In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: rfcomm: Fix null-ptr-deref in rfcomm_check_security During our fuzz testing of the connection and disconnection process at the RFCOMM layer, we discovered this bug. By comparing the packets from a normal connection and disconnection process with the testcase that triggered a KASAN report. We analyzed the cause of this bug as follows: 1. In the packets captured during a normal connection, the host sends a `Read Encryption Key Size` type of `HCI_CMD` packet (Command Opcode: 0x1408) to the controller to inquire the length of encryption key.After receiving this packet, the controller immediately replies with a Command Completepacket (Event Code: 0x0e) to return the Encryption Key Size. 2. In our fuzz test case, the timing of the controller's response to this packet was delayed to an unexpected point: after the RFCOMM and L2CAP layers had disconnected but before the HCI layer had disconnected. 3. After receiving the Encryption Key Size Response at the time described in point 2, the host still called the rfcomm_check_security function. However, by this time `struct l2cap_conn *conn = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan->conn;` had already been released, and when the function executed `return hci_conn_security(conn->hcon, d->sec_level, auth_type, d->out);`, specifically when accessing `conn->hcon`, a null-ptr-deref error occurred. To fix this bug, check if `sk->sk_state` is BT_CLOSED before calling rfcomm_recv_frame in rfcomm_process_rx.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btrtl: fix out of bounds memory access The problem is detected by KASAN. btrtl driver uses private hci data to store 'struct btrealtek_data'. If btrtl driver is used with btusb, then memory for private hci data is allocated in btusb. But no private data is allocated after hci_dev, when btrtl is used with hci_h5. This commit adds memory allocation for hci_h5 case. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in btrtl_initialize+0x6cc/0x958 [btrtl] Write of size 8 at addr ffff00000f5a5748 by task kworker/u9:0/76 Hardware name: Pine64 PinePhone (1.2) (DT) Workqueue: hci0 hci_power_on [bluetooth] Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x9c/0x128 show_stack+0x20/0x38 dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x60 print_report+0xf8/0x5d8 kasan_report+0x90/0xd0 __asan_store8+0x9c/0xc0 [btrtl] h5_btrtl_setup+0xd0/0x2f8 [hci_uart] h5_setup+0x50/0x80 [hci_uart] hci_uart_setup+0xd4/0x260 [hci_uart] hci_dev_open_sync+0x1cc/0xf68 [bluetooth] hci_dev_do_open+0x34/0x90 [bluetooth] hci_power_on+0xc4/0x3c8 [bluetooth] process_one_work+0x328/0x6f0 worker_thread+0x410/0x778 kthread+0x168/0x178 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Allocated by task 53: kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x68 kasan_save_track+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x68/0x78 __kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0xd8 __kmalloc+0x1b4/0x3b0 hci_alloc_dev_priv+0x28/0xa58 [bluetooth] hci_uart_register_device+0x118/0x4f8 [hci_uart] h5_serdev_probe+0xf4/0x178 [hci_uart] serdev_drv_probe+0x54/0xa0 really_probe+0x254/0x588 __driver_probe_device+0xc4/0x210 driver_probe_device+0x64/0x160 __driver_attach_async_helper+0x88/0x158 async_run_entry_fn+0xd0/0x388 process_one_work+0x328/0x6f0 worker_thread+0x410/0x778 kthread+0x168/0x178 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x68 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb0/0x150 kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc+0x14/0x20 __queue_work+0x33c/0x960 queue_work_on+0x98/0xc0 hci_recv_frame+0xc8/0x1e8 [bluetooth] h5_complete_rx_pkt+0x2c8/0x800 [hci_uart] h5_rx_payload+0x98/0xb8 [hci_uart] h5_recv+0x158/0x3d8 [hci_uart] hci_uart_receive_buf+0xa0/0xe8 [hci_uart] ttyport_receive_buf+0xac/0x178 flush_to_ldisc+0x130/0x2c8 process_one_work+0x328/0x6f0 worker_thread+0x410/0x778 kthread+0x168/0x178 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Second to last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x68 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb0/0x150 kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc+0x14/0x20 __queue_work+0x788/0x960 queue_work_on+0x98/0xc0 __hci_cmd_sync_sk+0x23c/0x7a0 [bluetooth] __hci_cmd_sync+0x24/0x38 [bluetooth] btrtl_initialize+0x760/0x958 [btrtl] h5_btrtl_setup+0xd0/0x2f8 [hci_uart] h5_setup+0x50/0x80 [hci_uart] hci_uart_setup+0xd4/0x260 [hci_uart] hci_dev_open_sync+0x1cc/0xf68 [bluetooth] hci_dev_do_open+0x34/0x90 [bluetooth] hci_power_on+0xc4/0x3c8 [bluetooth] process_one_work+0x328/0x6f0 worker_thread+0x410/0x778 kthread+0x168/0x178 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 ==================================================================

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix possible buffer overflow struct hci_dev_info has a fixed size name[8] field so in the event that hdev->name is bigger than that strcpy would attempt to write past its size, so this fixes this problem by switching to use strscpy.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: msft: Fix memory leak Fix leaking buffer allocated to send MSFT_OP_LE_MONITOR_ADVERTISEMENT.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btusb: Fix memory leak This checks if CONFIG_DEV_COREDUMP is enabled before attempting to clone the skb and also make sure btmtk_process_coredump frees the skb passed following the same logic.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: af_bluetooth: Fix deadlock Attemting to do sock_lock on .recvmsg may cause a deadlock as shown bellow, so instead of using sock_sock this uses sk_receive_queue.lock on bt_sock_ioctl to avoid the UAF: INFO: task kworker/u9:1:121 blocked for more than 30 seconds. Not tainted 6.7.6-lemon #183 Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work Call Trace: <TASK> __schedule+0x37d/0xa00 schedule+0x32/0xe0 __lock_sock+0x68/0xa0 ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10 lock_sock_nested+0x43/0x50 l2cap_sock_recv_cb+0x21/0xa0 l2cap_recv_frame+0x55b/0x30a0 ? psi_task_switch+0xeb/0x270 ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x93/0x2a0 hci_rx_work+0x33a/0x3f0 process_one_work+0x13a/0x2f0 worker_thread+0x2f0/0x410 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xe0/0x110 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK>

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: b43: Stop/wake correct queue in DMA Tx path when QoS is disabled When QoS is disabled, the queue priority value will not map to the correct ieee80211 queue since there is only one queue. Stop/wake queue 0 when QoS is disabled to prevent trying to stop/wake a non-existent queue and failing to stop/wake the actual queue instantiated. Log of issue before change (with kernel parameter qos=0): [ +5.112651] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ +0.000005] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 25513 at net/mac80211/util.c:449 __ieee80211_wake_queue+0xd5/0x180 [mac80211] [ +0.000067] Modules linked in: b43(O) snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer snd_seq snd_seq_device nft_chain_nat xt_MASQUERADE nf_nat xfrm_user xfrm_algo xt_addrtype overlay ccm af_packet amdgpu snd_hda_codec_cirrus snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio drm_exec amdxcp gpu_sched xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip6t_rpfilter ipt_rpfilter xt_pkttype xt_LOG nf_log_syslog xt_tcpudp nft_compat nf_tables nfnetlink sch_fq_codel btusb uinput iTCO_wdt ctr btrtl intel_pmc_bxt i915 intel_rapl_msr mei_hdcp mei_pxp joydev at24 watchdog btintel atkbd libps2 serio radeon btbcm vivaldi_fmap btmtk intel_rapl_common snd_hda_codec_hdmi bluetooth uvcvideo nls_iso8859_1 applesmc nls_cp437 x86_pkg_temp_thermal snd_hda_intel intel_powerclamp vfat videobuf2_vmalloc coretemp fat snd_intel_dspcfg crc32_pclmul uvc polyval_clmulni snd_intel_sdw_acpi loop videobuf2_memops snd_hda_codec tun drm_suballoc_helper polyval_generic drm_ttm_helper drm_buddy tap ecdh_generic videobuf2_v4l2 gf128mul macvlan ttm ghash_clmulni_intel ecc tg3 [ +0.000044] videodev bridge snd_hda_core rapl crc16 drm_display_helper cec mousedev snd_hwdep evdev intel_cstate bcm5974 hid_appleir videobuf2_common stp mac_hid libphy snd_pcm drm_kms_helper acpi_als mei_me intel_uncore llc mc snd_timer intel_gtt industrialio_triggered_buffer apple_mfi_fastcharge i2c_i801 mei snd lpc_ich agpgart ptp i2c_smbus thunderbolt apple_gmux i2c_algo_bit kfifo_buf video industrialio soundcore pps_core wmi tiny_power_button sbs sbshc button ac cordic bcma mac80211 cfg80211 ssb rfkill libarc4 kvm_intel kvm drm irqbypass fuse backlight firmware_class efi_pstore configfs efivarfs dmi_sysfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 dm_crypt cbc encrypted_keys trusted asn1_encoder tee tpm rng_core input_leds hid_apple led_class hid_generic usbhid hid sd_mod t10_pi crc64_rocksoft crc64 crc_t10dif crct10dif_generic ahci libahci libata uhci_hcd ehci_pci ehci_hcd crct10dif_pclmul crct10dif_common sha512_ssse3 sha512_generic sha256_ssse3 sha1_ssse3 aesni_intel usbcore scsi_mod libaes crypto_simd cryptd scsi_common [ +0.000055] usb_common rtc_cmos btrfs blake2b_generic libcrc32c crc32c_generic crc32c_intel xor raid6_pq dm_snapshot dm_bufio dm_mod dax [last unloaded: b43(O)] [ +0.000009] CPU: 7 PID: 25513 Comm: irq/17-b43 Tainted: G W O 6.6.7 #1-NixOS [ +0.000003] Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookPro8,3/Mac-942459F5819B171B, BIOS 87.0.0.0.0 06/13/2019 [ +0.000001] RIP: 0010:__ieee80211_wake_queue+0xd5/0x180 [mac80211] [ +0.000046] Code: 00 45 85 e4 0f 85 9b 00 00 00 48 8d bd 40 09 00 00 f0 48 0f ba ad 48 09 00 00 00 72 0f 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 cb 6d 3c d0 <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e c3 cc cc cc cc 48 8d b4 16 94 00 00 [ +0.000002] RSP: 0018:ffffc90003c77d60 EFLAGS: 00010097 [ +0.000001] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ +0.000001] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffff88820b924900 [ +0.000002] RBP: ffff88820b924900 R08: ffffc90003c77d90 R09: 000000000003bfd0 [ +0.000001] R10: ffff88820b924900 R11: ffffc90003c77c68 R12: 0000000000000000 [ +0.000001] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc90003c77d90 R15: ffffffffc0fa6f40 [ +0.000001] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88846fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ +0.000001] CS: 0010 DS: 0 ---truncated---

Permission control vulnerability in the Bluetooth module. Impact: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect service confidentiality.

Path traversal vulnerability in the Bluetooth-based sharing module. Impact: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect service confidentiality.

Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in Apache NimBLE.  Specially crafted GATT operation can cause infinite loop in GATT server leading to denial of service in Bluetooth stack or device. This issue affects Apache NimBLE: through 1.6.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.7.0, which fixes the issue.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: Avoid potential use-after-free in hci_error_reset While handling the HCI_EV_HARDWARE_ERROR event, if the underlying BT controller is not responding, the GPIO reset mechanism would free the hci_dev and lead to a use-after-free in hci_error_reset. Here's the call trace observed on a ChromeOS device with Intel AX201: queue_work_on+0x3e/0x6c __hci_cmd_sync_sk+0x2ee/0x4c0 [bluetooth <HASH:3b4a6>] ? init_wait_entry+0x31/0x31 __hci_cmd_sync+0x16/0x20 [bluetooth <HASH:3b4a 6>] hci_error_reset+0x4f/0xa4 [bluetooth <HASH:3b4a 6>] process_one_work+0x1d8/0x33f worker_thread+0x21b/0x373 kthread+0x13a/0x152 ? pr_cont_work+0x54/0x54 ? kthread_blkcg+0x31/0x31 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 This patch holds the reference count on the hci_dev while processing a HCI_EV_HARDWARE_ERROR event to avoid potential crash.

Sciener locks' firmware update mechanism do not authenticate or validate firmware updates if passed to the lock through the Bluetooth Low Energy service. A challenge request can be sent to the lock with a command to prepare for an update, rather than an unlock request, allowing an attacker to compromise the device.

Some Sciener-based locks support plaintext message processing over Bluetooth Low Energy, allowing unencrypted malicious commands to be passed to the lock. These malicious commands, less then 16 bytes in length, will be processed by the lock as if they were encrypted communications. This can be further exploited by an attacker to compromise the lock's integrity.

In sendHciCommand of bluetooth_hci.cc, there is a possible out of bounds read due to a heap buffer overflow. This could lead to local information disclosure with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.

An access issue was addressed with improved access restrictions. This issue is fixed in tvOS 17.4, iOS 17.4 and iPadOS 17.4, macOS Sonoma 14.4, watchOS 10.4. An app may be able to access Bluetooth-connected microphones without user permission.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_codec: Fix leaking content of local_codecs The following memory leak can be observed when the controller supports codecs which are stored in local_codecs list but the elements are never freed: unreferenced object 0xffff88800221d840 (size 32): comm "kworker/u3:0", pid 36, jiffies 4294898739 (age 127.060s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): f8 d3 02 03 80 88 ff ff 80 d8 21 02 80 88 ff ff ..........!..... 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<ffffffffb324f557>] __kmalloc+0x47/0x120 [<ffffffffb39ef37d>] hci_codec_list_add.isra.0+0x2d/0x160 [<ffffffffb39ef643>] hci_read_codec_capabilities+0x183/0x270 [<ffffffffb39ef9ab>] hci_read_supported_codecs+0x1bb/0x2d0 [<ffffffffb39f162e>] hci_read_local_codecs_sync+0x3e/0x60 [<ffffffffb39ff1b3>] hci_dev_open_sync+0x943/0x11e0 [<ffffffffb396d55d>] hci_power_on+0x10d/0x3f0 [<ffffffffb30c99b4>] process_one_work+0x404/0x800 [<ffffffffb30ca134>] worker_thread+0x374/0x670 [<ffffffffb30d9108>] kthread+0x188/0x1c0 [<ffffffffb304db6b>] ret_from_fork+0x2b/0x50 [<ffffffffb300206a>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: avoid deadlock between hci_dev->lock and socket lock Commit eab2404ba798 ("Bluetooth: Add BT_PHY socket option") added a dependency between socket lock and hci_dev->lock that could lead to deadlock. It turns out that hci_conn_get_phy() is not in any way relying on hdev being immutable during the runtime of this function, neither does it even look at any of the members of hdev, and as such there is no need to hold that lock. This fixes the lockdep splat below: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.12.0-rc1-00026-g73d464503354 #10 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ bluetoothd/1118 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8f078383c078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_conn_get_phy+0x1c/0x150 [bluetooth] but task is already holding lock: ffff8f07e831d920 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: l2cap_sock_getsockopt+0x8b/0x610 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_sock_nested+0x72/0xa0 l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0x18/0x70 [bluetooth] l2cap_config_rsp+0x27a/0x520 [bluetooth] l2cap_sig_channel+0x658/0x1330 [bluetooth] l2cap_recv_frame+0x1ba/0x310 [bluetooth] hci_rx_work+0x1cc/0x640 [bluetooth] process_one_work+0x244/0x5f0 worker_thread+0x3c/0x380 kthread+0x13e/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 -> #2 (&chan->lock#2/1){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xa3/0xa10 l2cap_chan_connect+0x33a/0x940 [bluetooth] l2cap_sock_connect+0x141/0x2a0 [bluetooth] __sys_connect+0x9b/0xc0 __x64_sys_connect+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #1 (&conn->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xa3/0xa10 l2cap_chan_connect+0x322/0x940 [bluetooth] l2cap_sock_connect+0x141/0x2a0 [bluetooth] __sys_connect+0x9b/0xc0 __x64_sys_connect+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #0 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x147a/0x1a50 lock_acquire+0x277/0x3d0 __mutex_lock+0xa3/0xa10 hci_conn_get_phy+0x1c/0x150 [bluetooth] l2cap_sock_getsockopt+0x5a9/0x610 [bluetooth] __sys_getsockopt+0xcc/0x200 __x64_sys_getsockopt+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &hdev->lock --> &chan->lock#2/1 --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP); lock(&chan->lock#2/1); lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP); lock(&hdev->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by bluetoothd/1118: #0: ffff8f07e831d920 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_L2CAP){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: l2cap_sock_getsockopt+0x8b/0x610 [bluetooth] stack backtrace: CPU: 3 PID: 1118 Comm: bluetoothd Not tainted 5.12.0-rc1-00026-g73d464503354 #10 Hardware name: LENOVO 20K5S22R00/20K5S22R00, BIOS R0IET38W (1.16 ) 05/31/2017 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x7f/0xa1 check_noncircular+0x105/0x120 ? __lock_acquire+0x147a/0x1a50 __lock_acquire+0x147a/0x1a50 lock_acquire+0x277/0x3d0 ? hci_conn_get_phy+0x1c/0x150 [bluetooth] ? __lock_acquire+0x2e1/0x1a50 ? lock_is_held_type+0xb4/0x120 ? hci_conn_get_phy+0x1c/0x150 [bluetooth] __mutex_lock+0xa3/0xa10 ? hci_conn_get_phy+0x1c/0x150 [bluetooth] ? lock_acquire+0x277/0x3d0 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 ? hci_conn_get_phy+0x1c/0x150 [bluetooth] hci_conn_get_phy+0x ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_fs: Clear ffs_eventfd in ffs_data_clear. ffs_data_clear is indirectly called from both ffs_fs_kill_sb and ffs_ep0_release, so it ends up being called twice when userland closes ep0 and then unmounts f_fs. If userland provided an eventfd along with function's USB descriptors, it ends up calling eventfd_ctx_put as many times, causing a refcount underflow. NULL-ify ffs_eventfd to prevent these extraneous eventfd_ctx_put calls. Also, set epfiles to NULL right after de-allocating it, for readability. For completeness, ffs_data_clear actually ends up being called thrice, the last call being before the whole ffs structure gets freed, so when this specific sequence happens there is a second underflow happening (but not being reported): /sys/kernel/debug/tracing# modprobe usb_f_fs /sys/kernel/debug/tracing# echo ffs_data_clear > set_ftrace_filter /sys/kernel/debug/tracing# echo function > current_tracer /sys/kernel/debug/tracing# echo 1 > tracing_on (setup gadget, run and kill function userland process, teardown gadget) /sys/kernel/debug/tracing# echo 0 > tracing_on /sys/kernel/debug/tracing# cat trace smartcard-openp-436 [000] ..... 1946.208786: ffs_data_clear <-ffs_data_closed smartcard-openp-431 [000] ..... 1946.279147: ffs_data_clear <-ffs_data_closed smartcard-openp-431 [000] .n... 1946.905512: ffs_data_clear <-ffs_data_put Warning output corresponding to above trace: [ 1946.284139] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 431 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0x110/0x15c [ 1946.293094] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. [ 1946.298164] Modules linked in: usb_f_ncm(E) u_ether(E) usb_f_fs(E) hci_uart(E) btqca(E) btrtl(E) btbcm(E) btintel(E) bluetooth(E) nls_ascii(E) nls_cp437(E) vfat(E) fat(E) bcm2835_v4l2(CE) bcm2835_mmal_vchiq(CE) videobuf2_vmalloc(E) videobuf2_memops(E) sha512_generic(E) videobuf2_v4l2(E) sha512_arm(E) videobuf2_common(E) videodev(E) cpufreq_dt(E) snd_bcm2835(CE) brcmfmac(E) mc(E) vc4(E) ctr(E) brcmutil(E) snd_soc_core(E) snd_pcm_dmaengine(E) drbg(E) snd_pcm(E) snd_timer(E) snd(E) soundcore(E) drm_kms_helper(E) cec(E) ansi_cprng(E) rc_core(E) syscopyarea(E) raspberrypi_cpufreq(E) sysfillrect(E) sysimgblt(E) cfg80211(E) max17040_battery(OE) raspberrypi_hwmon(E) fb_sys_fops(E) regmap_i2c(E) ecdh_generic(E) rfkill(E) ecc(E) bcm2835_rng(E) rng_core(E) vchiq(CE) leds_gpio(E) libcomposite(E) fuse(E) configfs(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E) autofs4(E) ext4(E) crc16(E) mbcache(E) jbd2(E) crc32c_generic(E) sdhci_iproc(E) sdhci_pltfm(E) sdhci(E) [ 1946.399633] CPU: 0 PID: 431 Comm: smartcard-openp Tainted: G C OE 5.15.0-1-rpi #1 Debian 5.15.3-1 [ 1946.417950] Hardware name: BCM2835 [ 1946.425442] Backtrace: [ 1946.432048] [<c08d60a0>] (dump_backtrace) from [<c08d62ec>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) [ 1946.448226] r7:00000009 r6:0000001c r5:c04a948c r4:c0a64e2c [ 1946.458412] [<c08d62cc>] (show_stack) from [<c08d9ae0>] (dump_stack+0x28/0x30) [ 1946.470380] [<c08d9ab8>] (dump_stack) from [<c0123500>] (__warn+0xe8/0x154) [ 1946.482067] r5:c04a948c r4:c0a71dc8 [ 1946.490184] [<c0123418>] (__warn) from [<c08d6948>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0xa0/0xe4) [ 1946.506758] r7:00000009 r6:0000001c r5:c0a71dc8 r4:c0a71e04 [ 1946.517070] [<c08d68ac>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c04a948c>] (refcount_warn_saturate+0x110/0x15c) [ 1946.535309] r8:c0100224 r7:c0dfcb84 r6:ffffffff r5:c3b84c00 r4:c24a17c0 [ 1946.546708] [<c04a937c>] (refcount_warn_saturate) from [<c0380134>] (eventfd_ctx_put+0x48/0x74) [ 1946.564476] [<c03800ec>] (eventfd_ctx_put) from [<bf5464e8>] (ffs_data_clear+0xd0/0x118 [usb_f_fs]) [ 1946.582664] r5:c3b84c00 r4:c2695b00 [ 1946.590668] [<bf546418>] (ffs_data_clear [usb_f_fs]) from [<bf547cc0>] (ffs_data_closed+0x9c/0x150 [usb_f_fs]) [ 1946.609608] r5:bf54d014 r4:c2695b00 [ 1946.617522] [<bf547c24>] (ffs_data_closed [usb_f_fs]) from [<bf547da0>] (ffs_fs_kill_sb+0x2c/0x30 [usb_f_fs]) [ 1946.636217] r7:c0dfcb ---truncated---

A permissions issue was addressed with additional restrictions. This issue is fixed in macOS Sonoma 14.1. An app may gain unauthorized access to Bluetooth.

The documentation specifies that the BT_GATT_PERM_READ_LESC and BT_GATT_PERM_WRITE_LESC defines for a Bluetooth characteristic: Attribute read/write permission with LE Secure Connection encryption. If set, requires that LE Secure Connections is used for read/write access, however this is only true when it is combined with other permissions, namely BT_GATT_PERM_READ_ENCRYPT/BT_GATT_PERM_READ_AUTHEN (for read) or BT_GATT_PERM_WRITE_ENCRYPT/BT_GATT_PERM_WRITE_AUTHEN (for write), if these additional permissions are not set (even in secure connections only mode) then the stack does not perform any permission checks on these characteristics and they can be freely written/read.