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This CVE record has been updated after NVD enrichment efforts were completed. Enrichment data supplied by the NVD may require amendment due to these changes.
Description
The Rolling Proximity Identifier used in the Apple/Google Exposure Notification API beta through 2020-05-29 enables attackers to circumvent Bluetooth Smart Privacy because there is a secondary temporary UID. An attacker with access to Beacon or IoT networks can seamlessly track individual device movement via a Bluetooth LE discovery mechanism.
Metrics
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https://github.com/google/exposure-notifications-internals/commit/8f751a666697 No Types Assigned
https://github.com/google/exposure-notifications-internals/commit/8f751a666697 Patch, Third Party Advisory
Changed
Reference Type
https://github.com/google/exposure-notifications-internals/commit/8f751a666697c3cae0a56ae3464c2c6cbe31b69e No Types Assigned
https://github.com/google/exposure-notifications-internals/commit/8f751a666697c3cae0a56ae3464c2c6cbe31b69e Patch, Third Party Advisory
CVE Modified by MITRE3/01/2021 1:15:18 PM
Action
Type
Old Value
New Value
Changed
Description
** DISPUTED ** The Rolling Proximity Identifier used in the Apple/Google Exposure Notification API beta through 2020-05-29 enables attackers to circumvent Bluetooth Smart Privacy because there is a secondary temporary UID. An attacker with access to Beacon or IoT networks can seamlessly track individual device movement via a Bluetooth LE discovery mechanism. NOTE: this is disputed because the specification states "The advertiser address, Rolling Proximity Identifier, and Associated Encrypted Metadata shall be changed synchronously so that they cannot be linked" and therefore the purported tracking actually cannot occur. The original reporter says that synchronous changes only occur in one direction, not both directions.
The Rolling Proximity Identifier used in the Apple/Google Exposure Notification API beta through 2020-05-29 enables attackers to circumvent Bluetooth Smart Privacy because there is a secondary temporary UID. An attacker with access to Beacon or IoT networks can seamlessly track individual device movement via a Bluetooth LE discovery mechanism.
OR
*cpe:2.3:a:the_rolling_proximity_identifier_project:the_rolling_proximity_identifier:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions up to (including) 2020-05-29
Changed
Reference Type
https://blog.google/documents/70/Exposure_Notification_-_Bluetooth_Specification_v1.2.2.pdf No Types Assigned
https://blog.google/documents/70/Exposure_Notification_-_Bluetooth_Specification_v1.2.2.pdf Third Party Advisory
Changed
Reference Type
https://github.com/normanluhrmann/infosec/raw/master/exposure-notification-vulnerability-20200611.pdf No Types Assigned
https://github.com/normanluhrmann/infosec/raw/master/exposure-notification-vulnerability-20200611.pdf Exploit, Technical Description, Third Party Advisory
Changed
Reference Type
https://github.com/normanluhrmann/infosec/raw/master/exposure-notification-vulnerability-20200616-2.pdf No Types Assigned
https://github.com/normanluhrmann/infosec/raw/master/exposure-notification-vulnerability-20200616-2.pdf Exploit, Technical Description, Third Party Advisory
Changed
Reference Type
https://github.com/normanluhrmann/infosec/raw/master/exposure-notification-vulnerability-20200616.pdf No Types Assigned
https://github.com/normanluhrmann/infosec/raw/master/exposure-notification-vulnerability-20200616.pdf Exploit, Technical Description, Third Party Advisory
CVE Modified by MITRE6/16/2020 5:15:11 PM
Action
Type
Old Value
New Value
Changed
Description
** DISPUTED ** The Rolling Proximity Identifier used in the Apple/Google Exposure Notification API beta through 2020-05-29 enables attackers to circumvent Bluetooth Smart Privacy because there is a secondary temporary UID. An attacker with access to Beacon or IoT networks can seamlessly track individual device movement via a Bluetooth LE discovery mechanism. NOTE: this is disputed because the specification states "The advertiser address, Rolling Proximity Identifier, and Associated Encrypted Metadata shall be changed synchronously so that they cannot be linked" and therefore the purported tracking actually cannot occur.
** DISPUTED ** The Rolling Proximity Identifier used in the Apple/Google Exposure Notification API beta through 2020-05-29 enables attackers to circumvent Bluetooth Smart Privacy because there is a secondary temporary UID. An attacker with access to Beacon or IoT networks can seamlessly track individual device movement via a Bluetooth LE discovery mechanism. NOTE: this is disputed because the specification states "The advertiser address, Rolling Proximity Identifier, and Associated Encrypted Metadata shall be changed synchronously so that they cannot be linked" and therefore the purported tracking actually cannot occur. The original reporter says that synchronous changes only occur in one direction, not both directions.
The Rolling Proximity Identifier used in the Apple/Google Exposure Notification API beta through 2020-05-29 enables attackers to circumvent Bluetooth Smart Privacy because there is a secondary temporary UID. An attacker with access to Beacon or IoT networks can seamlessly track individual device movement via a Bluetooth LE discovery mechanism.
** DISPUTED ** The Rolling Proximity Identifier used in the Apple/Google Exposure Notification API beta through 2020-05-29 enables attackers to circumvent Bluetooth Smart Privacy because there is a secondary temporary UID. An attacker with access to Beacon or IoT networks can seamlessly track individual device movement via a Bluetooth LE discovery mechanism. NOTE: this is disputed because the specification states "The advertiser address, Rolling Proximity Identifier, and Associated Encrypted Metadata shall be changed synchronously so that they cannot be linked" and therefore the purported tracking actually cannot occur.