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Description
Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') vulnerability in elixir-mint Mint allows HTTP Request Splitting and HTTP Request Smuggling.
In lib/mint/http1/request.ex, the encode_request_line/2 function splices the caller-supplied method and target arguments directly into the HTTP/1 request line without any character validation: [method, ?\s, target, " HTTP/1.1\r\n"]. An application that forwards attacker-controlled input as the HTTP method or target to Mint.HTTP.request/5 is therefore exposed to request-line CRLF injection: the attacker can terminate the request line early, inject arbitrary headers, and smuggle an entirely separate pipelined HTTP request onto the same TCP connection.
Mint 1.7.0 introduced validate_request_target/2, which rejects CRLF and other control characters in the target by default and closes the path/query vector unless the caller opts out via skip_target_validation: true. The method field remains unvalidated, so the method-based injection is exploitable under the default Mint configuration on all versions.
This issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.9.0.
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Title: mint de elixir-mint, Description: Neutralización incorrecta de secuencias CRLF ('Inyección CRLF') vulnerabilidad en elixir-mint Mint permite la división de solicitudes HTTP (HTTP Request Splitting) y el contrabando de solicitudes HTTP (HTTP Request Smuggling).
En lib/mint/http1/request.ex, la función encode_request_line/2 inserta los argumentos de método y objetivo proporcionados por el llamador directamente en la línea de solicitud HTTP/1 sin ninguna validación de caracteres: [method, ?\s, target, " HTTP/1.1\r\n"]. Una aplicación que reenvía entrada controlada por el atacante como el método HTTP o el objetivo a Mint.HTTP.request/5 está, por lo tanto, expuesta a la inyección CRLF en la línea de solicitud: el atacante puede terminar la línea de solicitud prematuramente, inyectar encabezados arbitrarios y contrabandear una solicitud HTTP canalizada (pipelined) completamente separada en la misma conexión TCP.
Mint 1.7.0 introdujo validate_request_target/2, que rechaza CRLF y otros caracteres de control en el objetivo por defecto y cierra el vector de ruta/consulta a menos que el llamador opte por no hacerlo a través de skip_target_validation: true. El campo del método permanece sin validar, por lo que la inyección basada en el método es explotable bajo la configuración predeterminada de Mint en todas las versiones.
Este problema afecta a mint: desde 0.1.0 antes de 1.9.0.
Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') vulnerability in elixir-mint Mint allows HTTP Request Splitting and HTTP Request Smuggling.
In lib/mint/http1/request.ex, the encode_request_line/2 function splices the caller-supplied method and target arguments directly into the HTTP/1 request line without any character validation: [method, ?\s, target, " HTTP/1.1\r\n"]. An application that forwards attacker-controlled input as the HTTP method or target to Mint.HTTP.request/5 is therefore exposed to request-line CRLF injection: the attacker can terminate the request line early, inject arbitrary headers, and smuggle an entirely separate pipelined HTTP request onto the same TCP connection.
Mint 1.7.0 introduced validate_request_target/2, which rejects CRLF and other control characters in the target by default and closes the path/query vector unless the caller opts out via skip_target_validation: true. The method field remains unvalidated, so the method-based injection is exploitable under the default Mint configuration on all versions.
This issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.9.0.
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