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Vulnerability Change Records for CVE-2025-15284

Change History

CVE Modified by harborist 2/10/2026 3:16:43 PM

Action Type Old Value New Value
Changed Description
Improper Input Validation vulnerability in qs (parse modules) allows HTTP DoS.This issue affects qs: < 6.14.1.


SummaryThe arrayLimit option in qs does not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2), allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. Applications using arrayLimit for DoS protection are vulnerable.

DetailsThe arrayLimit option only checks limits for indexed notation (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but completely bypasses it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2).

Vulnerable code (lib/parse.js:159-162):

if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) {
    obj = utils.combine([], leaf);  // No arrayLimit check
}





Working code (lib/parse.js:175):

else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) {  // Limit checked here
    obj = [];
    obj[index] = leaf;
}





The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses utils.combine([], leaf) without validating against options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175 checks index <= options.arrayLimit before creating arrays.

PoCTest 1 - Basic bypass:

npm install qs





const qs = require('qs');
const result = qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 });
console.log(result.a.length);  // Output: 6 (should be max 5)





Test 2 - DoS demonstration:

const qs = require('qs');
const attack = 'a[]=' + Array(10000).fill('x').join('&a[]=');
const result = qs.parse(attack, { arrayLimit: 100 });
console.log(result.a.length);  // Output: 10000 (should be max 100)





Configuration:

  *  arrayLimit: 5 (test 1) or arrayLimit: 100 (test 2)
  *  Use bracket notation: a[]=value (not indexed a[0]=value)


ImpactDenial of Service via memory exhaustion. Affects applications using qs.parse() with user-controlled input and arrayLimit for protection.

Attack scenario:

  *  Attacker sends HTTP request: GET /api/search?filters[]=x&filters[]=x&...&filters[]=x (100,000+ times)
  *  Application parses with qs.parse(query, { arrayLimit: 100 })
  *  qs ignores limit, parses all 100,000 elements into array
  *  Server memory exhausted → application crashes or becomes unresponsive
  *  Service unavailable for all users
Real-world impact:

  *  Single malicious request can crash server
  *  No authentication required
  *  Easy to automate and scale
  *  Affects any endpoint parsing query strings with bracket notation
Improper Input Validation vulnerability in qs (parse modules) allows HTTP DoS.This issue affects qs: < 6.14.1.


Summary

The arrayLimit option in qs did not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2), only for indexed notation (a[0]=1). This is a consistency bug; arrayLimit should apply uniformly across all array notations.

Note: The default parameterLimit of 1000 effectively mitigates the DoS scenario originally described. With default options, bracket notation cannot produce arrays larger than parameterLimit regardless of arrayLimit, because each a[]=valueconsumes one parameter slot. The severity has been reduced accordingly.

Details

The arrayLimit option only checked limits for indexed notation (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but did not enforce it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2).

Vulnerable code (lib/parse.js:159-162):

if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) {
    obj = utils.combine([], leaf);  // No arrayLimit check
}





Working code (lib/parse.js:175):

else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) {  // Limit checked here
    obj = [];
    obj[index] = leaf;
}





The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses utils.combine([], leaf) without validating against options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175 checks index <= options.arrayLimit before creating arrays.



PoC

const qs = require('qs');
const result = qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 });
console.log(result.a.length);  // Output: 6 (should be max 5)





Note on parameterLimit interaction: The original advisory's "DoS demonstration" claimed a length of 10,000, but parameterLimit (default: 1000) caps parsing to 1,000 parameters. With default options, the actual output is 1,000, not 10,000.

Impact

Consistency bug in arrayLimit enforcement. With default parameterLimit, the practical DoS risk is negligible since parameterLimit already caps the total number of parsed parameters (and thus array elements from bracket notation). The risk increases only when parameterLimit is explicitly set to a very high value.
Added CVSS V4.0

								
							
							
						
AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Removed CVSS V4.0
AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

								
						
Added CVSS V3.1

								
							
							
						
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Removed CVSS V3.1
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H