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BentoML is a Python library for building online serving systems optimized for AI apps and model inference. In versions 1.4.38 and prior, the build packaging workflow follows attacker-controlled symlinks inside the build context and copies the referenced file contents into the generated Bento artifact. If a victim builds an untrusted repository or other attacker-supplied build context, the attacker can place a symlink such as loot.txt -> /tmp/outside-marker.txt or a link to a more sensitive local file. When bentoml build runs, BentoML dereferences the symlink and packages the target file contents into the Bento. The leaked file can then propagate further through export, push, or containerization workflows. An attacker can exfiltrate local files from the build host into the Bento artifact, exposing secrets such as cloud credentials, SSH keys, API tokens, environment files, or other sensitive local configurations. Because Bento artifacts are commonly exported, uploaded, stored, or containerized after build, the leaked file contents can spread beyond the original build machine. This issue has been fixed in version 1.4.39.
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Title: BentoML de bentoml, Description: BentoML es una biblioteca de Python para construir sistemas de servicio en línea optimizados para aplicaciones de IA e inferencia de modelos. En las versiones 1.4.38 y anteriores, el flujo de trabajo de empaquetado de compilación sigue enlaces simbólicos controlados por el atacante dentro del contexto de compilación y copia el contenido del archivo referenciado en el artefacto Bento generado. Si una víctima compila un repositorio no confiable o cualquier otro contexto de compilación suministrado por el atacante, el atacante puede colocar un enlace simbólico como loot.txt -> /tmp/outside-marker.txt o un enlace a un archivo local más sensible. Cuando se ejecuta bentoml build, BentoML desreferencia el enlace simbólico y empaqueta el contenido del archivo de destino en el Bento. El archivo filtrado puede propagarse aún más a través de flujos de trabajo de exportación, envío (push) o contenerización. Un atacante puede exfiltrar archivos locales del host de compilación al artefacto Bento, exponiendo secretos como credenciales de la nube, claves SSH, tokens de API, archivos de entorno u otras configuraciones locales sensibles. Debido a que los artefactos Bento se exportan, cargan, almacenan o contenerizan comúnmente después de la compilación, el contenido del archivo filtrado puede propagarse más allá de la máquina de compilación original. Este problema ha sido solucionado en la versión 1.4.39.
New CVE Received from GitHub, Inc.5/22/2026 4:16:34 PM
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Description
BentoML is a Python library for building online serving systems optimized for AI apps and model inference. In versions 1.4.38 and prior, the build packaging workflow follows attacker-controlled symlinks inside the build context and copies the referenced file contents into the generated Bento artifact. If a victim builds an untrusted repository or other attacker-supplied build context, the attacker can place a symlink such as loot.txt -> /tmp/outside-marker.txt or a link to a more sensitive local file. When bentoml build runs, BentoML dereferences the symlink and packages the target file contents into the Bento. The leaked file can then propagate further through export, push, or containerization workflows. An attacker can exfiltrate local files from the build host into the Bento artifact, exposing secrets such as cloud credentials, SSH keys, API tokens, environment files, or other sensitive local configurations. Because Bento artifacts are commonly exported, uploaded, stored, or containerized after build, the leaked file contents can spread beyond the original build machine. This issue has been fixed in version 1.4.39.