http://blog.mozilla.com/security/2008/12/30/md5-weaknesses-could-lead-to-certificate-forgery/

http://blogs.technet.com/swi/archive/2008/12/30/information-regarding-md5-collisions-problem.aspx

http://secunia.com/advisories/33826

http://secunia.com/advisories/34281

http://secunia.com/advisories/42181

http://securityreason.com/securityalert/4866

http://securitytracker.com/id?1024697

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_response09186a0080a5d24a.html

http://www.doxpara.com/research/md5/md5_someday.pdf

http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/836068

http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/961509.mspx

http://www.phreedom.org/research/rogue-ca/

http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/499685/100/0/threaded

http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/33065

http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-740-1

http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/SoftIntCodeSign/

http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/

https://blogs.verisign.com/ssl-blog/2008/12/on_md5_vulnerabilities_and_mit.php

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=648886

https://h20566.www2.hpe.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/kb/docDisplay?docId=emr_na-c05289935

https://h20566.www2.hpe.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/kb/docDisplay?docId=emr_na-c05336888

https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSMA-18-058-02

https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2010-0837.html

https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2010-0838.html

https://support.hpe.com/hpsc/doc/public/display?docLocale=en_US&docId=emr_na-hpesbhf03814en_us

https://www.redhat.com/archives/fedora-package-announce/2009-February/msg00096.html

http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/499685/100/0/threaded [No Types Assigned]

http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/archive/1/499685/100/0/threaded [No Types Assigned]

https://support.hpe.com/hpsc/doc/public/display?docLocale=en_US&docId=emr_na-hpesbhf03814en_us [No Types Assigned]

https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSMA-18-058-02 [No Types Assigned]

AND
     OR
          *cpe:2.3:a:ietf:md5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
     OR
          cpe:2.3:a:ietf:x.509_certificate:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

AND
     OR
          *cpe:2.3:a:ietf:md5:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
     OR
          cpe:2.3:a:ietf:x.509_certificate:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/836068 US Government Resource

http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/836068 Third Party Advisory, US Government Resource

http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/961509.mspx No Types Assigned

http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/961509.mspx Mitigation, Vendor Advisory, Patch

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=648886 No Types Assigned

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=648886 Issue Tracking

There are four significant mitigating factors.

1) Most enterprise-class certificates, such as VeriSign’s Extended Validation SSL Certificates use the still secure SHA-1 hash function. 

2) Certificates already issued with MD5 signatures are not at risk.  The exploit only affects new certificate acquisitions. 

3) CAs are quickly moving to replace MD5 with SHA-1.  For example, VeriSign was planning to phase out MD5 by the end of January 2009.  The date was pushed up due to the December pro

There are four significant mitigating factors.

1) Most enterprise-class certificates, such as VeriSign’s Extended Validation SSL Certificates use the still secure SHA-1 hash function. 

2) Certificates already issued with MD5 signatures are not at risk.  The exploit only affects new certificate acquisitions. 

3) CAs are quickly moving to replace MD5 with SHA-1.  For example, VeriSign was planning to phase out MD5 by the end of January 2009.  The date was pushed up due to the December proof of 

https://h20566.www2.hpe.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/kb/docDisplay?docId=emr_na-c05336888 [No Types Assigned]

https://h20566.www2.hpe.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/kb/docDisplay?docId=emr_na-c05289935