A buffer overflow was discovered in NTFS-3G before 2022.10.3. Crafted metadata in an NTFS image can cause code execution. A local attacker can exploit this if the ntfs-3g binary is setuid root. A physically proximate attacker can exploit this if NTFS-3G software is configured to execute upon attachment of an external storage device.

In libpixman in Pixman before 0.42.2, there is an out-of-bounds write (aka heap-based buffer overflow) in rasterize_edges_8 due to an integer overflow in pixman_sample_floor_y.

A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. This issue is fixed in tvOS 16.1, macOS Ventura 13, watchOS 9.1, Safari 16.1, iOS 16.1 and iPadOS 16. Processing maliciously crafted web content may disclose sensitive user information.

A type confusion issue was addressed with improved memory handling. This issue is fixed in tvOS 16.1, macOS Ventura 13, watchOS 9.1, Safari 16.1, iOS 16.1 and iPadOS 16. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution.

The issue was addressed with improved UI handling. This issue is fixed in tvOS 16.1, macOS Ventura 13, watchOS 9.1, Safari 16.1, iOS 16.1 and iPadOS 16. Visiting a malicious website may lead to user interface spoofing.

phpCAS is an authentication library that allows PHP applications to easily authenticate users via a Central Authentication Service (CAS) server. The phpCAS library uses HTTP headers to determine the service URL used to validate tickets. This allows an attacker to control the host header and use a valid ticket granted for any authorized service in the same SSO realm (CAS server) to authenticate to the service protected by phpCAS. Depending on the settings of the CAS server service registry in worst case this may be any other service URL (if the allowed URLs are configured to "^(https)://.*") or may be strictly limited to known and authorized services in the same SSO federation if proper URL service validation is applied. This vulnerability may allow an attacker to gain access to a victim's account on a vulnerable CASified service without victim's knowledge, when the victim visits attacker's website while being logged in to the same CAS server. phpCAS 1.6.0 is a major version upgrade that starts enforcing service URL discovery validation, because there is unfortunately no 100% safe default config to use in PHP. Starting this version, it is required to pass in an additional service base URL argument when constructing the client class. For more information, please refer to the upgrading doc. This vulnerability only impacts the CAS client that the phpCAS library protects against. The problematic service URL discovery behavior in phpCAS < 1.6.0 will only be disabled, and thus you are not impacted from it, if the phpCAS configuration has the following setup: 1. `phpCAS::setUrl()` is called (a reminder that you have to pass in the full URL of the current page, rather than your service base URL), and 2. `phpCAS::setCallbackURL()` is called, only when the proxy mode is enabled. 3. If your PHP's HTTP header input `X-Forwarded-Host`, `X-Forwarded-Server`, `Host`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`, `X-Forwarded-Protocol` is sanitized before reaching PHP (by a reverse proxy, for example), you will not be impacted by this vulnerability either. If your CAS server service registry is configured to only allow known and trusted service URLs the severity of the vulnerability is reduced substantially in its severity since an attacker must be in control of another authorized service. Otherwise, you should upgrade the library to get the safe service discovery behavior.

Xenstore: Guests can create arbitrary number of nodes via transactions T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] In case a node has been created in a transaction and it is later deleted in the same transaction, the transaction will be terminated with an error. As this error is encountered only when handling the deleted node at transaction finalization, the transaction will have been performed partially and without updating the accounting information. This will enable a malicious guest to create arbitrary number of nodes.

Xenstore: Guests can create arbitrary number of nodes via transactions T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] In case a node has been created in a transaction and it is later deleted in the same transaction, the transaction will be terminated with an error. As this error is encountered only when handling the deleted node at transaction finalization, the transaction will have been performed partially and without updating the accounting information. This will enable a malicious guest to create arbitrary number of nodes.

Oxenstored 32->31 bit integer truncation issues Integers in Ocaml are 63 or 31 bits of signed precision. The Ocaml Xenbus library takes a C uint32_t out of the ring and casts it directly to an Ocaml integer. In 64-bit Ocaml builds this is fine, but in 32-bit builds, it truncates off the most significant bit, and then creates unsigned/signed confusion in the remainder. This in turn can feed a negative value into logic not expecting a negative value, resulting in unexpected exceptions being thrown. The unexpected exception is not handled suitably, creating a busy-loop trying (and failing) to take the bad packet out of the xenstore ring.

Xenstore: Cooperating guests can create arbitrary numbers of nodes T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] Since the fix of XSA-322 any Xenstore node owned by a removed domain will be modified to be owned by Dom0. This will allow two malicious guests working together to create an arbitrary number of Xenstore nodes. This is possible by domain A letting domain B write into domain A's local Xenstore tree. Domain B can then create many nodes and reboot. The nodes created by domain B will now be owned by Dom0. By repeating this process over and over again an arbitrary number of nodes can be created, as Dom0's number of nodes isn't limited by Xenstore quota.

Xenstore: Cooperating guests can create arbitrary numbers of nodes T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] Since the fix of XSA-322 any Xenstore node owned by a removed domain will be modified to be owned by Dom0. This will allow two malicious guests working together to create an arbitrary number of Xenstore nodes. This is possible by domain A letting domain B write into domain A's local Xenstore tree. Domain B can then create many nodes and reboot. The nodes created by domain B will now be owned by Dom0. By repeating this process over and over again an arbitrary number of nodes can be created, as Dom0's number of nodes isn't limited by Xenstore quota.

Xenstore: Guests can crash xenstored via exhausting the stack Xenstored is using recursion for some Xenstore operations (e.g. for deleting a sub-tree of Xenstore nodes). With sufficiently deep nesting levels this can result in stack exhaustion on xenstored, leading to a crash of xenstored.

Xenstore: Guests can get access to Xenstore nodes of deleted domains Access rights of Xenstore nodes are per domid. When a domain is gone, there might be Xenstore nodes left with access rights containing the domid of the removed domain. This is normally no problem, as those access right entries will be corrected when such a node is written later. There is a small time window when a new domain is created, where the access rights of a past domain with the same domid as the new one will be regarded to be still valid, leading to the new domain being able to get access to a node which was meant to be accessible by the removed domain. For this to happen another domain needs to write the node before the newly created domain is being introduced to Xenstore by dom0.

Xenstore: Guests can cause Xenstore to not free temporary memory When working on a request of a guest, xenstored might need to allocate quite large amounts of memory temporarily. This memory is freed only after the request has been finished completely. A request is regarded to be finished only after the guest has read the response message of the request from the ring page. Thus a guest not reading the response can cause xenstored to not free the temporary memory. This can result in memory shortages causing Denial of Service (DoS) of xenstored.

Xenstore: guests can let run xenstored out of memory T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] Malicious guests can cause xenstored to allocate vast amounts of memory, eventually resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) of xenstored. There are multiple ways how guests can cause large memory allocations in xenstored: - - by issuing new requests to xenstored without reading the responses, causing the responses to be buffered in memory - - by causing large number of watch events to be generated via setting up multiple xenstore watches and then e.g. deleting many xenstore nodes below the watched path - - by creating as many nodes as allowed with the maximum allowed size and path length in as many transactions as possible - - by accessing many nodes inside a transaction

Xenstore: guests can let run xenstored out of memory T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] Malicious guests can cause xenstored to allocate vast amounts of memory, eventually resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) of xenstored. There are multiple ways how guests can cause large memory allocations in xenstored: - - by issuing new requests to xenstored without reading the responses, causing the responses to be buffered in memory - - by causing large number of watch events to be generated via setting up multiple xenstore watches and then e.g. deleting many xenstore nodes below the watched path - - by creating as many nodes as allowed with the maximum allowed size and path length in as many transactions as possible - - by accessing many nodes inside a transaction

Xenstore: guests can let run xenstored out of memory T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] Malicious guests can cause xenstored to allocate vast amounts of memory, eventually resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) of xenstored. There are multiple ways how guests can cause large memory allocations in xenstored: - - by issuing new requests to xenstored without reading the responses, causing the responses to be buffered in memory - - by causing large number of watch events to be generated via setting up multiple xenstore watches and then e.g. deleting many xenstore nodes below the watched path - - by creating as many nodes as allowed with the maximum allowed size and path length in as many transactions as possible - - by accessing many nodes inside a transaction

Xenstore: guests can let run xenstored out of memory T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] Malicious guests can cause xenstored to allocate vast amounts of memory, eventually resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) of xenstored. There are multiple ways how guests can cause large memory allocations in xenstored: - - by issuing new requests to xenstored without reading the responses, causing the responses to be buffered in memory - - by causing large number of watch events to be generated via setting up multiple xenstore watches and then e.g. deleting many xenstore nodes below the watched path - - by creating as many nodes as allowed with the maximum allowed size and path length in as many transactions as possible - - by accessing many nodes inside a transaction

Xenstore: guests can let run xenstored out of memory T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] Malicious guests can cause xenstored to allocate vast amounts of memory, eventually resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) of xenstored. There are multiple ways how guests can cause large memory allocations in xenstored: - - by issuing new requests to xenstored without reading the responses, causing the responses to be buffered in memory - - by causing large number of watch events to be generated via setting up multiple xenstore watches and then e.g. deleting many xenstore nodes below the watched path - - by creating as many nodes as allowed with the maximum allowed size and path length in as many transactions as possible - - by accessing many nodes inside a transaction

Xenstore: guests can let run xenstored out of memory T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] Malicious guests can cause xenstored to allocate vast amounts of memory, eventually resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) of xenstored. There are multiple ways how guests can cause large memory allocations in xenstored: - - by issuing new requests to xenstored without reading the responses, causing the responses to be buffered in memory - - by causing large number of watch events to be generated via setting up multiple xenstore watches and then e.g. deleting many xenstore nodes below the watched path - - by creating as many nodes as allowed with the maximum allowed size and path length in as many transactions as possible - - by accessing many nodes inside a transaction