In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: do not start relocation until in progress drops are done We hit a bug with a recovering relocation on mount for one of our file systems in production. I reproduced this locally by injecting errors into snapshot delete with balance running at the same time. This presented as an error while looking up an extent item WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1501 at fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:866 lookup_inline_extent_backref+0x647/0x680 CPU: 5 PID: 1501 Comm: btrfs-balance Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8+ #8 RIP: 0010:lookup_inline_extent_backref+0x647/0x680 RSP: 0018:ffffae0a023ab960 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000c RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff943fd2a39b60 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0001434088152de0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000001d05000 R13: ffff943fd2a39b60 R14: ffff943fdb96f2a0 R15: ffff9442fc923000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff944e9eb40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1157b1fca8 CR3: 000000010f092000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 Call Trace: <TASK> insert_inline_extent_backref+0x46/0xd0 __btrfs_inc_extent_ref.isra.0+0x5f/0x200 ? btrfs_merge_delayed_refs+0x164/0x190 __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x561/0xfa0 ? btrfs_search_slot+0x7b4/0xb30 ? btrfs_update_root+0x1a9/0x2c0 btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x73/0x1f0 ? btrfs_update_root+0x1a9/0x2c0 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x50/0xa50 ? btrfs_update_reloc_root+0x122/0x220 prepare_to_merge+0x29f/0x320 relocate_block_group+0x2b8/0x550 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x1a6/0x350 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x27/0xe0 btrfs_balance+0x777/0xe60 balance_kthread+0x35/0x50 ? btrfs_balance+0xe60/0xe60 kthread+0x16b/0x190 ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 </TASK> Normally snapshot deletion and relocation are excluded from running at the same time by the fs_info->cleaner_mutex. However if we had a pending balance waiting to get the ->cleaner_mutex, and a snapshot deletion was running, and then the box crashed, we would come up in a state where we have a half deleted snapshot. Again, in the normal case the snapshot deletion needs to complete before relocation can start, but in this case relocation could very well start before the snapshot deletion completes, as we simply add the root to the dead roots list and wait for the next time the cleaner runs to clean up the snapshot. Fix this by setting a bit on the fs_info if we have any DEAD_ROOT's that had a pending drop_progress key. If they do then we know we were in the middle of the drop operation and set a flag on the fs_info. Then balance can wait until this flag is cleared to start up again. If there are DEAD_ROOT's that don't have a drop_progress set then we're safe to start balance right away as we'll be properly protected by the cleaner_mutex.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Fixed bug on error when unloading amdgpu Fixed bug on error when unloading amdgpu. The error message is as follows: [ 377.706202] kernel BUG at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_buddy.c:278! [ 377.706215] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 377.706222] CPU: 4 PID: 8610 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G IOE 6.0.0-thomas #1 [ 377.706231] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z390-A, BIOS 2004 11/02/2021 [ 377.706238] RIP: 0010:drm_buddy_free_block+0x26/0x30 [drm_buddy] [ 377.706264] Code: 00 00 00 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 0e 89 c8 25 00 0c 00 00 3d 00 04 00 00 75 10 48 8b 47 18 48 d3 e0 48 01 47 28 e9 fa fe ff ff <0f> 0b 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 48 89 f5 53 [ 377.706282] RSP: 0018:ffffad2dc4683cb8 EFLAGS: 00010287 [ 377.706289] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8b1743bd5138 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 377.706297] RDX: ffff8b1743bd5160 RSI: ffff8b1743bd5c78 RDI: ffff8b16d1b25f70 [ 377.706304] RBP: ffff8b1743bd59e0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 377.706311] R10: ffff8b16c8572400 R11: ffffad2dc4683cf0 R12: ffff8b16d1b25f70 [ 377.706318] R13: ffff8b16d1b25fd0 R14: ffff8b1743bd59c0 R15: ffff8b16d1b25f70 [ 377.706325] FS: 00007fec56c72c40(0000) GS:ffff8b1836500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 377.706334] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 377.706340] CR2: 00007f9b88c1ba50 CR3: 0000000110450004 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [ 377.706347] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 377.706354] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 377.706361] Call Trace: [ 377.706365] <TASK> [ 377.706369] drm_buddy_free_list+0x2a/0x60 [drm_buddy] [ 377.706376] amdgpu_vram_mgr_fini+0xea/0x180 [amdgpu] [ 377.706572] amdgpu_ttm_fini+0x12e/0x1a0 [amdgpu] [ 377.706650] amdgpu_bo_fini+0x22/0x90 [amdgpu] [ 377.706727] gmc_v11_0_sw_fini+0x26/0x30 [amdgpu] [ 377.706821] amdgpu_device_fini_sw+0xa1/0x3c0 [amdgpu] [ 377.706897] amdgpu_driver_release_kms+0x12/0x30 [amdgpu] [ 377.706975] drm_dev_release+0x20/0x40 [drm] [ 377.707006] release_nodes+0x35/0xb0 [ 377.707014] devres_release_all+0x8b/0xc0 [ 377.707020] device_unbind_cleanup+0xe/0x70 [ 377.707027] device_release_driver_internal+0xee/0x160 [ 377.707033] driver_detach+0x44/0x90 [ 377.707039] bus_remove_driver+0x55/0xe0 [ 377.707045] pci_unregister_driver+0x3b/0x90 [ 377.707052] amdgpu_exit+0x11/0x6c [amdgpu] [ 377.707194] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x142/0x2b0 [ 377.707201] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x22/0x50 [ 377.707208] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x3e/0x190 [ 377.707215] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 377.707221] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring: lock overflowing for IOPOLL syzbot reports an issue with overflow filling for IOPOLL: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28 at io_uring/io_uring.c:734 io_cqring_event_overflow+0x1c0/0x230 io_uring/io_uring.c:734 CPU: 0 PID: 28 Comm: kworker/u4:1 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc3-syzkaller-16369-g358a161a6a9e #0 Workqueue: events_unbound io_ring_exit_work Call trace:  io_cqring_event_overflow+0x1c0/0x230 io_uring/io_uring.c:734  io_req_cqe_overflow+0x5c/0x70 io_uring/io_uring.c:773  io_fill_cqe_req io_uring/io_uring.h:168 [inline]  io_do_iopoll+0x474/0x62c io_uring/rw.c:1065  io_iopoll_try_reap_events+0x6c/0x108 io_uring/io_uring.c:1513  io_uring_try_cancel_requests+0x13c/0x258 io_uring/io_uring.c:3056  io_ring_exit_work+0xec/0x390 io_uring/io_uring.c:2869  process_one_work+0x2d8/0x504 kernel/workqueue.c:2289  worker_thread+0x340/0x610 kernel/workqueue.c:2436  kthread+0x12c/0x158 kernel/kthread.c:376  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:863 There is no real problem for normal IOPOLL as flush is also called with uring_lock taken, but it's getting more complicated for IOPOLL|SQPOLL, for which __io_cqring_overflow_flush() happens from the CQ waiting path.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nilfs2: fix general protection fault in nilfs_btree_insert() If nilfs2 reads a corrupted disk image and tries to reads a b-tree node block by calling __nilfs_btree_get_block() against an invalid virtual block address, it returns -ENOENT because conversion of the virtual block address to a disk block address fails. However, this return value is the same as the internal code that b-tree lookup routines return to indicate that the block being searched does not exist, so functions that operate on that b-tree may misbehave. When nilfs_btree_insert() receives this spurious 'not found' code from nilfs_btree_do_lookup(), it misunderstands that the 'not found' check was successful and continues the insert operation using incomplete lookup path data, causing the following crash: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f] ... RIP: 0010:nilfs_btree_get_nonroot_node fs/nilfs2/btree.c:418 [inline] RIP: 0010:nilfs_btree_prepare_insert fs/nilfs2/btree.c:1077 [inline] RIP: 0010:nilfs_btree_insert+0x6d3/0x1c10 fs/nilfs2/btree.c:1238 Code: bc 24 80 00 00 00 4c 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 28 00 74 08 4c 89 ff e8 4b 02 92 fe 4d 8b 3f 49 83 c7 28 4c 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 28 00 74 08 4c 89 ff e8 2e 02 92 fe 4d 8b 3f 49 83 c7 02 ... Call Trace: <TASK> nilfs_bmap_do_insert fs/nilfs2/bmap.c:121 [inline] nilfs_bmap_insert+0x20d/0x360 fs/nilfs2/bmap.c:147 nilfs_get_block+0x414/0x8d0 fs/nilfs2/inode.c:101 __block_write_begin_int+0x54c/0x1a80 fs/buffer.c:1991 __block_write_begin fs/buffer.c:2041 [inline] block_write_begin+0x93/0x1e0 fs/buffer.c:2102 nilfs_write_begin+0x9c/0x110 fs/nilfs2/inode.c:261 generic_perform_write+0x2e4/0x5e0 mm/filemap.c:3772 __generic_file_write_iter+0x176/0x400 mm/filemap.c:3900 generic_file_write_iter+0xab/0x310 mm/filemap.c:3932 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2186 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline] vfs_write+0x7dc/0xc50 fs/read_write.c:584 ksys_write+0x177/0x2a0 fs/read_write.c:637 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd ... </TASK> This patch fixes the root cause of this problem by replacing the error code that __nilfs_btree_get_block() returns on block address conversion failure from -ENOENT to another internal code -EINVAL which means that the b-tree metadata is corrupted. By returning -EINVAL, it propagates without glitches, and for all relevant b-tree operations, functions in the upper bmap layer output an error message indicating corrupted b-tree metadata via nilfs_bmap_convert_error(), and code -EIO will be eventually returned as it should be.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Add exception protection processing for vd in axi_chan_handle_err function Since there is no protection for vd, a kernel panic will be triggered here in exceptional cases. You can refer to the processing of axi_chan_block_xfer_complete function The triggered kernel panic is as follows: [ 67.848444] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000060 [ 67.848447] Mem abort info: [ 67.848449] ESR = 0x96000004 [ 67.848451] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 67.848454] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 67.848456] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 67.848458] Data abort info: [ 67.848460] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 [ 67.848462] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 67.848465] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000800c4c0b000 [ 67.848468] [0000000000000060] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 67.848472] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 67.848475] Modules linked in: dmatest [ 67.848479] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.10.100-emu_x2rc+ #11 [ 67.848483] pstate: 62000085 (nZCv daIf -PAN -UAO +TCO BTYPE=--) [ 67.848487] pc : axi_chan_handle_err+0xc4/0x230 [ 67.848491] lr : axi_chan_handle_err+0x30/0x230 [ 67.848493] sp : ffff0803fe55ae50 [ 67.848495] x29: ffff0803fe55ae50 x28: ffff800011212200 [ 67.848500] x27: ffff0800c42c0080 x26: ffff0800c097c080 [ 67.848504] x25: ffff800010d33880 x24: ffff80001139d850 [ 67.848508] x23: ffff0800c097c168 x22: 0000000000000000 [ 67.848512] x21: 0000000000000080 x20: 0000000000002000 [ 67.848517] x19: ffff0800c097c080 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 67.848521] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 67.848525] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 67.848529] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000040 [ 67.848533] x11: ffff0800c0400248 x10: ffff0800c040024a [ 67.848538] x9 : ffff800010576cd4 x8 : ffff0800c0400270 [ 67.848542] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff0800c04003e0 [ 67.848546] x5 : ffff0800c0400248 x4 : ffff0800c4294480 [ 67.848550] x3 : dead000000000100 x2 : dead000000000122 [ 67.848555] x1 : 0000000000000100 x0 : ffff0800c097c168 [ 67.848559] Call trace: [ 67.848562] axi_chan_handle_err+0xc4/0x230 [ 67.848566] dw_axi_dma_interrupt+0xf4/0x590 [ 67.848569] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x60/0x220 [ 67.848573] handle_irq_event+0x64/0x120 [ 67.848576] handle_fasteoi_irq+0xc4/0x220 [ 67.848580] __handle_domain_irq+0x80/0xe0 [ 67.848583] gic_handle_irq+0xc0/0x138 [ 67.848585] el1_irq+0xc8/0x180 [ 67.848588] arch_cpu_idle+0x14/0x2c [ 67.848591] default_idle_call+0x40/0x16c [ 67.848594] do_idle+0x1f0/0x250 [ 67.848597] cpu_startup_entry+0x2c/0x60 [ 67.848600] rest_init+0xc0/0xcc [ 67.848603] arch_call_rest_init+0x14/0x1c [ 67.848606] start_kernel+0x4cc/0x500 [ 67.848610] Code: eb0002ff 9a9f12d6 f2fbd5a2 f2fbd5a3 (a94602c1) [ 67.848613] ---[ end trace 585a97036f88203a ]---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xhci: Fix null pointer dereference when host dies Make sure xhci_free_dev() and xhci_kill_endpoint_urbs() do not race and cause null pointer dereference when host suddenly dies. Usb core may call xhci_free_dev() which frees the xhci->devs[slot_id] virt device at the same time that xhci_kill_endpoint_urbs() tries to loop through all the device's endpoints, checking if there are any cancelled urbs left to give back. hold the xhci spinlock while freeing the virt device

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_ncm: fix potential NULL ptr deref in ncm_bitrate() In Google internal bug 265639009 we've received an (as yet) unreproducible crash report from an aarch64 GKI 5.10.149-android13 running device. AFAICT the source code is at: https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common/+/refs/tags/ASB-2022-12-05_13-5.10 The call stack is: ncm_close() -> ncm_notify() -> ncm_do_notify() with the crash at: ncm_do_notify+0x98/0x270 Code: 79000d0b b9000a6c f940012a f9400269 (b9405d4b) Which I believe disassembles to (I don't know ARM assembly, but it looks sane enough to me...): // halfword (16-bit) store presumably to event->wLength (at offset 6 of struct usb_cdc_notification) 0B 0D 00 79 strh w11, [x8, #6] // word (32-bit) store presumably to req->Length (at offset 8 of struct usb_request) 6C 0A 00 B9 str w12, [x19, #8] // x10 (NULL) was read here from offset 0 of valid pointer x9 // IMHO we're reading 'cdev->gadget' and getting NULL // gadget is indeed at offset 0 of struct usb_composite_dev 2A 01 40 F9 ldr x10, [x9] // loading req->buf pointer, which is at offset 0 of struct usb_request 69 02 40 F9 ldr x9, [x19] // x10 is null, crash, appears to be attempt to read cdev->gadget->max_speed 4B 5D 40 B9 ldr w11, [x10, #0x5c] which seems to line up with ncm_do_notify() case NCM_NOTIFY_SPEED code fragment: event->wLength = cpu_to_le16(8); req->length = NCM_STATUS_BYTECOUNT; /* SPEED_CHANGE data is up/down speeds in bits/sec */ data = req->buf + sizeof *event; data[0] = cpu_to_le32(ncm_bitrate(cdev->gadget)); My analysis of registers and NULL ptr deref crash offset (Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000000000005c) heavily suggests that the crash is due to 'cdev->gadget' being NULL when executing: data[0] = cpu_to_le32(ncm_bitrate(cdev->gadget)); which calls: ncm_bitrate(NULL) which then calls: gadget_is_superspeed(NULL) which reads ((struct usb_gadget *)NULL)->max_speed and hits a panic. AFAICT, if I'm counting right, the offset of max_speed is indeed 0x5C. (remember there's a GKI KABI reservation of 16 bytes in struct work_struct) It's not at all clear to me how this is all supposed to work... but returning 0 seems much better than panic-ing...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915/gt: Cleanup partial engine discovery failures If we abort driver initialisation in the middle of gt/engine discovery, some engines will be fully setup and some not. Those incompletely setup engines only have 'engine->release == NULL' and so will leak any of the common objects allocated. v2: - Drop the destroy_pinned_context() helper for now. It's not really worth it with just a single callsite at the moment. (Janusz)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: regulator: da9211: Use irq handler when ready If the system does not come from reset (like when it is kexec()), the regulator might have an IRQ waiting for us. If we enable the IRQ handler before its structures are ready, we crash. This patch fixes: [ 1.141839] Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address 0000000000000078 [ 1.316096] Call trace: [ 1.316101] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x20/0xa8 [ 1.322757] cpu cpu0: dummy supplies not allowed for exclusive requests [ 1.327823] regulator_notifier_call_chain+0x1c/0x2c [ 1.327825] da9211_irq_handler+0x68/0xf8 [ 1.327829] irq_thread+0x11c/0x234 [ 1.327833] kthread+0x13c/0x154

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: let's avoid panic if extent_tree is not created This patch avoids the below panic. pc : __lookup_extent_tree+0xd8/0x760 lr : f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x104/0x87c sp : ffffffc010cbb3c0 x29: ffffffc010cbb3e0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffffff8803e7f020 x26: ffffff8803e7ed40 x25: ffffff8803e7f020 x24: ffffffc010cbb460 x23: ffffffc010cbb480 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000000 x20: ffffffff22e90900 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffffffc010c5d080 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000020 x15: ffffffdb1acdbb88 x14: ffffff888759e2b0 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffffff802da49000 x11: 000000000a001200 x10: ffffff8803e7ed40 x9 : ffffff8023195800 x8 : ffffff802da49078 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000006 x4 : ffffffc010cbba28 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffffffc010cbb480 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffff8803e7ed40 Call trace: __lookup_extent_tree+0xd8/0x760 f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x104/0x87c f2fs_write_single_data_page+0x420/0xb60 f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x418/0xb1c __f2fs_write_data_pages+0x428/0x58c f2fs_write_data_pages+0x30/0x40 do_writepages+0x88/0x190 __writeback_single_inode+0x48/0x448 writeback_sb_inodes+0x468/0x9e8 __writeback_inodes_wb+0xb8/0x2a4 wb_writeback+0x33c/0x740 wb_do_writeback+0x2b4/0x400 wb_workfn+0xe4/0x34c process_one_work+0x24c/0x5bc worker_thread+0x3e8/0xa50 kthread+0x150/0x1b4

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: sdata can be NULL during AMPDU start ieee80211_tx_ba_session_handle_start() may get NULL for sdata when a deauthentication is ongoing. Here a trace triggering the race with the hostapd test multi_ap_fronthaul_on_ap: (gdb) list *drv_ampdu_action+0x46 0x8b16 is in drv_ampdu_action (net/mac80211/driver-ops.c:396). 391 int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; 392 393 might_sleep(); 394 395 sdata = get_bss_sdata(sdata); 396 if (!check_sdata_in_driver(sdata)) 397 return -EIO; 398 399 trace_drv_ampdu_action(local, sdata, params); 400 wlan0: moving STA 02:00:00:00:03:00 to state 3 wlan0: associated wlan0: deauthenticating from 02:00:00:00:03:00 by local choice (Reason: 3=DEAUTH_LEAVING) wlan3.sta1: Open BA session requested for 02:00:00:00:00:00 tid 0 wlan3.sta1: dropped frame to 02:00:00:00:00:00 (unauthorized port) wlan0: moving STA 02:00:00:00:03:00 to state 2 wlan0: moving STA 02:00:00:00:03:00 to state 1 wlan0: Removed STA 02:00:00:00:03:00 wlan0: Destroyed STA 02:00:00:00:03:00 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffffffffffb48 PGD 11814067 P4D 11814067 PUD 11816067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 2 PID: 133397 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rc8-wt+ #59 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.0-20220807_005459-localhost 04/01/2014 Workqueue: phy3 ieee80211_ba_session_work [mac80211] RIP: 0010:drv_ampdu_action+0x46/0x280 [mac80211] Code: 53 48 89 f3 be 89 01 00 00 e8 d6 43 bf ef e8 21 46 81 f0 83 bb a0 1b 00 00 04 75 0e 48 8b 9b 28 0d 00 00 48 81 eb 10 0e 00 00 <8b> 93 58 09 00 00 f6 c2 20 0f 84 3b 01 00 00 8b 05 dd 1c 0f 00 85 RSP: 0018:ffffc900025ebd20 EFLAGS: 00010287 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: fffffffffffff1f0 RCX: ffff888102228240 RDX: 0000000080000000 RSI: ffffffff918c5de0 RDI: ffff888102228b40 RBP: ffffc900025ebd40 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888118c18ec0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc900025ebd60 R15: ffff888018b7efb8 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88817a600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: fffffffffffffb48 CR3: 0000000105228006 CR4: 0000000000170ee0 Call Trace: <TASK> ieee80211_tx_ba_session_handle_start+0xd0/0x190 [mac80211] ieee80211_ba_session_work+0xff/0x2e0 [mac80211] process_one_work+0x29f/0x620 worker_thread+0x4d/0x3d0 ? process_one_work+0x620/0x620 kthread+0xfb/0x120 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 </TASK>

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exec: Fix ToCToU between perm check and set-uid/gid usage When opening a file for exec via do_filp_open(), permission checking is done against the file's metadata at that moment, and on success, a file pointer is passed back. Much later in the execve() code path, the file metadata (specifically mode, uid, and gid) is used to determine if/how to set the uid and gid. However, those values may have changed since the permissions check, meaning the execution may gain unintended privileges. For example, if a file could change permissions from executable and not set-id: ---------x 1 root root 16048 Aug 7 13:16 target to set-id and non-executable: ---S------ 1 root root 16048 Aug 7 13:16 target it is possible to gain root privileges when execution should have been disallowed. While this race condition is rare in real-world scenarios, it has been observed (and proven exploitable) when package managers are updating the setuid bits of installed programs. Such files start with being world-executable but then are adjusted to be group-exec with a set-uid bit. For example, "chmod o-x,u+s target" makes "target" executable only by uid "root" and gid "cdrom", while also becoming setuid-root: -rwxr-xr-x 1 root cdrom 16048 Aug 7 13:16 target becomes: -rwsr-xr-- 1 root cdrom 16048 Aug 7 13:16 target But racing the chmod means users without group "cdrom" membership can get the permission to execute "target" just before the chmod, and when the chmod finishes, the exec reaches brpm_fill_uid(), and performs the setuid to root, violating the expressed authorization of "only cdrom group members can setuid to root". Re-check that we still have execute permissions in case the metadata has changed. It would be better to keep a copy from the perm-check time, but until we can do that refactoring, the least-bad option is to do a full inode_permission() call (under inode lock). It is understood that this is safe against dead-locks, but hardly optimal.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: jfs: Fix array-index-out-of-bounds in diFree

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md: fix deadlock between mddev_suspend and flush bio Deadlock occurs when mddev is being suspended while some flush bio is in progress. It is a complex issue. T1. the first flush is at the ending stage, it clears 'mddev->flush_bio' and tries to submit data, but is blocked because mddev is suspended by T4. T2. the second flush sets 'mddev->flush_bio', and attempts to queue md_submit_flush_data(), which is already running (T1) and won't execute again if on the same CPU as T1. T3. the third flush inc active_io and tries to flush, but is blocked because 'mddev->flush_bio' is not NULL (set by T2). T4. mddev_suspend() is called and waits for active_io dec to 0 which is inc by T3. T1 T2 T3 T4 (flush 1) (flush 2) (third 3) (suspend) md_submit_flush_data mddev->flush_bio = NULL; . . md_flush_request . mddev->flush_bio = bio . queue submit_flushes . . . . md_handle_request . . active_io + 1 . . md_flush_request . . wait !mddev->flush_bio . . . . mddev_suspend . . wait !active_io . . . submit_flushes . queue_work md_submit_flush_data . //md_submit_flush_data is already running (T1) . md_handle_request wait resume The root issue is non-atomic inc/dec of active_io during flush process. active_io is dec before md_submit_flush_data is queued, and inc soon after md_submit_flush_data() run. md_flush_request active_io + 1 submit_flushes active_io - 1 md_submit_flush_data md_handle_request active_io + 1 make_request active_io - 1 If active_io is dec after md_handle_request() instead of within submit_flushes(), make_request() can be called directly intead of md_handle_request() in md_submit_flush_data(), and active_io will only inc and dec once in the whole flush process. Deadlock will be fixed. Additionally, the only difference between fixing the issue and before is that there is no return error handling of make_request(). But after previous patch cleaned md_write_start(), make_requst() only return error in raid5_make_request() by dm-raid, see commit 41425f96d7aa ("dm-raid456, md/raid456: fix a deadlock for dm-raid456 while io concurrent with reshape)". Since dm always splits data and flush operation into two separate io, io size of flush submitted by dm always is 0, make_request() will not be called in md_submit_flush_data(). To prevent future modifications from introducing issues, add WARN_ON to ensure make_request() no error is returned in this context.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hfs: fix to initialize fields of hfs_inode_info after hfs_alloc_inode() Syzbot reports uninitialized value access issue as below: loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 64 ===================================================== BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in hfs_revalidate_dentry+0x307/0x3f0 fs/hfs/sysdep.c:30 hfs_revalidate_dentry+0x307/0x3f0 fs/hfs/sysdep.c:30 d_revalidate fs/namei.c:862 [inline] lookup_fast+0x89e/0x8e0 fs/namei.c:1649 walk_component fs/namei.c:2001 [inline] link_path_walk+0x817/0x1480 fs/namei.c:2332 path_lookupat+0xd9/0x6f0 fs/namei.c:2485 filename_lookup+0x22e/0x740 fs/namei.c:2515 user_path_at_empty+0x8b/0x390 fs/namei.c:2924 user_path_at include/linux/namei.h:57 [inline] do_mount fs/namespace.c:3689 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3898 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x66b/0x810 fs/namespace.c:3875 __x64_sys_mount+0xe4/0x140 fs/namespace.c:3875 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in hfs_ext_read_extent fs/hfs/extent.c:196 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in hfs_get_block+0x92d/0x1620 fs/hfs/extent.c:366 hfs_ext_read_extent fs/hfs/extent.c:196 [inline] hfs_get_block+0x92d/0x1620 fs/hfs/extent.c:366 block_read_full_folio+0x4ff/0x11b0 fs/buffer.c:2271 hfs_read_folio+0x55/0x60 fs/hfs/inode.c:39 filemap_read_folio+0x148/0x4f0 mm/filemap.c:2426 do_read_cache_folio+0x7c8/0xd90 mm/filemap.c:3553 do_read_cache_page mm/filemap.c:3595 [inline] read_cache_page+0xfb/0x2f0 mm/filemap.c:3604 read_mapping_page include/linux/pagemap.h:755 [inline] hfs_btree_open+0x928/0x1ae0 fs/hfs/btree.c:78 hfs_mdb_get+0x260c/0x3000 fs/hfs/mdb.c:204 hfs_fill_super+0x1fb1/0x2790 fs/hfs/super.c:406 mount_bdev+0x628/0x920 fs/super.c:1359 hfs_mount+0xcd/0xe0 fs/hfs/super.c:456 legacy_get_tree+0x167/0x2e0 fs/fs_context.c:610 vfs_get_tree+0xdc/0x5d0 fs/super.c:1489 do_new_mount+0x7a9/0x16f0 fs/namespace.c:3145 path_mount+0xf98/0x26a0 fs/namespace.c:3475 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3488 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3697 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x919/0x9e0 fs/namespace.c:3674 __ia32_sys_mount+0x15b/0x1b0 fs/namespace.c:3674 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:112 [inline] __do_fast_syscall_32+0xa2/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:178 do_fast_syscall_32+0x37/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:203 do_SYSENTER_32+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/common.c:246 entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x70/0x82 Uninit was created at: __alloc_pages+0x9a6/0xe00 mm/page_alloc.c:4590 __alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:238 [inline] alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:261 [inline] alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:2190 [inline] allocate_slab mm/slub.c:2354 [inline] new_slab+0x2d7/0x1400 mm/slub.c:2407 ___slab_alloc+0x16b5/0x3970 mm/slub.c:3540 __slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3625 [inline] __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3678 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3850 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x64d/0xb30 mm/slub.c:3879 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3018 [inline] hfs_alloc_inode+0x5a/0xc0 fs/hfs/super.c:165 alloc_inode+0x83/0x440 fs/inode.c:260 new_inode_pseudo fs/inode.c:1005 [inline] new_inode+0x38/0x4f0 fs/inode.c:1031 hfs_new_inode+0x61/0x1010 fs/hfs/inode.c:186 hfs_mkdir+0x54/0x250 fs/hfs/dir.c:228 vfs_mkdir+0x49a/0x700 fs/namei.c:4126 do_mkdirat+0x529/0x810 fs/namei.c:4149 __do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4164 [inline] __se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4162 [inline] __x64_sys_mkdirat+0xc8/0x120 fs/namei.c:4162 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b It missed to initialize .tz_secondswest, .cached_start and .cached_blocks fields in struct hfs_inode_info after hfs_alloc_inode(), fix it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Check for NULL pointer [why & how] Need to make sure plane_state is initialized before accessing its members. (cherry picked from commit 295d91cbc700651782a60572f83c24861607b648)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PCI/DPC: Fix use-after-free on concurrent DPC and hot-removal Keith reports a use-after-free when a DPC event occurs concurrently to hot-removal of the same portion of the hierarchy: The dpc_handler() awaits readiness of the secondary bus below the Downstream Port where the DPC event occurred. To do so, it polls the config space of the first child device on the secondary bus. If that child device is concurrently removed, accesses to its struct pci_dev cause the kernel to oops. That's because pci_bridge_wait_for_secondary_bus() neglects to hold a reference on the child device. Before v6.3, the function was only called on resume from system sleep or on runtime resume. Holding a reference wasn't necessary back then because the pciehp IRQ thread could never run concurrently. (On resume from system sleep, IRQs are not enabled until after the resume_noirq phase. And runtime resume is always awaited before a PCI device is removed.) However starting with v6.3, pci_bridge_wait_for_secondary_bus() is also called on a DPC event. Commit 53b54ad074de ("PCI/DPC: Await readiness of secondary bus after reset"), which introduced that, failed to appreciate that pci_bridge_wait_for_secondary_bus() now needs to hold a reference on the child device because dpc_handler() and pciehp may indeed run concurrently. The commit was backported to v5.10+ stable kernels, so that's the oldest one affected. Add the missing reference acquisition. Abridged stack trace: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000091400c0 CPU: 15 PID: 2464 Comm: irq/53-pcie-dpc 6.9.0 RIP: pci_bus_read_config_dword+0x17/0x50 pci_dev_wait() pci_bridge_wait_for_secondary_bus() dpc_reset_link() pcie_do_recovery() dpc_handler()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dev/parport: fix the array out-of-bounds risk Fixed array out-of-bounds issues caused by sprintf by replacing it with snprintf for safer data copying, ensuring the destination buffer is not overflowed. Below is the stack trace I encountered during the actual issue: [ 66.575408s] [pid:5118,cpu4,QThread,4]Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: do_hardware_base_addr+0xcc/0xd0 [parport] [ 66.575408s] [pid:5118,cpu4,QThread,5]CPU: 4 PID: 5118 Comm: QThread Tainted: G S W O 5.10.97-arm64-desktop #7100.57021.2 [ 66.575439s] [pid:5118,cpu4,QThread,6]TGID: 5087 Comm: EFileApp [ 66.575439s] [pid:5118,cpu4,QThread,7]Hardware name: HUAWEI HUAWEI QingYun PGUX-W515x-B081/SP1PANGUXM, BIOS 1.00.07 04/29/2024 [ 66.575439s] [pid:5118,cpu4,QThread,8]Call trace: [ 66.575469s] [pid:5118,cpu4,QThread,9] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1c0 [ 66.575469s] [pid:5118,cpu4,QThread,0] show_stack+0x14/0x20 [ 66.575469s] [pid:5118,cpu4,QThread,1] dump_stack+0xd4/0x10c [ 66.575500s] [pid:5118,cpu4,QThread,2] panic+0x1d8/0x3bc [ 66.575500s] [pid:5118,cpu4,QThread,3] __stack_chk_fail+0x2c/0x38 [ 66.575500s] [pid:5118,cpu4,QThread,4] do_hardware_base_addr+0xcc/0xd0 [parport]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: During vport delete send async logout explicitly During vport delete, it is observed that during unload we hit a crash because of stale entries in outstanding command array. For all these stale I/O entries, eh_abort was issued and aborted (fast_fail_io = 2009h) but I/Os could not complete while vport delete is in process of deleting. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000001c #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI Workqueue: qla2xxx_wq qla_do_work [qla2xxx] RIP: 0010:dma_direct_unmap_sg+0x51/0x1e0 RSP: 0018:ffffa1e1e150fc68 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000021 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000021 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ce208a7a0d0 RBP: ffff8ce208a7a0d0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8ce378aac9c8 R10: ffff8ce378aac8a0 R11: ffffa1e1e150f9d8 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8ce378aac9c8 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8d217f000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000000001c CR3: 0000002089acc000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 Call Trace: <TASK> qla2xxx_qpair_sp_free_dma+0x417/0x4e0 ? qla2xxx_qpair_sp_compl+0x10d/0x1a0 ? qla2x00_status_entry+0x768/0x2830 ? newidle_balance+0x2f0/0x430 ? dequeue_entity+0x100/0x3c0 ? qla24xx_process_response_queue+0x6a1/0x19e0 ? __schedule+0x2d5/0x1140 ? qla_do_work+0x47/0x60 ? process_one_work+0x267/0x440 ? process_one_work+0x440/0x440 ? worker_thread+0x2d/0x3d0 ? process_one_work+0x440/0x440 ? kthread+0x156/0x180 ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 ? ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 </TASK> Send out async logout explicitly for all the ports during vport delete.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: Fix for possible memory corruption Init Control Block is dereferenced incorrectly. Correctly dereference ICB