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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: ops: Consistently treat platform_max as control value
This reverts commit 9bdd10d57a88 ("ASoC: ops: Shift tested values in
snd_soc_put_volsw() by +min"), and makes some additional related
updates.
There are two ways the platform_max could be interpreted; the maximum
register value, or the maximum value the control can be set to. The
patch moved from treating the value as a control value to a register
one. When the patch was applied it was technically correct as
snd_soc_limit_volume() also used the register interpretation. However,
even then most of the other usages treated platform_max as a
control value, and snd_soc_limit_volume() has since been updated to
also do so in commit fb9ad24485087 ("ASoC: ops: add correct range
check for limiting volume"). That patch however, missed updating
snd_soc_put_volsw() back to the control interpretation, and fixing
snd_soc_info_volsw_range(). The control interpretation makes more
sense as limiting is typically done from the machine driver, so it is
appropriate to use the customer facing representation rather than the
internal codec representation. Update all the code to consistently use
this interpretation of platform_max.
Finally, also add some comments to the soc_mixer_control struct to
hopefully avoid further patches switching between the two approaches.
Metrics
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OR
*cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:11.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Added
CPE Configuration
OR
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.7:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.7:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.7:rc8:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.7:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.7:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.14:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 5.15.148 up to (excluding) 5.15.180
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.1.74 up to (excluding) 6.1.132
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.6.7 up to (excluding) 6.6.84
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.7.1 up to (excluding) 6.12.20
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.13 up to (excluding) 6.13.8
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.14:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.14:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.14:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.14:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.14:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*
Added
Reference Type
CVE: https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/05/msg00045.html Types: Mailing List
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI/MSI: Handle the NOMASK flag correctly for all PCI/MSI backends
The conversion of the XEN specific global variable pci_msi_ignore_mask to a
MSI domain flag, missed the facts that:
1) Legacy architectures do not provide a interrupt domain
2) Parent MSI domains do not necessarily have a domain info attached
Both cases result in an unconditional NULL pointer dereference. This was
unfortunatly missed in review and testing revealed it late.
Cure this by using the existing pci_msi_domain_supports() helper, which
handles all possible cases correctly.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: ops: Consistently treat platform_max as control value
This reverts commit 9bdd10d57a88 ("ASoC: ops: Shift tested values in
snd_soc_put_volsw() by +min"), and makes some additional related
updates.
There are two ways the platform_max could be interpreted; the maximum
register value, or the maximum value the control can be set to. The
patch moved from treating the value as a control value to a register
one. When the patch was applied it was technically correct as
snd_soc_limit_volume() also used the register interpretation. However,
even then most of the other usages treated platform_max as a
control value, and snd_soc_limit_volume() has since been updated to
also do so in commit fb9ad24485087 ("ASoC: ops: add correct range
check for limiting volume"). That patch however, missed updating
snd_soc_put_volsw() back to the control interpretation, and fixing
snd_soc_info_volsw_range(). The control interpretation makes more
sense as limiting is typically done from the machine driver, so it is
appropriate to use the customer facing representation rather than the
internal codec representation. Update all the code to consistently use
this interpretation of platform_max.
Finally, also add some comments to the soc_mixer_control struct to
hopefully avoid further patches switching between the two approaches.
New CVE Received from kernel.org5/09/2025 3:16:10 AM
Action
Type
Old Value
New Value
Added
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI/MSI: Handle the NOMASK flag correctly for all PCI/MSI backends
The conversion of the XEN specific global variable pci_msi_ignore_mask to a
MSI domain flag, missed the facts that:
1) Legacy architectures do not provide a interrupt domain
2) Parent MSI domains do not necessarily have a domain info attached
Both cases result in an unconditional NULL pointer dereference. This was
unfortunatly missed in review and testing revealed it late.
Cure this by using the existing pci_msi_domain_supports() helper, which
handles all possible cases correctly.