Title: Docker Desktop de Docker, Description: La bandera '--use-api-socket' de Docker CLI elude las restricciones de Aislamiento Mejorado de Contenedores (ECI) en Docker Desktop. Cuando ECI está habilitado, los montajes de sockets de Docker desde los contenedores son denegados a menos que se permitan explícitamente a través de la configuración de  admin-settings . Sin embargo, la bandera '--use-api-socket' añade el montaje del socket de Docker a través del campo 'HostConfig.Mounts' en lugar del campo 'HostConfig.Binds'. La aplicación de ECI en el proxy de la API de Docker Desktop solo inspeccionaba  Binds , permitiendo que el montaje pasara sin ser verificado. Esto otorga a un contenedor acceso completo al socket del Docker Engine y, si el usuario del host ha iniciado sesión en registros de contenedores, sus credenciales de autenticación.

Un atacante local con la capacidad de ejecutar comandos de Docker CLI puede explotar esto para evadir las restricciones de ECI, acceder al Docker Engine y potencialmente escalar privilegios.

{"timestamp":"2026-05-22T00:00:00+00:00","id":"CVE-2026-6406","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"total"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}

[{"vendor":"Docker","product":"Docker Desktop","defaultStatus":"unaffected","platforms":["MacOS","Linux","Windows"],"versions":[{"version":"4.41.0","lessThan":"4.59.0","versionType":"semver","status":"affected"}]}]

AND
     OR
          *cpe:2.3:a:docker:docker_desktop:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 4.41.0 up to (excluding) 4.59.0
     OR
          cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
          cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
          cpe:2.3:o:apple:macos:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

Docker Inc.: https://docs.docker.com/desktop/release-notes/#4590 Types: Release Notes

Docker Inc.: https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-26-299/ Types: Third Party Advisory

The Docker CLI --use-api-socket flag bypasses Enhanced Container Isolation (ECI) restrictions in Docker Desktop. When ECI is enabled, Docker socket mounts from containers are denied unless explicitly allowed via the admin-settings configuration. However, the --use-api-socket flag adds the Docker socket mount via the HostConfig.Mounts field rather than the HostConfig.Binds field. The ECI enforcement in the Docker Desktop API proxy only inspected Binds, allowing the mount to pass unchecked. This grants a container full access to the Docker Engine socket and, if the host user has logged in to container registries, their authentication credentials.

A local attacker with the ability to run Docker CLI commands can exploit this to escape ECI restrictions, access the Docker Engine, and potentially escalate privileges.

AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

CWE-863

https://docs.docker.com/desktop/release-notes/#4590

https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-26-299/