A SMB force-authentication vulnerability exists in all versions of OPA for Windows prior to v0.68.0. The vulnerability exists because of improper input validation, allowing a user to pass an arbitrary SMB share instead of a Rego file as an argument to OPA CLI or to one of the OPA Go library’s functions.

An issue in the AST parser (ast/compile.go) of Open Policy Agent v0.10.2 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted input.

OPA is an open source, general-purpose policy engine. Under certain conditions, pretty-printing an abstract syntax tree (AST) that contains synthetic nodes could change the logic of some statements by reordering array literals. Example of policies impacted are those that parse and compare web paths. **All of these** three conditions have to be met to create an adverse effect: 1. An AST of Rego had to be **created programmatically** such that it ends up containing terms without a location (such as wildcard variables). 2. The AST had to be **pretty-printed** using the `github.com/open-policy-agent/opa/format` package. 3. The result of the pretty-printing had to be **parsed and evaluated again** via an OPA instance using the bundles, or the Golang packages. If any of these three conditions are not met, you are not affected. Notably, all three would be true if using **optimized bundles**, i.e. bundles created with `opa build -O=1` or higher. In that case, the optimizer would fulfil condition (1.), the result of that would be pretty-printed when writing the bundle to disk, fulfilling (2.). When the bundle was then used, we'd satisfy (3.). As a workaround users may disable optimization when creating bundles.