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The Rolling Proximity Identifier used in the Apple/Google Exposure Notification API beta through 2020-05-29 enables attackers to circumvent Bluetooth Smart Privacy because there is a secondary temporary UID. An attacker with access to Beacon or IoT networks can seamlessly track individual device movement via a Bluetooth LE discovery mechanism.
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** DISPUTED ** The Rolling Proximity Identifier used in the Apple/Google Exposure Notification API beta through 2020-05-29 enables attackers to circumvent Bluetooth Smart Privacy because there is a secondary temporary UID. An attacker with access to Beacon or IoT networks can seamlessly track individual device movement via a Bluetooth LE discovery mechanism. NOTE: this is disputed because the specification states "The advertiser address, Rolling Proximity Identifier, and Associated Encrypted Met
The Rolling Proximity Identifier used in the Apple/Google Exposure Notification API beta through 2020-05-29 enables attackers to circumvent Bluetooth Smart Privacy because there is a secondary temporary UID. An attacker with access to Beacon or IoT networks can seamlessly track individual device movement via a Bluetooth LE discovery mechanism.
OR
*cpe:2.3:a:the_rolling_proximity_identifier_project:the_rolling_proximity_identifier:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions up to (including) 2020-05-29
Added
CVSS V2
NIST (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N)
Added
CVSS V3.1
NIST AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Added
CWE
NIST CWE-200
Changed
Reference Type
https://blog.google/documents/70/Exposure_Notification_-_Bluetooth_Specification_v1.2.2.pdf No Types Assigned
https://blog.google/documents/70/Exposure_Notification_-_Bluetooth_Specification_v1.2.2.pdf Third Party Advisory
Changed
Reference Type
https://github.com/normanluhrmann/infosec/raw/master/exposure-notification-vulnerability-20200611.pdf No Types Assigned
https://github.com/normanluhrmann/infosec/raw/master/exposure-notification-vulnerability-20200611.pdf Exploit, Technical Description, Third Party Advisory
Changed
Reference Type
https://github.com/normanluhrmann/infosec/raw/master/exposure-notification-vulnerability-20200616-2.pdf No Types Assigned
https://github.com/normanluhrmann/infosec/raw/master/exposure-notification-vulnerability-20200616-2.pdf Exploit, Technical Description, Third Party Advisory
Changed
Reference Type
https://github.com/normanluhrmann/infosec/raw/master/exposure-notification-vulnerability-20200616.pdf No Types Assigned
https://github.com/normanluhrmann/infosec/raw/master/exposure-notification-vulnerability-20200616.pdf Exploit, Technical Description, Third Party Advisory
** DISPUTED ** The Rolling Proximity Identifier used in the Apple/Google Exposure Notification API beta through 2020-05-29 enables attackers to circumvent Bluetooth Smart Privacy because there is a secondary temporary UID. An attacker with access to Beacon or IoT networks can seamlessly track individual device movement via a Bluetooth LE discovery mechanism. NOTE: this is disputed because the specification states "The advertiser address, Rolling Proximity Identifier, and Associated Encrypted Met
** DISPUTED ** The Rolling Proximity Identifier used in the Apple/Google Exposure Notification API beta through 2020-05-29 enables attackers to circumvent Bluetooth Smart Privacy because there is a secondary temporary UID. An attacker with access to Beacon or IoT networks can seamlessly track individual device movement via a Bluetooth LE discovery mechanism. NOTE: this is disputed because the specification states "The advertiser address, Rolling Proximity Identifier, and Associated Encrypted Met
The Rolling Proximity Identifier used in the Apple/Google Exposure Notification API beta through 2020-05-29 enables attackers to circumvent Bluetooth Smart Privacy because there is a secondary temporary UID. An attacker with access to Beacon or IoT networks can seamlessly track individual device movement via a Bluetooth LE discovery mechanism.
** DISPUTED ** The Rolling Proximity Identifier used in the Apple/Google Exposure Notification API beta through 2020-05-29 enables attackers to circumvent Bluetooth Smart Privacy because there is a secondary temporary UID. An attacker with access to Beacon or IoT networks can seamlessly track individual device movement via a Bluetooth LE discovery mechanism. NOTE: this is disputed because the specification states "The advertiser address, Rolling Proximity Identifier, and Associated Encrypted Met
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