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This CVE record is not being prioritized for NVD enrichment efforts due to resource or other concerns.
Description
The Contact Form 7 – PayPal & Stripe Add-on plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Payment Bypass via Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity in all versions up to, and including, 2.4.9. Although `cf7pp_paypal_ipn_handler()` correctly validates IPN authenticity by posting back to PayPal with `cmd=_notify-validate`, it fails to compare the IPN payload's `mc_gross` (payment amount), `mc_currency`, or `receiver_email` fields against the corresponding stored order values before passing the attacker-controlled `invoice` field directly to `cf7pp_complete_payment()`, which marks the order completed after only an integer cast with no amount verification. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to mark arbitrary high-value pending orders as fully paid by making a minimal real PayPal payment and crafting an IPN whose `invoice` parameter references the targeted order, effectively completing purchases without tendering the required payment amount.
Metrics
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Title: plugin de WordPress Contact Form 7 – PayPal & Stripe Add-on, Description: El plugin Contact Form 7 – PayPal & Stripe Add-on para WordPress es vulnerable a una Omisión de Pago (Payment Bypass) a través de una Verificación Insuficiente de la Autenticidad de los Datos en todas las versiones hasta la 2.4.9, inclusive. Aunque `cf7pp_paypal_ipn_handler()` valida correctamente la autenticidad del IPN al enviar una publicación de vuelta a PayPal con `cmd=_notify-validate`, no compara los campos `mc_gross` (importe del pago), `mc_currency` o `receiver_email` del payload del IPN con los valores de pedido almacenados correspondientes antes de pasar el campo `invoice` controlado por el atacante directamente a `cf7pp_complete_payment()`, el cual marca el pedido como completado después de solo una conversión a entero sin verificación de importe. Esto hace posible que atacantes no autenticados marquen pedidos pendientes arbitrarios de alto valor como totalmente pagados al realizar un pago real mínimo de PayPal y elaborar un IPN cuyo parámetro `invoice` haga referencia al pedido objetivo, completando efectivamente las compras sin abonar el importe de pago requerido.
[{"vendor":"scottpaterson","product":"Contact Form 7 – PayPal & Stripe Add-on","defaultStatus":"unaffected","versions":[{"version":"0","lessThanOrEqual":"2.4.9","versionType":"semver","status":"affected"}]}]
New CVE Received from Wordfence5/29/2026 5:16:18 AM
Action
Type
Old Value
New Value
Added
Description
The Contact Form 7 – PayPal & Stripe Add-on plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Payment Bypass via Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity in all versions up to, and including, 2.4.9. Although `cf7pp_paypal_ipn_handler()` correctly validates IPN authenticity by posting back to PayPal with `cmd=_notify-validate`, it fails to compare the IPN payload's `mc_gross` (payment amount), `mc_currency`, or `receiver_email` fields against the corresponding stored order values before passing the attacker-controlled `invoice` field directly to `cf7pp_complete_payment()`, which marks the order completed after only an integer cast with no amount verification. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to mark arbitrary high-value pending orders as fully paid by making a minimal real PayPal payment and crafting an IPN whose `invoice` parameter references the targeted order, effectively completing purchases without tendering the required payment amount.