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This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by the NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis which may result in further changes to the information provided.
Current Description
The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm is not collision resistant, which makes it easier for context-dependent attackers to conduct spoofing attacks, as demonstrated by attacks on the use of MD5 in the signature algorithm of an X.509 certificate.
The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm is not collision resistant, which makes it easier for context-dependent attackers to conduct spoofing attacks, as demonstrated by attacks on the use of MD5 in the signature algorithm of an X.509 certificate.
NVD Analysts use publicly available information to associate vector strings and CVSS scores. We also display any CVSS information provided within the CVE List from the CNA.
Note: NVD Analysts have not published a CVSS score for this CVE at this time. NVD Analysts use publicly available information at the time of analysis to associate CVSS vector strings.
NVD Analysts use publicly available information to associate vector strings and CVSS scores. We also display any CVSS information provided within the CVE List from the CNA.
Note: NVD Analysts have published a CVSS score for this CVE based on publicly available information at the time of analysis. The CNA has not provided a score within the CVE List.
Evaluator Impact
There are four significant mitigating factors.
1) Most enterprise-class certificates, such as VeriSign’s Extended Validation SSL Certificates use the still secure SHA-1 hash function.
2) Certificates already issued with MD5 signatures are not at risk. The exploit only affects new certificate acquisitions.
3) CAs are quickly moving to replace MD5 with SHA-1. For example, VeriSign was planning to phase out MD5 by the end of January 2009. The date was pushed up due to the December proof of concept. On December 31, 2008, RapidSSL certificates shipped with SHA-1 digital signatures.
4)The researchers did not release the under-the-hood specifics of how the exploit was executed.
Source - http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/it-security/the-new-md5-ssl-exploit-is-not-the-end-of-civilization-as-we-know-it/?tag=nl.e036
Please see http://kbase.redhat.com/faq/docs/DOC-15379
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
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There are four significant mitigating factors.
1) Most enterprise-class certificates, such as VeriSign’s Extended Validation SSL Certificates use the still secure SHA-1 hash function.
2) Certificates already issued with MD5 signatures are not at risk. The exploit only affects new certificate acquisitions.
3) CAs are quickly moving to replace MD5 with SHA-1. For example, VeriSign was planning to phase out MD5 by the end of January 2009. The date was pushed up due to the December pro
There are four significant mitigating factors.
1) Most enterprise-class certificates, such as VeriSign’s Extended Validation SSL Certificates use the still secure SHA-1 hash function.
2) Certificates already issued with MD5 signatures are not at risk. The exploit only affects new certificate acquisitions.
3) CAs are quickly moving to replace MD5 with SHA-1. For example, VeriSign was planning to phase out MD5 by the end of January 2009. The date was pushed up due to the December proof of
Changed
Reference Type
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/836068 US Government Resource
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/836068 Third Party Advisory, US Government Resource
Changed
Reference Type
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/961509.mspx No Types Assigned
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