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This CVE has been marked Rejected in the CVE List. These CVEs are stored in the NVD, but do not show up in search results by default.
Description
Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.
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Title: kernel de Linux
Description: En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: fs: relajar las comprobaciones de permisos de mount_setattr() Cuando agregamos mount_setattr(), agregué comprobaciones adicionales en comparación con los ayudantes heredados do_reconfigure_mnt() y do_change_type() utilizados por el mount(2) normal. Si ese montaje tenía un padre, verifique que la persona que llama y el espacio de nombres del montaje coincidan y, de lo contrario, asegúrese de que sea un montaje anónimo. Los rootfs reales no entran en ninguna de las dos categorías. No es un montaje anónimo porque obviamente está adjunto al espacio de nombres de montaje inicial pero obviamente tampoco tiene un montaje principal. Eso significa que el montaje heredado (2) permite cambiar las propiedades de montaje en los rootfs reales, pero mount_setattr (2) bloquea esto. Nunca pensé mucho en esto pero, por supuesto, alguien en este planeta tierra cambia las propiedades de las raíces reales como se puede ver en [1]. Dado que util-linux finalmente cambió a la nueva API de montaje en 2.39 no hace mucho, también depende de mount_setattr() y surgió este problema cuando Fedora 39 finalmente cambió a ella. Arregla esto.
CVE Modified by kernel.org5/16/2024 9:15:47 AM
Action
Type
Old Value
New Value
Changed
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: relax mount_setattr() permission checks
When we added mount_setattr() I added additional checks compared to the
legacy do_reconfigure_mnt() and do_change_type() helpers used by regular
mount(2). If that mount had a parent then verify that the caller and the
mount namespace the mount is attached to match and if not make sure that
it's an anonymous mount.
The real rootfs falls into neither category. It is neither an anoymous
mount because it is obviously attached to the initial mount namespace
but it also obviously doesn't have a parent mount. So that means legacy
mount(2) allows changing mount properties on the real rootfs but
mount_setattr(2) blocks this. I never thought much about this but of
course someone on this planet of earth changes properties on the real
rootfs as can be seen in [1].
Since util-linux finally switched to the new mount api in 2.39 not so
long ago it also relies on mount_setattr() and that surfaced this issue
when Fedora 39 finally switched to it. Fix this.
Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.
New CVE Received from kernel.org4/17/2024 6:15:08 AM
Action
Type
Old Value
New Value
Added
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: relax mount_setattr() permission checks
When we added mount_setattr() I added additional checks compared to the
legacy do_reconfigure_mnt() and do_change_type() helpers used by regular
mount(2). If that mount had a parent then verify that the caller and the
mount namespace the mount is attached to match and if not make sure that
it's an anonymous mount.
The real rootfs falls into neither category. It is neither an anoymous
mount because it is obviously attached to the initial mount namespace
but it also obviously doesn't have a parent mount. So that means legacy
mount(2) allows changing mount properties on the real rootfs but
mount_setattr(2) blocks this. I never thought much about this but of
course someone on this planet of earth changes properties on the real
rootfs as can be seen in [1].
Since util-linux finally switched to the new mount api in 2.39 not so
long ago it also relies on mount_setattr() and that surfaced this issue
when Fedora 39 finally switched to it. Fix this.