When configured to enable default typing, Jackson contained a deserialization vulnerability that could lead to arbitrary code execution. Jackson fixed this vulnerability by blacklisting known "deserialization gadgets". Spring Batch configures Jackson with global default typing enabled which means that through the previous exploit, arbitrary code could be executed if all of the following is true: * Spring Batch's Jackson support is being leveraged to serialize a job's ExecutionContext. * A malicious user gains write access to the data store used by the JobRepository (where the data to be deserialized is stored). In order to protect against this type of attack, Jackson prevents a set of untrusted gadget classes from being deserialized. Spring Batch should be proactive against blocking unknown "deserialization gadgets" when enabling default typing.
When configured to enable default typing, Jackson contained a deserialization vulnerability that could lead to arbitrary code execution. Jackson fixed this vulnerability by blacklisting known "deserialization gadgets". Spring Batch configures Jackson with global default typing enabled which means that through the previous exploit, arbitrary code could be executed if all of the following is true: * Spring Batch's Jackson support is being leveraged to serialize a job's ExecutionContext. * A malicious user gains write access to the data store used by the JobRepository (where the data to be deserialized is stored). In order to protect against this type of attack, Jackson prevents a set of untrusted gadget classes from being deserialized. Spring Batch should be proactive against blocking unknown "deserialization gadgets" when enabling default typing.
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Note: NVD Analysts have published a CVSS score for this CVE based on publicly available information at the time of analysis. The CNA has not provided a score within the CVE List.
NVD Analysts use publicly available information to associate vector strings and CVSS scores. We also display any CVSS information provided within the CVE List from the CNA.
Note: NVD Analysts have published a CVSS score for this CVE based on publicly available information at the time of analysis. The CNA has not provided a score within the CVE List.
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OR
*cpe:2.3:a:pivotal_software:spring_batch:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 4.0.0 up to (including) 4.0.4
*cpe:2.3:a:pivotal_software:spring_batch:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 4.1.0 up to (including) 4.1.4
*cpe:2.3:a:pivotal_software:spring_batch:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 4.2.0 up to (including) 4.2.2
Added
CVSS V2
NIST (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P)
Added
CVSS V3.1
NIST AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Added
CWE
NIST CWE-502
Changed
Reference Type
https://tanzu.vmware.com/security/cve-2020-5411 No Types Assigned
When configured to enable default typing, Jackson contained a deserialization vulnerability that could lead to arbitrary code execution. Jackson fixed this vulnerability by blacklisting known "deserialization gadgets".
Spring Batch configures Jackson with global default typing enabled which means that through the previous exploit, arbitrary code could be executed if all of the following is true:
* Spring Batch's Jackson support is being leveraged to serialize a job's ExecutionContext.
* A mali
When configured to enable default typing, Jackson contained a deserialization vulnerability that could lead to arbitrary code execution. Jackson fixed this vulnerability by blacklisting known "deserialization gadgets". Spring Batch configures Jackson with global default typing enabled which means that through the previous exploit, arbitrary code could be executed if all of the following is true: * Spring Batch's Jackson support is being leveraged to serialize a job's ExecutionContext. * A malici
Quick Info
CVE Dictionary Entry: CVE-2020-5411 NVD
Published Date: 06/11/2020 NVD
Last Modified: 08/07/2020
Source: Pivotal Software, Inc.
