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Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') vulnerability in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Response Splitting. The hackney_cookie:setcookie/3 function in src/hackney_cookie.erl validates the Name and Value arguments against CRLF and control characters, but concatenates the domain and path options verbatim into the output iolist with no equivalent check. An attacker who controls either option — for example by supplying a Host header value forwarded as the cookie domain, or a request path forwarded as the cookie path — can inject a literal CRLF sequence and arbitrary additional Set-Cookie headers into the HTTP response.
This issue affects hackney: from 0.9.0 before 4.0.1.
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Title: hackney de benoitc, Description: La vulnerabilidad de Neutralización Incorrecta de Secuencias CRLF ('Inyección CRLF') en benoitc hackney permite la División de Respuesta HTTP. La función hackney_cookie:setcookie/3 en src/hackney_cookie.erl valida los argumentos Name y Value contra CRLF y caracteres de control, pero concatena las opciones de dominio y ruta textualmente en la iolist de salida sin una verificación equivalente. Un atacante que controla cualquiera de las opciones - por ejemplo, al proporcionar un valor de encabezado Host reenviado como el dominio de la cookie, o una ruta de solicitud reenviada como la ruta de la cookie - puede inyectar una secuencia CRLF literal y encabezados Set-Cookie adicionales arbitrarios en la respuesta HTTP.
Este problema afecta a hackney: desde 0.9.0 antes de 4.0.1.
Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') vulnerability in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Response Splitting. The hackney_cookie:setcookie/3 function in src/hackney_cookie.erl validates the Name and Value arguments against CRLF and control characters, but concatenates the domain and path options verbatim into the output iolist with no equivalent check. An attacker who controls either option — for example by supplying a Host header value forwarded as the cookie domain, or a request path forwarded as the cookie path — can inject a literal CRLF sequence and arbitrary additional Set-Cookie headers into the HTTP response.
This issue affects hackney: from 0.9.0 before 4.0.1.
) or https:// means you've safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.
