The decode_init function in libavcodec/utvideodec.c in FFmpeg through 3.4.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out of array read) via an AVI file.

The export function in libavfilter/vf_signature.c in FFmpeg through 3.4.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a long filename.

The decode_init function in libavcodec/utvideodec.c in FFmpeg 2.8 through 3.4.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (Out of array read) via an AVI file with crafted dimensions within chroma subsampling data.

The decode_plane function in libavcodec/utvideodec.c in FFmpeg through 3.4.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out of array read) via a crafted AVI file.

The filter_slice function in libavfilter/vf_transpose.c in FFmpeg through 3.4.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-array access) via a crafted MP4 file.

The read_header function in libavcodec/ffv1dec.c in FFmpeg 2.4 and 3.3.4 and possibly earlier allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via a crafted MP4 file, which triggers an out-of-bounds read.

Double free vulnerability in FFmpeg 3.3.4 and earlier allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted AVI file.

The sdp_parse_fmtp_config_h264 function in libavformat/rtpdec_h264.c in FFmpeg before 3.3.4 mishandles empty sprop-parameter-sets values, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted sdp file.

The av_color_primaries_name function in libavutil/pixdesc.c in FFmpeg 3.3.3 may return a NULL pointer depending on a value contained in a file, but callers do not anticipate this, as demonstrated by the avcodec_string function in libavcodec/utils.c, leading to a NULL pointer dereference. (It is also conceivable that there is security relevance for a NULL pointer dereference in av_color_primaries_name calls within the ffprobe command-line program.)

In libavformat/asfdec_f.c in FFmpeg 3.3.3, a DoS in asf_build_simple_index() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU consumption. When a crafted ASF file, which claims a large "ict" field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the for loop would consume huge CPU and memory resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop.

In libavformat/mov.c in FFmpeg 3.3.3, a DoS in read_tfra() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU and memory consumption. When a crafted MOV file, which claims a large "item_count" field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the loop would consume huge CPU and memory resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop.

In libavformat/nsvdec.c in FFmpeg 2.4 and 3.3.3, a DoS in nsv_parse_NSVf_header() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU consumption. When a crafted NSV file, which claims a large "table_entries_used" field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the loop over 'table_entries_used' would consume huge CPU resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop.

In libavformat/mxfdec.c in FFmpeg 3.3.3 -> 2.4, a DoS in mxf_read_index_entry_array() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU consumption. When a crafted MXF file, which claims a large "nb_index_entries" field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the loop would consume huge CPU resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop. Moreover, this big loop can be invoked multiple times if there is more than one applicable data segment in the crafted MXF file.

In the mxf_read_primer_pack function in libavformat/mxfdec.c in FFmpeg 3.3.3 -> 2.4, an integer signedness error might occur when a crafted file, which claims a large "item_num" field such as 0xffffffff, is provided. As a result, the variable "item_num" turns negative, bypassing the check for a large value.

In FFmpeg 3.3.3, a DoS in cine_read_header() due to lack of an EOF check might cause huge CPU and memory consumption. When a crafted CINE file, which claims a large "duration" field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the image-offset parsing loop would consume huge CPU and memory resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop.

In FFmpeg 2.4 and 3.3.3, the read_data function in libavformat/hls.c does not restrict reload attempts for an insufficient list, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop).

In FFmpeg 3.3.3, a DoS in asf_read_marker() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU and memory consumption. When a crafted ASF file, which claims a large "name_len" or "count" field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the loops over the name and markers would consume huge CPU and memory resources, since there is no EOF check inside these loops.

In libavformat/rl2.c in FFmpeg 3.3.3, a DoS in rl2_read_header() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU and memory consumption. When a crafted RL2 file, which claims a large "frame_count" field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the loops (for offset and size tables) would consume huge CPU and memory resources, since there is no EOF check inside these loops.

In libavformat/mvdec.c in FFmpeg 3.3.3, a DoS in mv_read_header() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU and memory consumption. When a crafted MV file, which claims a large "nb_frames" field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the loop over the frames would consume huge CPU and memory resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop.

In libavformat/rmdec.c in FFmpeg 3.3.3, a DoS in ivr_read_header() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU consumption. When a crafted IVR file, which claims a large "len" field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the first type==4 loop would consume huge CPU resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop.