The Datadog Android application stores operationally sensitive content in plaintext SQLite databases via Room. Two databases were reviewed: LocalNotificationDatabase (table local_notifications, columns including title, message, recipient, service, tags, and on-call/incident deeplinks) and SearchRecentDatabase (table search_recents, storing every in-app search query the user typed).
A repository-wide search for SQLCipher, SupportFactory, openHelperFactory, or any Room encryption configuration returns no matches. Databases are stored as cleartext SQLite files in /data/data/com.datadog.app/databases/. At-rest protection therefore depends solely on the Android application sandbox — the standard Android baseline, adequate for many applications but flagged here as a hardening recommendation because the stored content is operationally sensitive (customer infrastructure monitoring metadata, incident notification recipients, and free-text search queries that may reveal service names, dashboards, and queries of interest).
Exploitation paths include rooted or jailbroken devices, adb backup if android:allowBackup is misconfigured for any build flavor, physical-device handover scenarios, and forensic acquisition.

In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v554-5.9.4, two Room-backed SQLite databases store sensitive content in plaintext: LocalNotificationDatabase (notification title, message, recipient, service, tags, and on-call/incident deep links) and SearchRecentDatabase (the user's full in-app search history). 
Impact: Any actor able to bypass the app sandbox can read these databases in plaintext.

AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

{"timestamp":"2026-08-07T18:28:11.214660Z","id":"CVE-2026-47362","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}

The Datadog Android application stores operationally sensitive content in plaintext SQLite databases via Room. Two databases were reviewed: LocalNotificationDatabase (table local_notifications, columns including title, message, recipient, service, tags, and on-call/incident deeplinks) and SearchRecentDatabase (table search_recents, storing every in-app search query the user typed).
A repository-wide search for SQLCipher, SupportFactory, openHelperFactory, or any Room encryption configuration returns no matches. Databases are stored as cleartext SQLite files in /data/data/com.datadog.app/databases/. At-rest protection therefore depends solely on the Android application sandbox — the standard Android baseline, adequate for many applications but flagged here as a hardening recommendation because the stored content is operationally sensitive (customer infrastructure monitoring metadata, incident notification recipients, and free-text search queries that may reveal service names, dashboards, and queries of interest).
Exploitation paths include rooted or jailbroken devices, adb backup if android:allowBackup is misconfigured for any build flavor, physical-device handover scenarios, and forensic acquisition.

CWE-922

https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/922.html

https://trust.datadoghq.com/?tcuUid=2e8b8fa5-39ca-43f4-9f6a-aeafafb440ef

https://www.zetetic.net/sqlcipher/sqlcipher-for-android/

[{"vendor":"Datadog","product":"Android App","defaultStatus":"unaffected","versions":[{"version":"5.9.4","lessThan":"5.9.4","versionType":"semver","status":"affected"}]}]