A vulnerability in the information storage architecture of several Cisco IP Phone models could allow an unauthenticated, physical attacker to obtain confidential information from an affected device. This vulnerability is due to unencrypted storage of confidential information on an affected device. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by physically extracting and accessing one of the flash memory chips. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to obtain confidential information from the device, which could be used for subsequent attacks.

A vulnerability in the debug shell of Cisco IP Phone software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to read any file on the device file system. This vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by providing crafted input to a debug shell command. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to read any file on the device file system.

An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The Wi-Fi implementation does not verify the Message Integrity Check (authenticity) of fragmented TKIP frames. An adversary can abuse this to inject and possibly decrypt packets in WPA or WPA2 networks that support the TKIP data-confidentiality protocol.

A vulnerability in the Cisco Discovery Protocol implementation for the Cisco IP Phone could allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to remotely execute code with root privileges or cause a reload of an affected IP phone. The vulnerability is due to missing checks when processing Cisco Discovery Protocol messages. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted Cisco Discovery Protocol packet to the targeted IP phone. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to remotely execute code with root privileges or cause a reload of an affected IP phone, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. Cisco Discovery Protocol is a Layer 2 protocol. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must be in the same broadcast domain as the affected device (Layer 2 adjacent).