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Known Affected Software Configurations Switch to CPE 2.2

Change History

AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

OR
          *cpe:2.3:a:zfnd:zebra-consensus:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:* versions up to (excluding) 5.0.2
          *cpe:2.3:a:zfnd:zebrad:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:* versions up to (excluding) 4.3.1

GitHub, Inc.: https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-xvj8-ph7x-65gf Types: Vendor Advisory

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.2, a logic error in Zebra's transaction verification cache could allow a malicious miner to induce a consensus split. By carefully submitting a transaction that is valid for height H+1 but invalid for H+2 and then mining that transaction in a block at height H+2, a miner could cause vulnerable Zebra nodes to accept an invalid block, leading to a consensus split from the rest of the Zcash network. This vulnerability is fixed in zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.2.

AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CWE-1025

https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-xvj8-ph7x-65gf