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  • CPE Product Version: cpe:/a:digium:certified_asterisk:11.3.0:rc1
There are 2 matching records.
Displaying matches 1 through 2.
Vuln ID Summary CVSS Severity
CVE-2019-13161

An issue was discovered in Asterisk Open Source through 13.27.0, 14.x and 15.x through 15.7.2, and 16.x through 16.4.0, and Certified Asterisk through 13.21-cert3. A pointer dereference in chan_sip while handling SDP negotiation allows an attacker to crash Asterisk when handling an SDP answer to an outgoing T.38 re-invite. To exploit this vulnerability an attacker must cause the chan_sip module to send a T.38 re-invite request to them. Upon receipt, the attacker must send an SDP answer containing both a T.38 UDPTL stream and another media stream containing only a codec (which is not permitted according to the chan_sip configuration).

Published: July 12, 2019; 4:15:11 PM -0400
V3.1: 5.3 MEDIUM
V2.0: 3.5 LOW
CVE-2016-9938

An issue was discovered in Asterisk Open Source 11.x before 11.25.1, 13.x before 13.13.1, and 14.x before 14.2.1 and Certified Asterisk 11.x before 11.6-cert16 and 13.x before 13.8-cert4. The chan_sip channel driver has a liberal definition for whitespace when attempting to strip the content between a SIP header name and a colon character. Rather than following RFC 3261 and stripping only spaces and horizontal tabs, Asterisk treats any non-printable ASCII character as if it were whitespace. This means that headers such as Contact\x01: will be seen as a valid Contact header. This mostly does not pose a problem until Asterisk is placed in tandem with an authenticating SIP proxy. In such a case, a crafty combination of valid and invalid To headers can cause a proxy to allow an INVITE request into Asterisk without authentication since it believes the request is an in-dialog request. However, because of the bug described above, the request will look like an out-of-dialog request to Asterisk. Asterisk will then process the request as a new call. The result is that Asterisk can process calls from unvetted sources without any authentication. If you do not use a proxy for authentication, then this issue does not affect you. If your proxy is dialog-aware (meaning that the proxy keeps track of what dialogs are currently valid), then this issue does not affect you. If you use chan_pjsip instead of chan_sip, then this issue does not affect you.

Published: December 12, 2016; 4:59:01 PM -0500
V3.0: 5.3 MEDIUM
V2.0: 5.0 MEDIUM