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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: fix use-after-free on failed backlog decryption
When the decrypt request goes to the backlog and crypto_aead_decrypt
returns -EBUSY, tls_do_decryption will wait until all async
decryptions have completed. If one of them fails, tls_do_decryption
will return -EBADMSG and tls_decrypt_sg jumps to the error path,
releasing all the pages. But the pages have been passed to the async
callback, and have already been released by tls_decrypt_done.
The only true async case is when crypto_aead_decrypt returns
-EINPROGRESS. With -EBUSY, we already waited so we can tell
tls_sw_recvmsg that the data is available for immediate copy, but we
need to notify tls_decrypt_sg (via the new ->async_done flag) that the
memory has already been released.
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OR
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.6.18 up to (excluding) 6.6.21
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.7.6 up to (excluding) 6.7.9
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.8:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.8:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.8:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.8:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.8:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.8:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*
Changed
Reference Type
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/13114dc5543069f7b97991e3b79937b6da05f5b0 No Types Assigned
New CVE Received from kernel.org4/04/2024 5:15:09 AM
Action
Type
Old Value
New Value
Added
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: fix use-after-free on failed backlog decryption
When the decrypt request goes to the backlog and crypto_aead_decrypt
returns -EBUSY, tls_do_decryption will wait until all async
decryptions have completed. If one of them fails, tls_do_decryption
will return -EBADMSG and tls_decrypt_sg jumps to the error path,
releasing all the pages. But the pages have been passed to the async
callback, and have already been released by tls_decrypt_done.
The only true async case is when crypto_aead_decrypt returns
-EINPROGRESS. With -EBUSY, we already waited so we can tell
tls_sw_recvmsg that the data is available for immediate copy, but we
need to notify tls_decrypt_sg (via the new ->async_done flag) that the
memory has already been released.