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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: icmp: clear skb2->cb[] in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach()
Sashiko AI-review observed:
In ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(), the skb is an outer IPv4 ICMP error packet
where its cb contains an IPv4 inet_skb_parm. When skb is cloned into skb2
and passed to icmp6_send(), it uses IP6CB(skb2).
IP6CB interprets the IPv4 inet_skb_parm as an inet6_skb_parm. The cipso
offset in inet_skb_parm.opt directly overlaps with dsthao in inet6_skb_parm
at offset 18.
If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv4 error with a CIPSO IP option, dsthao
would be a non-zero offset. Inside icmp6_send(), mip6_addr_swap() is called
and uses ipv6_find_tlv(skb, opt->dsthao, IPV6_TLV_HAO).
This would scan the inner, attacker-controlled IPv6 packet starting at that
offset, potentially returning a fake TLV without checking if the remaining
packet length can hold the full 18-byte struct ipv6_destopt_hao.
Could mip6_addr_swap() then perform a 16-byte swap that extends past the end
of the packet data into skb_shared_info?
Should the cb array also be cleared in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() and
ip6ip6_err() to prevent this?
This patch implements the first suggestion.
I am not sure if ip6ip6_err() needs to be changed.
A separate patch would be better anyway.
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OR
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:3.13:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:3.13:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:3.13:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:3.13:rc8:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 5.11 up to (excluding) 5.15.203
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.13 up to (excluding) 6.18.22
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 5.16 up to (excluding) 6.1.168
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.19 up to (excluding) 6.19.12
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.7 up to (excluding) 6.12.81
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (including) 6.2 up to (excluding) 6.6.134
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* versions from (excluding) 3.13 up to (excluding) 5.10.253
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:3.13:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:3.13:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*
*cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:3.13:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*
New CVE Received from kernel.org5/01/2026 11:16:48 AM
Action
Type
Old Value
New Value
Added
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: icmp: clear skb2->cb[] in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach()
Sashiko AI-review observed:
In ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(), the skb is an outer IPv4 ICMP error packet
where its cb contains an IPv4 inet_skb_parm. When skb is cloned into skb2
and passed to icmp6_send(), it uses IP6CB(skb2).
IP6CB interprets the IPv4 inet_skb_parm as an inet6_skb_parm. The cipso
offset in inet_skb_parm.opt directly overlaps with dsthao in inet6_skb_parm
at offset 18.
If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv4 error with a CIPSO IP option, dsthao
would be a non-zero offset. Inside icmp6_send(), mip6_addr_swap() is called
and uses ipv6_find_tlv(skb, opt->dsthao, IPV6_TLV_HAO).
This would scan the inner, attacker-controlled IPv6 packet starting at that
offset, potentially returning a fake TLV without checking if the remaining
packet length can hold the full 18-byte struct ipv6_destopt_hao.
Could mip6_addr_swap() then perform a 16-byte swap that extends past the end
of the packet data into skb_shared_info?
Should the cb array also be cleared in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() and
ip6ip6_err() to prevent this?
This patch implements the first suggestion.
I am not sure if ip6ip6_err() needs to be changed.
A separate patch would be better anyway.