Affected devices do not check the TFTP blocksize correctly. This could allow an authenticated attacker to read from an uninitialized buffer that potentially contains previously allocated data.

Affected devices store the CLI user passwords encrypted in flash memory. Attackers with physical access to the device could retrieve the file and decrypt the CLI user passwords.

Affected devices use a weak encryption scheme to encrypt the debug zip file. This could allow an authenticated attacker to decrypt the contents of the file and retrieve debug information about the system.

An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations accept plaintext frames in a protected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary data frames independent of the network configuration.

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets.