In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/proc: do_task_stat: use sig->stats_lock to gather the threads/children stats lock_task_sighand() can trigger a hard lockup. If NR_CPUS threads call do_task_stat() at the same time and the process has NR_THREADS, it will spin with irqs disabled O(NR_CPUS * NR_THREADS) time. Change do_task_stat() to use sig->stats_lock to gather the statistics outside of ->siglock protected section, in the likely case this code will run lockless.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nilfs2: fix potential bug in end_buffer_async_write According to a syzbot report, end_buffer_async_write(), which handles the completion of block device writes, may detect abnormal condition of the buffer async_write flag and cause a BUG_ON failure when using nilfs2. Nilfs2 itself does not use end_buffer_async_write(). But, the async_write flag is now used as a marker by commit 7f42ec394156 ("nilfs2: fix issue with race condition of competition between segments for dirty blocks") as a means of resolving double list insertion of dirty blocks in nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers() and nilfs_lookup_node_buffers() and the resulting crash. This modification is safe as long as it is used for file data and b-tree node blocks where the page caches are independent. However, it was irrelevant and redundant to also introduce async_write for segment summary and super root blocks that share buffers with the backing device. This led to the possibility that the BUG_ON check in end_buffer_async_write would fail as described above, if independent writebacks of the backing device occurred in parallel. The use of async_write for segment summary buffers has already been removed in a previous change. Fix this issue by removing the manipulation of the async_write flag for the remaining super root block buffer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: vsie: fix race during shadow creation Right now it is possible to see gmap->private being zero in kvm_s390_vsie_gmap_notifier resulting in a crash. This is due to the fact that we add gmap->private == kvm after creation: static int acquire_gmap_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page) { [...] gmap = gmap_shadow(vcpu->arch.gmap, asce, edat); if (IS_ERR(gmap)) return PTR_ERR(gmap); gmap->private = vcpu->kvm; Let children inherit the private field of the parent.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: j1939: prevent deadlock by changing j1939_socks_lock to rwlock The following 3 locks would race against each other, causing the deadlock situation in the Syzbot bug report: - j1939_socks_lock - active_session_list_lock - sk_session_queue_lock A reasonable fix is to change j1939_socks_lock to an rwlock, since in the rare situations where a write lock is required for the linked list that j1939_socks_lock is protecting, the code does not attempt to acquire any more locks. This would break the circular lock dependency, where, for example, the current thread already locks j1939_socks_lock and attempts to acquire sk_session_queue_lock, and at the same time, another thread attempts to acquire j1939_socks_lock while holding sk_session_queue_lock. NOTE: This patch along does not fix the unregister_netdevice bug reported by Syzbot; instead, it solves a deadlock situation to prepare for one or more further patches to actually fix the Syzbot bug, which appears to be a reference counting problem within the j1939 codebase. [mkl: remove unrelated newline change]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: j1939: Fix UAF in j1939_sk_match_filter during setsockopt(SO_J1939_FILTER) Lock jsk->sk to prevent UAF when setsockopt(..., SO_J1939_FILTER, ...) modifies jsk->filters while receiving packets. Following trace was seen on affected system: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012144014 by task j1939/350 CPU: 0 PID: 350 Comm: j1939 Tainted: G W OE 6.5.0-rc5 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: print_report+0xd3/0x620 ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x7d/0x200 ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] kasan_report+0xc2/0x100 ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] __asan_load4+0x84/0xb0 j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] j1939_sk_recv+0x20b/0x320 [can_j1939] ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 ? __pfx_j1939_sk_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] ? j1939_simple_recv+0x69/0x280 [can_j1939] ? j1939_ac_recv+0x5e/0x310 [can_j1939] j1939_can_recv+0x43f/0x580 [can_j1939] ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] ? raw_rcv+0x42/0x3c0 [can_raw] ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] can_rcv_filter+0x11f/0x350 [can] can_receive+0x12f/0x190 [can] ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can] can_rcv+0xdd/0x130 [can] ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x13d/0x150 ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8c/0xe0 __netif_receive_skb+0x23/0xb0 process_backlog+0x107/0x260 __napi_poll+0x69/0x310 net_rx_action+0x2a1/0x580 ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? handle_irq_event+0x7d/0xa0 __do_softirq+0xf3/0x3f8 do_softirq+0x53/0x80 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x6e/0x70 netif_rx+0x16b/0x180 can_send+0x32b/0x520 [can] ? __pfx_can_send+0x10/0x10 [can] ? __check_object_size+0x299/0x410 raw_sendmsg+0x572/0x6d0 [can_raw] ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw] ? apparmor_socket_sendmsg+0x2f/0x40 ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw] sock_sendmsg+0xef/0x100 sock_write_iter+0x162/0x220 ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10 ? __rtnl_unlock+0x47/0x80 ? security_file_permission+0x54/0x320 vfs_write+0x6ba/0x750 ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10 ? __fget_light+0x1ca/0x1f0 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280 ksys_write+0x143/0x170 ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x62/0x70 __x64_sys_write+0x47/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90 ? irqentry_exit+0x3f/0x50 ? exc_page_fault+0x79/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Allocated by task 348: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xb5/0xc0 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x67/0x160 j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x284/0x450 [can_j1939] __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Freed by task 349: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x2f/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x1c0 __kmem_cache_free+0x1b9/0x380 kfree+0x7a/0x120 j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x3b2/0x450 [can_j1939] __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: stmmac: xgmac: fix handling of DPP safety error for DMA channels Commit 56e58d6c8a56 ("net: stmmac: Implement Safety Features in XGMAC core") checks and reports safety errors, but leaves the Data Path Parity Errors for each channel in DMA unhandled at all, lead to a storm of interrupt. Fix it by checking and clearing the DMA_DPP_Interrupt_Status register.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: detect stuck ECSA element in probe resp We recently added some validation that we don't try to connect to an AP that is currently in a channel switch process, since that might want the channel to be quiet or we might not be able to connect in time to hear the switching in a beacon. This was in commit c09c4f31998b ("wifi: mac80211: don't connect to an AP while it's in a CSA process"). However, we promptly got a report that this caused new connection failures, and it turns out that the AP that we now cannot connect to is permanently advertising an extended channel switch announcement, even with quiet. The AP in question was an Asus RT-AC53, with firmware 3.0.0.4.380_10760-g21a5898. As a first step, attempt to detect that we're dealing with such a situation, so mac80211 can use this later.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: improve CSA/ECSA connection refusal As mentioned in the previous commit, we pretty quickly found that some APs have ECSA elements stuck in their probe response, so using that to not attempt to connect while CSA is happening we never connect to such an AP. Improve this situation by checking more carefully and ignoring the ECSA if cfg80211 has previously detected the ECSA element being stuck in the probe response. Additionally, allow connecting to an AP that's switching to a channel it's already using, unless it's using quiet mode. In this case, we may just have to adjust bandwidth later. If it's actually switching channels, it's better not to try to connect in the middle of that.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netdevsim: avoid potential loop in nsim_dev_trap_report_work() Many syzbot reports include the following trace [1] If nsim_dev_trap_report_work() can not grab the mutex, it should rearm itself at least one jiffie later. [1] Sending NMI from CPU 1 to CPUs 0: NMI backtrace for cpu 0 CPU: 0 PID: 32383 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2-syzkaller-00031-g861c0981648f #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023 Workqueue: events nsim_dev_trap_report_work RIP: 0010:bytes_is_nonzero mm/kasan/generic.c:89 [inline] RIP: 0010:memory_is_nonzero mm/kasan/generic.c:104 [inline] RIP: 0010:memory_is_poisoned_n mm/kasan/generic.c:129 [inline] RIP: 0010:memory_is_poisoned mm/kasan/generic.c:161 [inline] RIP: 0010:check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:180 [inline] RIP: 0010:kasan_check_range+0x101/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:189 Code: 07 49 39 d1 75 0a 45 3a 11 b8 01 00 00 00 7c 0b 44 89 c2 e8 21 ed ff ff 83 f0 01 5b 5d 41 5c c3 48 85 d2 74 4f 48 01 ea eb 09 <48> 83 c0 01 48 39 d0 74 41 80 38 00 74 f2 eb b6 41 bc 08 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc90012dcf998 EFLAGS: 00000046 RAX: fffffbfff258af1e RBX: fffffbfff258af1f RCX: ffffffff8168eda3 RDX: fffffbfff258af1f RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff92c578f0 RBP: fffffbfff258af1e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff258af1e R10: ffffffff92c578f3 R11: ffffffff8acbcbc0 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: ffff88806db38400 R14: 1ffff920025b9f42 R15: ffffffff92c578e8 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000c00994e078 CR3: 000000002c250000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <NMI> </NMI> <TASK> instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:68 [inline] atomic_read include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:32 [inline] queued_spin_is_locked include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:57 [inline] debug_spin_unlock kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:101 [inline] do_raw_spin_unlock+0x53/0x230 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:141 __raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:150 [inline] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x22/0x70 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194 debug_object_activate+0x349/0x540 lib/debugobjects.c:726 debug_work_activate kernel/workqueue.c:578 [inline] insert_work+0x30/0x230 kernel/workqueue.c:1650 __queue_work+0x62e/0x11d0 kernel/workqueue.c:1802 __queue_delayed_work+0x1bf/0x270 kernel/workqueue.c:1953 queue_delayed_work_on+0x106/0x130 kernel/workqueue.c:1989 queue_delayed_work include/linux/workqueue.h:563 [inline] schedule_delayed_work include/linux/workqueue.h:677 [inline] nsim_dev_trap_report_work+0x9c0/0xc80 drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:842 process_one_work+0x886/0x15d0 kernel/workqueue.c:2633 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:2706 [inline] worker_thread+0x8b9/0x1290 kernel/workqueue.c:2787 kthread+0x2c6/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242 </TASK>

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: atlantic: Fix DMA mapping for PTP hwts ring Function aq_ring_hwts_rx_alloc() maps extra AQ_CFG_RXDS_DEF bytes for PTP HWTS ring but then generic aq_ring_free() does not take this into account. Create and use a specific function to free HWTS ring to fix this issue. Trace: [ 215.351607] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 215.351612] DMA-API: atlantic 0000:4b:00.0: device driver frees DMA memory with different size [device address=0x00000000fbdd0000] [map size=34816 bytes] [unmap size=32768 bytes] [ 215.351635] WARNING: CPU: 33 PID: 10759 at kernel/dma/debug.c:988 check_unmap+0xa6f/0x2360 ... [ 215.581176] Call Trace: [ 215.583632] <TASK> [ 215.585745] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df [ 215.590114] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df [ 215.594497] ? debug_dma_free_coherent+0x196/0x210 [ 215.599305] ? check_unmap+0xa6f/0x2360 [ 215.603147] ? __warn+0xca/0x1d0 [ 215.606391] ? check_unmap+0xa6f/0x2360 [ 215.610237] ? report_bug+0x1ef/0x370 [ 215.613921] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 [ 215.617423] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x50 [ 215.621269] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 [ 215.625480] ? check_unmap+0xa6f/0x2360 [ 215.629331] ? mark_lock.part.0+0xca/0xa40 [ 215.633445] debug_dma_free_coherent+0x196/0x210 [ 215.638079] ? __pfx_debug_dma_free_coherent+0x10/0x10 [ 215.643242] ? slab_free_freelist_hook+0x11d/0x1d0 [ 215.648060] dma_free_attrs+0x6d/0x130 [ 215.651834] aq_ring_free+0x193/0x290 [atlantic] [ 215.656487] aq_ptp_ring_free+0x67/0x110 [atlantic] ... [ 216.127540] ---[ end trace 6467e5964dd2640b ]--- [ 216.132160] DMA-API: Mapped at: [ 216.132162] debug_dma_alloc_coherent+0x66/0x2f0 [ 216.132165] dma_alloc_attrs+0xf5/0x1b0 [ 216.132168] aq_ring_hwts_rx_alloc+0x150/0x1f0 [atlantic] [ 216.132193] aq_ptp_ring_alloc+0x1bb/0x540 [atlantic] [ 216.132213] aq_nic_init+0x4a1/0x760 [atlantic]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: inet: read sk->sk_family once in inet_recv_error() inet_recv_error() is called without holding the socket lock. IPv6 socket could mutate to IPv4 with IPV6_ADDRFORM socket option and trigger a KCSAN warning.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/efistub: Use 1:1 file:memory mapping for PE/COFF .compat section The .compat section is a dummy PE section that contains the address of the 32-bit entrypoint of the 64-bit kernel image if it is bootable from 32-bit firmware (i.e., CONFIG_EFI_MIXED=y) This section is only 8 bytes in size and is only referenced from the loader, and so it is placed at the end of the memory view of the image, to avoid the need for padding it to 4k, which is required for sections appearing in the middle of the image. Unfortunately, this violates the PE/COFF spec, and even if most EFI loaders will work correctly (including the Tianocore reference implementation), PE loaders do exist that reject such images, on the basis that both the file and memory views of the file contents should be described by the section headers in a monotonically increasing manner without leaving any gaps. So reorganize the sections to avoid this issue. This results in a slight padding overhead (< 4k) which can be avoided if desired by disabling CONFIG_EFI_MIXED (which is only needed in rare cases these days)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix delayed ACKs to not set the reference serial number Fix the construction of delayed ACKs to not set the reference serial number as they can't be used as an RTT reference.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_unix: Call kfree_skb() for dead unix_(sk)->oob_skb in GC. syzbot reported a warning [0] in __unix_gc() with a repro, which creates a socketpair and sends one socket's fd to itself using the peer. socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, [3, 4]) = 0 sendmsg(4, {msg_name=NULL, msg_namelen=0, msg_iov=[{iov_base="\360", iov_len=1}], msg_iovlen=1, msg_control=[{cmsg_len=20, cmsg_level=SOL_SOCKET, cmsg_type=SCM_RIGHTS, cmsg_data=[3]}], msg_controllen=24, msg_flags=0}, MSG_OOB|MSG_PROBE|MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_ZEROCOPY) = 1 This forms a self-cyclic reference that GC should finally untangle but does not due to lack of MSG_OOB handling, resulting in memory leak. Recently, commit 11498715f266 ("af_unix: Remove io_uring code for GC.") removed io_uring's dead code in GC and revealed the problem. The code was executed at the final stage of GC and unconditionally moved all GC candidates from gc_candidates to gc_inflight_list. That papered over the reported problem by always making the following WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&gc_candidates)) false. The problem has been there since commit 2aab4b969002 ("af_unix: fix struct pid leaks in OOB support") added full scm support for MSG_OOB while fixing another bug. To fix this problem, we must call kfree_skb() for unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb if the socket still exists in gc_candidates after purging collected skb. Then, we need to set NULL to oob_skb before calling kfree_skb() because it calls last fput() and triggers unix_release_sock(), where we call duplicate kfree_skb(u->oob_skb) if not NULL. Note that the leaked socket remained being linked to a global list, so kmemleak also could not detect it. We need to check /proc/net/protocol to notice the unfreed socket. [0]: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2863 at net/unix/garbage.c:345 __unix_gc+0xc74/0xe80 net/unix/garbage.c:345 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 2863 Comm: kworker/u4:11 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1-syzkaller-00583-g1701940b1a02 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024 Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc RIP: 0010:__unix_gc+0xc74/0xe80 net/unix/garbage.c:345 Code: 8b 5c 24 50 e9 86 f8 ff ff e8 f8 e4 22 f8 31 d2 48 c7 c6 30 6a 69 89 4c 89 ef e8 97 ef ff ff e9 80 f9 ff ff e8 dd e4 22 f8 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 7b fd ff ff 48 89 df e8 5c e7 7c f8 e9 d3 f8 ff ff e8 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b03fba0 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9000b03fc10 RCX: ffffffff816c493e RDX: ffff88802c02d940 RSI: ffffffff896982f3 RDI: ffffc9000b03fb30 RBP: ffffc9000b03fce0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff52001607f66 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffffc9000b03fc10 R14: ffffc9000b03fc10 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00005559c8677a60 CR3: 000000000d57a000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> process_one_work+0x889/0x15e0 kernel/workqueue.c:2633 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:2706 [inline] worker_thread+0x8b9/0x12a0 kernel/workqueue.c:2787 kthread+0x2c6/0x3b0 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242 </TASK>

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ppp_async: limit MRU to 64K syzbot triggered a warning [1] in __alloc_pages(): WARN_ON_ONCE_GFP(order > MAX_PAGE_ORDER, gfp) Willem fixed a similar issue in commit c0a2a1b0d631 ("ppp: limit MRU to 64K") Adopt the same sanity check for ppp_async_ioctl(PPPIOCSMRU) [1]: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 11 at mm/page_alloc.c:4543 __alloc_pages+0x308/0x698 mm/page_alloc.c:4543 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2-syzkaller-g41bccc98fb79 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023 Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc pstate: 204000c5 (nzCv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : __alloc_pages+0x308/0x698 mm/page_alloc.c:4543 lr : __alloc_pages+0xc8/0x698 mm/page_alloc.c:4537 sp : ffff800093967580 x29: ffff800093967660 x28: ffff8000939675a0 x27: dfff800000000000 x26: ffff70001272ceb4 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff8000939675c0 x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000060820 x21: 1ffff0001272ceb8 x20: ffff8000939675e0 x19: 0000000000000010 x18: ffff800093967120 x17: ffff800083bded5c x16: ffff80008ac97500 x15: 0000000000000005 x14: 1ffff0001272cebc x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: ffff70001272cec1 x10: 1ffff0001272cec0 x9 : 0000000000000001 x8 : ffff800091c91000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f x5 : 00000000ffffffff x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000020 x2 : 0000000000000008 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff8000939675e0 Call trace: __alloc_pages+0x308/0x698 mm/page_alloc.c:4543 __alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:238 [inline] alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:261 [inline] __kmalloc_large_node+0xbc/0x1fc mm/slub.c:3926 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3969 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x418/0x620 mm/slub.c:4001 kmalloc_reserve+0x17c/0x23c net/core/skbuff.c:590 __alloc_skb+0x1c8/0x3d8 net/core/skbuff.c:651 __netdev_alloc_skb+0xb8/0x3e8 net/core/skbuff.c:715 netdev_alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:3235 [inline] dev_alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:3248 [inline] ppp_async_input drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:863 [inline] ppp_asynctty_receive+0x588/0x186c drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:341 tty_ldisc_receive_buf+0x12c/0x15c drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:390 tty_port_default_receive_buf+0x74/0xac drivers/tty/tty_port.c:37 receive_buf drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:444 [inline] flush_to_ldisc+0x284/0x6e4 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:494 process_one_work+0x694/0x1204 kernel/workqueue.c:2633 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:2706 [inline] worker_thread+0x938/0xef4 kernel/workqueue.c:2787 kthread+0x288/0x310 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:860

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/lib: Revert to _ASM_EXTABLE_UA() for {get,put}_user() fixups During memory error injection test on kernels >= v6.4, the kernel panics like below. However, this issue couldn't be reproduced on kernels <= v6.3. mce: [Hardware Error]: CPU 296: Machine Check Exception: f Bank 1: bd80000000100134 mce: [Hardware Error]: RIP 10:<ffffffff821b9776> {__get_user_nocheck_4+0x6/0x20} mce: [Hardware Error]: TSC 411a93533ed ADDR 346a8730040 MISC 86 mce: [Hardware Error]: PROCESSOR 0:a06d0 TIME 1706000767 SOCKET 1 APIC 211 microcode 80001490 mce: [Hardware Error]: Run the above through 'mcelog --ascii' mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check: Data load in unrecoverable area of kernel Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal local machine check The MCA code can recover from an in-kernel #MC if the fixup type is EX_TYPE_UACCESS, explicitly indicating that the kernel is attempting to access userspace memory. However, if the fixup type is EX_TYPE_DEFAULT the only thing that is raised for an in-kernel #MC is a panic. ex_handler_uaccess() would warn if users gave a non-canonical addresses (with bit 63 clear) to {get, put}_user(), which was unexpected. Therefore, commit b19b74bc99b1 ("x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user()") replaced _ASM_EXTABLE_UA() with _ASM_EXTABLE() for {get, put}_user() fixups. However, the new fixup type EX_TYPE_DEFAULT results in a panic. Commit 6014bc27561f ("x86-64: make access_ok() independent of LAM") added the check gp_fault_address_ok() right before the WARN_ONCE() in ex_handler_uaccess() to not warn about non-canonical user addresses due to LAM. With that in place, revert back to _ASM_EXTABLE_UA() for {get,put}_user() exception fixups in order to be able to handle in-kernel MCEs correctly again. [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nft_ct: sanitize layer 3 and 4 protocol number in custom expectations - Disallow families other than NFPROTO_{IPV4,IPV6,INET}. - Disallow layer 4 protocol with no ports, since destination port is a mandatory attribute for this object.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Fix variable 'mca_funcs' dereferenced before NULL check in 'amdgpu_mca_smu_get_mca_entry()' Fixes the below: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_mca.c:377 amdgpu_mca_smu_get_mca_entry() warn: variable dereferenced before check 'mca_funcs' (see line 368) 357 int amdgpu_mca_smu_get_mca_entry(struct amdgpu_device *adev, enum amdgpu_mca_error_type type, 358 int idx, struct mca_bank_entry *entry) 359 { 360 const struct amdgpu_mca_smu_funcs *mca_funcs = adev->mca.mca_funcs; 361 int count; 362 363 switch (type) { 364 case AMDGPU_MCA_ERROR_TYPE_UE: 365 count = mca_funcs->max_ue_count; mca_funcs is dereferenced here. 366 break; 367 case AMDGPU_MCA_ERROR_TYPE_CE: 368 count = mca_funcs->max_ce_count; mca_funcs is dereferenced here. 369 break; 370 default: 371 return -EINVAL; 372 } 373 374 if (idx >= count) 375 return -EINVAL; 376 377 if (mca_funcs && mca_funcs->mca_get_mca_entry) ^^^^^^^^^ Checked too late!

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: blk-mq: fix IO hang from sbitmap wakeup race In blk_mq_mark_tag_wait(), __add_wait_queue() may be re-ordered with the following blk_mq_get_driver_tag() in case of getting driver tag failure. Then in __sbitmap_queue_wake_up(), waitqueue_active() may not observe the added waiter in blk_mq_mark_tag_wait() and wake up nothing, meantime blk_mq_mark_tag_wait() can't get driver tag successfully. This issue can be reproduced by running the following test in loop, and fio hang can be observed in < 30min when running it on my test VM in laptop. modprobe -r scsi_debug modprobe scsi_debug delay=0 dev_size_mb=4096 max_queue=1 host_max_queue=1 submit_queues=4 dev=`ls -d /sys/bus/pseudo/drivers/scsi_debug/adapter*/host*/target*/*/block/* | head -1 | xargs basename` fio --filename=/dev/"$dev" --direct=1 --rw=randrw --bs=4k --iodepth=1 \ --runtime=100 --numjobs=40 --time_based --name=test \ --ioengine=libaio Fix the issue by adding one explicit barrier in blk_mq_mark_tag_wait(), which is just fine in case of running out of tag.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: entry: fix ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD Currently the ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround isn't quite right, as it is supposed to be applied after the last explicit memory access, but is immediately followed by an LDR. The ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround is used to handle Cortex-A520 erratum 2966298 and Cortex-A510 erratum 3117295, which are described in: * https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN2444153/0600/?lang=en * https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN1873361/1600/?lang=en In both cases the workaround is described as: | If pagetable isolation is disabled, the context switch logic in the | kernel can be updated to execute the following sequence on affected | cores before exiting to EL0, and after all explicit memory accesses: | | 1. A non-shareable TLBI to any context and/or address, including | unused contexts or addresses, such as a `TLBI VALE1 Xzr`. | | 2. A DSB NSH to guarantee completion of the TLBI. The important part being that the TLBI+DSB must be placed "after all explicit memory accesses". Unfortunately, as-implemented, the TLBI+DSB is immediately followed by an LDR, as we have: | alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD | tlbi vale1, xzr | dsb nsh | alternative_else_nop_endif | alternative_if_not ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 | ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR] | add sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE // restore sp | eret | alternative_else_nop_endif | | [ ... KPTI exception return path ... ] This patch fixes this by reworking the logic to place the TLBI+DSB immediately before the ERET, after all explicit memory accesses. The ERET is currently in a separate alternative block, and alternatives cannot be nested. To account for this, the alternative block for ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 is replaced with a single alternative branch to skip the KPTI logic, with the new shape of the logic being: | alternative_insn "b .L_skip_tramp_exit_\@", nop, ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 | [ ... KPTI exception return path ... ] | .L_skip_tramp_exit_\@: | | ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR] | add sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE // restore sp | | alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD | tlbi vale1, xzr | dsb nsh | alternative_else_nop_endif | eret The new structure means that the workaround is only applied when KPTI is not in use; this is fine as noted in the documented implications of the erratum: | Pagetable isolation between EL0 and higher level ELs prevents the | issue from occurring. ... and as per the workaround description quoted above, the workaround is only necessary "If pagetable isolation is disabled".