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CVE-2022-46169
Detail
Modified
This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by the NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis which may result in further changes to the information provided.
Current Description
Cacti is an open source platform which provides a robust and extensible operational monitoring and fault management framework for users. In affected versions a command injection vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a server running Cacti, if a specific data source was selected for any monitored device. The vulnerability resides in the `remote_agent.php` file. This file can be accessed without authentication. This function retrieves the IP address of the client via `get_client_addr` and resolves this IP address to the corresponding hostname via `gethostbyaddr`. After this, it is verified that an entry within the `poller` table exists, where the hostname corresponds to the resolved hostname. If such an entry was found, the function returns `true` and the client is authorized. This authorization can be bypassed due to the implementation of the `get_client_addr` function. The function is defined in the file `lib/functions.php` and checks serval `$_SERVER` variables to determine the IP address of the client. The variables beginning with `HTTP_` can be arbitrarily set by an attacker. Since there is a default entry in the `poller` table with the hostname of the server running Cacti, an attacker can bypass the authentication e.g. by providing the header `Forwarded-For: <TARGETIP>`. This way the function `get_client_addr` returns the IP address of the server running Cacti. The following call to `gethostbyaddr` will resolve this IP address to the hostname of the server, which will pass the `poller` hostname check because of the default entry. After the authorization of the `remote_agent.php` file is bypassed, an attacker can trigger different actions. One of these actions is called `polldata`. The called function `poll_for_data` retrieves a few request parameters and loads the corresponding `poller_item` entries from the database. If the `action` of a `poller_item` equals `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`, the function `proc_open` is used to execute a PHP script. The attacker-controlled parameter `$poller_id` is retrieved via the function `get_nfilter_request_var`, which allows arbitrary strings. This variable is later inserted into the string passed to `proc_open`, which leads to a command injection vulnerability. By e.g. providing the `poller_id=;id` the `id` command is executed. In order to reach the vulnerable call, the attacker must provide a `host_id` and `local_data_id`, where the `action` of the corresponding `poller_item` is set to `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`. Both of these ids (`host_id` and `local_data_id`) can easily be bruteforced. The only requirement is that a `poller_item` with an `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP` action exists. This is very likely on a productive instance because this action is added by some predefined templates like `Device - Uptime` or `Device - Polling Time`.
This command injection vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary commands if a `poller_item` with the `action` type `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP` (`2`) is configured. The authorization bypass should be prevented by not allowing an attacker to make `get_client_addr` (file `lib/functions.php`) return an arbitrary IP address. This could be done by not honoring the `HTTP_...` `$_SERVER` variables. If these should be kept for compatibility reasons it should at least be prevented to fake the IP address of the server running Cacti. This vulnerability has been addressed in both the 1.2.x and 1.3.x release branches with `1.2.23` being the first release containing the patch.
Cacti is an open source platform which provides a robust and extensible operational monitoring and fault management framework for users. In affected versions a command injection vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a server running Cacti, if a specific data source was selected for any monitored device. The vulnerability resides in the `remote_agent.php` file. This file can be accessed without authentication. This function retrieves the IP address of the client via `get_client_addr` and resolves this IP address to the corresponding hostname via `gethostbyaddr`. After this, it is verified that an entry within the `poller` table exists, where the hostname corresponds to the resolved hostname. If such an entry was found, the function returns `true` and the client is authorized. This authorization can be bypassed due to the implementation of the `get_client_addr` function. The function is defined in the file `lib/functions.php` and checks serval `$_SERVER` variables to determine the IP address of the client. The variables beginning with `HTTP_` can be arbitrarily set by an attacker. Since there is a default entry in the `poller` table with the hostname of the server running Cacti, an attacker can bypass the authentication e.g. by providing the header `Forwarded-For: <TARGETIP>`. This way the function `get_client_addr` returns the IP address of the server running Cacti. The following call to `gethostbyaddr` will resolve this IP address to the hostname of the server, which will pass the `poller` hostname check because of the default entry. After the authorization of the `remote_agent.php` file is bypassed, an attacker can trigger different actions. One of these actions is called `polldata`. The called function `poll_for_data` retrieves a few request parameters and loads the corresponding `poller_item` entries from the database. If the `action` of a `poller_item` equals `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`, the function `proc_open` is used to execute a PHP script. The attacker-controlled parameter `$poller_id` is retrieved via the function `get_nfilter_request_var`, which allows arbitrary strings. This variable is later inserted into the string passed to `proc_open`, which leads to a command injection vulnerability. By e.g. providing the `poller_id=;id` the `id` command is executed. In order to reach the vulnerable call, the attacker must provide a `host_id` and `local_data_id`, where the `action` of the corresponding `poller_item` is set to `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP`. Both of these ids (`host_id` and `local_data_id`) can easily be bruteforced. The only requirement is that a `poller_item` with an `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP` action exists. This is very likely on a productive instance because this action is added by some predefined templates like `Device - Uptime` or `Device - Polling Time`. This command injection vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary commands if a `poller_item` with the `action` type `POLLER_ACTION_SCRIPT_PHP` (`2`) is configured. The authorization bypass should be prevented by not allowing an attacker to make `get_client_addr` (file `lib/functions.php`) return an arbitrary IP address. This could be done by not honoring the `HTTP_...` `$_SERVER` variables. If these should be kept for compatibility reasons it should at least be prevented to fake the IP address of the server running Cacti. This vulnerability has been addressed in both the 1.2.x and 1.3.x release branches with `1.2.23` being the first release containing the patch.
NVD Analysts use publicly available information to associate vector strings and CVSS scores. We also display any CVSS information provided within the CVE List from the CNA.
Note: The NVD and the CNA have provided the same score. When this occurs only the CNA information is displayed, but the Acceptance Level icon for the CNA is given a checkmark to signify NVD concurrence.
NVD Analysts use publicly available information to associate vector strings and CVSS scores. We also display any CVSS information provided within the CVE List from the CNA.
Note: NVD Analysts have not published a CVSS score for this CVE at this time. NVD Analysts use publicly available information at the time of analysis to associate CVSS vector strings.
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Cacti is an open source platform which provides a robust and extensible operational monitoring and fault management framework for users. In affected versions a command injection vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a server running Cacti, if a specific data source was selected for any monitored device. The vulnerability resides in the `remote_agent.php` file. This file can be accessed without authentication. This function retrieves the IP address of the clien
Cacti is an open source platform which provides a robust and extensible operational monitoring and fault management framework for users. In affected versions a command injection vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a server running Cacti, if a specific data source was selected for any monitored device. The vulnerability resides in the `remote_agent.php` file. This file can be accessed without authentication. This function retrieves the IP address of the clien
Reanalysis by NIST7/11/2023 10:52:33 AM
Action
Type
Old Value
New Value
Added
CWE
NIST CWE-78
Added
CWE
NIST CWE-863
Removed
CWE
NIST CWE-77
Initial Analysis by NIST12/06/2022 3:05:03 PM
Action
Type
Old Value
New Value
Added
CPE Configuration
OR
*cpe:2.3:a:cacti:cacti:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions up to (including) 1.2.22
Added
CVSS V3.1
NIST AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Added
CWE
NIST CWE-77
Changed
Reference Type
https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/commit/7f0e16312dd5ce20f93744ef8b9c3b0f1ece2216 No Types Assigned
https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/commit/7f0e16312dd5ce20f93744ef8b9c3b0f1ece2216 Patch, Third Party Advisory
Changed
Reference Type
https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/commit/a8d59e8fa5f0054aa9c6981b1cbe30ef0e2a0ec9 No Types Assigned
https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/commit/a8d59e8fa5f0054aa9c6981b1cbe30ef0e2a0ec9 Patch, Third Party Advisory
Changed
Reference Type
https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/commit/b43f13ae7f1e6bfe4e8e56a80a7cd867cf2db52b No Types Assigned
https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/commit/b43f13ae7f1e6bfe4e8e56a80a7cd867cf2db52b Patch, Third Party Advisory
Changed
Reference Type
https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/security/advisories/GHSA-6p93-p743-35gf No Types Assigned
https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/security/advisories/GHSA-6p93-p743-35gf Exploit, Mitigation, Patch, Third Party Advisory
Quick Info
CVE Dictionary Entry: CVE-2022-46169 NVD
Published Date: 12/05/2022 NVD
Last Modified: 11/06/2023
Source: GitHub, Inc.