In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

x86/signal: Detect and prevent an alternate signal stack overflow

The kernel pushes context on to the userspace stack to prepare for the
user's signal handler. When the user has supplied an alternate signal
stack, via sigaltstack(2), it is easy for the kernel to verify that the
stack size is sufficient for the current hardware context.

Check if writing the hardware context to the alternate stack will exceed
it's size. If yes, then instead of corrupting user-data and proceeding with
the original signal handler, an immediate SIGSEGV signal is delivered.

Refactor the stack pointer check code from on_sig_stack() and use the new
helper.

While the kernel allows new source code to discover and use a sufficient
alternate signal stack size, this check is still necessary to protect
binaries with insufficient alternate signal stack size from data
corruption.

kernel.org https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00fcd8f33e9b9f57115c3b1cfc4cb96450c18796 [No types assigned]

kernel.org https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2beb4a53fc3f1081cedc1c1a198c7f56cc4fc60c [No types assigned]

kernel.org https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/74569cb9ed7bc60e395927f55d3dc3be143a0164 [No types assigned]

kernel.org https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/74d6fcea1d896800e60f1c675137efebd1a6c9a6 [No types assigned]

kernel.org https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/afb04d0b5543a5bf8e157b9119fbfc52606f4c11 [No types assigned]