lessThanOrEqual":"5.26.0","versionType":"semver","status":"affected"}]}]
New CVE Received from Wordfence5/30/2026 6:16:22 AM
Action
Type
Old Value
New Value
Added
Description
The Simple History – Track, Log, and Audit WordPress Changes plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authenticated (Subscriber+) account takeover in all versions up to, and including, 5.26.0 via the event reaction endpoints (react_to_event() / unreact_to_event()). The endpoints register get_items_permissions_check() as their permission_callback, which only verifies the requester is logged in and does not enforce the per-logger capability checks normally applied by Log_Query. As a result, a Subscriber-level user can POST to /wp-json/simple-history/v1/events/<id>/react with the _fields=context query parameter and read the full context of any Simple History event — including SimpleUserLogger entries that record the full password-reset email body (reset URL with the reset key) for any user. The attacker triggers a password reset for an administrator via the lost-password form, brute-forces recent event IDs through the reaction endpoint to read the resulting user_requested_password_reset_link event, extracts the reset key from context.message, and completes the password reset to take over the administrator account. Exploitation requires an administrator to have first enabled the experimental features option (simple_history_experimental_features_enabled), which is not the default.