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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/tls: fix use-after-free in -EBUSY error path of tls_do_encryption
The -EBUSY handling in tls_do_encryption(), introduced by commit
859054147318 ("net: tls: handle backlogging of crypto requests"), has
a use-after-free due to double cleanup of encrypt_pending and the
scatterlist entry.
When crypto_aead_encrypt() returns -EBUSY, the request is enqueued to
the cryptd backlog and the async callback tls_encrypt_done() will be
invoked upon completion. That callback unconditionally restores the
scatterlist entry (sge->offset, sge->length) and decrements
ctx->encrypt_pending. However, if tls_encrypt_async_wait() returns an
error, the synchronous error path in tls_do_encryption() performs the
same cleanup again, double-decrementing encrypt_pending and
double-restoring the scatterlist.
The double-decrement corrupts the encrypt_pending sentinel (initialized
to 1), making tls_encrypt_async_wait() permanently skip the wait for
pending async callbacks. A subsequent sendmsg can then free the
tls_rec via bpf_exec_tx_verdict() while a cryptd callback is still
pending, resulting in a use-after-free when the callback fires on the
freed record.
Fix this by skipping the synchronous cleanup when the -EBUSY async
wait returns an error, since the callback has already handled
encrypt_pending and sge restoration.
Metrics
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OR
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.7.6 up to (excluding) 6.8
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 5.15.160 up to (excluding) 5.15.203
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.1.84 up to (excluding) 6.1.169
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.13 up to (excluding) 6.18.23
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.19 up to (excluding) 6.19.13
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.6.18 up to (excluding) 6.6.135
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.8.1 up to (excluding) 6.12.82
New CVE Received from kernel.org4/23/2026 2:16:26 PM
Action
Type
Old Value
New Value
Added
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/tls: fix use-after-free in -EBUSY error path of tls_do_encryption
The -EBUSY handling in tls_do_encryption(), introduced by commit
859054147318 ("net: tls: handle backlogging of crypto requests"), has
a use-after-free due to double cleanup of encrypt_pending and the
scatterlist entry.
When crypto_aead_encrypt() returns -EBUSY, the request is enqueued to
the cryptd backlog and the async callback tls_encrypt_done() will be
invoked upon completion. That callback unconditionally restores the
scatterlist entry (sge->offset, sge->length) and decrements
ctx->encrypt_pending. However, if tls_encrypt_async_wait() returns an
error, the synchronous error path in tls_do_encryption() performs the
same cleanup again, double-decrementing encrypt_pending and
double-restoring the scatterlist.
The double-decrement corrupts the encrypt_pending sentinel (initialized
to 1), making tls_encrypt_async_wait() permanently skip the wait for
pending async callbacks. A subsequent sendmsg can then free the
tls_rec via bpf_exec_tx_verdict() while a cryptd callback is still
pending, resulting in a use-after-free when the callback fires on the
freed record.
Fix this by skipping the synchronous cleanup when the -EBUSY async
wait returns an error, since the callback has already handled
encrypt_pending and sge restoration.