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Issue Summary: Cryptographic Message Services (CMS) processing fails to perform
sufficient input validation on the cipher and tag length fields of
AuthEnvelopedData containers, leading to various potential compromises.
Impact Summary: Attackers making use of these vulnerabilities may achieve
key-equivalent functionality for a given CMS recipient and/or bypass integrity
validation for a given message.
In one use case, an attacker may send a CMS message containing
AuthEnvelopedData with the cipher specified as a non-AEAD cipher. OpenSSL
erroneously allows this selection, and attempts to decrypt and validate the
message.
An on-path attacker who captures one legitimate AES-GCM AuthEnvelopedData
addressed to the victim can re-emit it with the recipientInfos set left
byte-for-byte intact, so the victim's private key still unwraps the genuine CEK
(the content-encryption key), but with the inner OID rewritten to AES-256-OFB
(Output Feedback Mode, an unauthenticated keystream mode) and with an
attacker-chosen IV and ciphertext. The victim initializes AES-256-OFB under the
real CEK, never consults the MAC field, and CMS_decrypt() returns success.
If the application under attack responds to the attacker with any indicator
showing success or failure of the decryption effort, it is possible for the
attacker to use this as an oracle to obtain key equivalent functionality for the
CEK used for the chosen recipient of the message.
In another use case, an attacker can reduce the tag length of the chosen AEAD
cipher for a given AuthEnvelopedData container to be a single byte long,
allowing an attacker to brute force CMS decryption, producing an integrity
bypass for applications that trust CMS_decrypt() to reject modified content.
The FIPS modules are not affected by this issue.
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Title: OpenSSL, Description: Resumen del problema: El procesamiento de los Servicios de Mensajes Criptográficos (CMS) no realiza una validación de entrada suficiente en los campos de cifrado y longitud de etiqueta de los contenedores AuthEnvelopedData, lo que lleva a varias posibles compromisos.
Resumen del impacto: Los atacantes que aprovechan estas vulnerabilidades pueden lograr una funcionalidad equivalente a la clave para un destinatario CMS dado y/o eludir la validación de integridad para un mensaje dado.
En un caso de uso, un atacante puede enviar un mensaje CMS que contiene AuthEnvelopedData con el cifrado especificado como un cifrado no AEAD. OpenSSL permite erróneamente esta selección e intenta descifrar y validar el mensaje.
Un atacante en la ruta que captura un AuthEnvelopedData AES-GCM legítimo dirigido a la víctima puede reemitirlo con el conjunto recipientInfos intacto byte a byte, de modo que la clave privada de la víctima aún desenvuelve la CEK genuina (la clave de cifrado de contenido), pero con el OID interno reescrito a AES-256-OFB (Modo de Retroalimentación de Salida, un modo de flujo de clave no autenticado) y con un IV y texto cifrado elegidos por el atacante. La víctima inicializa AES-256-OFB bajo la CEK real, nunca consulta el campo MAC, y CMS_decrypt() devuelve éxito.
Si la aplicación bajo ataque responde al atacante con cualquier indicador que muestre el éxito o fracaso del esfuerzo de descifrado, es posible que el atacante use esto como un oráculo para obtener una funcionalidad equivalente a la clave para la CEK utilizada para el destinatario elegido del mensaje.
En otro caso de uso, un atacante puede reducir la longitud de la etiqueta del cifrado AEAD elegido para un contenedor AuthEnvelopedData dado a una longitud de un solo byte, permitiendo a un atacante forzar por fuerza bruta el descifrado CMS, produciendo una elusión de integridad para aplicaciones que confían en que CMS_decrypt() rechace el contenido modificado.
Los módulos FIPS no se ven afectados por este problema.
OR
*cpe:2.3:a:openssl:openssl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 3.0.0 up to (excluding) 3.0.21
*cpe:2.3:a:openssl:openssl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 3.4.0 up to (excluding) 3.4.6
*cpe:2.3:a:openssl:openssl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 3.5.0 up to (excluding) 3.5.7
*cpe:2.3:a:openssl:openssl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 3.6.0 up to (excluding) 3.6.3
*cpe:2.3:a:openssl:openssl:4.0.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
New CVE Received from OpenSSL Software Foundation6/09/2026 1:17:04 PM
Action
Type
Old Value
New Value
Added
Description
Issue Summary: Cryptographic Message Services (CMS) processing fails to perform
sufficient input validation on the cipher and tag length fields of
AuthEnvelopedData containers, leading to various potential compromises.
Impact Summary: Attackers making use of these vulnerabilities may achieve
key-equivalent functionality for a given CMS recipient and/or bypass integrity
validation for a given message.
In one use case, an attacker may send a CMS message containing
AuthEnvelopedData with the cipher specified as a non-AEAD cipher. OpenSSL
erroneously allows this selection, and attempts to decrypt and validate the
message.
An on-path attacker who captures one legitimate AES-GCM AuthEnvelopedData
addressed to the victim can re-emit it with the recipientInfos set left
byte-for-byte intact, so the victim's private key still unwraps the genuine CEK
(the content-encryption key), but with the inner OID rewritten to AES-256-OFB
(Output Feedback Mode, an unauthenticated keystream mode) and with an
attacker-chosen IV and ciphertext. The victim initializes AES-256-OFB under the
real CEK, never consults the MAC field, and CMS_decrypt() returns success.
If the application under attack responds to the attacker with any indicator
showing success or failure of the decryption effort, it is possible for the
attacker to use this as an oracle to obtain key equivalent functionality for the
CEK used for the chosen recipient of the message.
In another use case, an attacker can reduce the tag length of the chosen AEAD
cipher for a given AuthEnvelopedData container to be a single byte long,
allowing an attacker to brute force CMS decryption, producing an integrity
bypass for applications that trust CMS_decrypt() to reject modified content.
The FIPS modules are not affected by this issue.
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