An issue was discovered in Dovecot before 2.3.13. By using IMAP IDLE, an authenticated attacker can trigger unhibernation via attacker-controlled parameters, leading to access to other users' email messages (and path disclosure).

decode_frame in libavcodec/exr.c in FFmpeg 4.3.1 has an out-of-bounds write because of errors in calculations of when to perform memset zero operations.

Nokogiri is a Rubygem providing HTML, XML, SAX, and Reader parsers with XPath and CSS selector support. In Nokogiri before version 1.11.0.rc4 there is an XXE vulnerability. XML Schemas parsed by Nokogiri::XML::Schema are trusted by default, allowing external resources to be accessed over the network, potentially enabling XXE or SSRF attacks. This behavior is counter to the security policy followed by Nokogiri maintainers, which is to treat all input as untrusted by default whenever possible. This is fixed in Nokogiri version 1.11.0.rc4.

The td-agent-builder plugin before 2020-12-18 for Fluentd allows attackers to gain privileges because the bin directory is writable by a user account, but a file in bin is executed as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM.

The Graphics Protocol feature in graphics.c in kitty before 0.19.3 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code because a filename containing special characters can be included in an error message.

An issue was discovered in MediaWiki before 1.35.1. Missing users (accounts that don't exist) and hidden users (accounts that have been explicitly hidden due to being abusive, or similar) that the viewer cannot see are handled differently, exposing sensitive information about the hidden status to unprivileged viewers. This exists on various code paths.

MediaWiki before 1.35.1 allows XSS via BlockLogFormatter.php. Language::translateBlockExpiry itself does not escape in all code paths. For example, the return of Language::userTimeAndDate is is always unsafe for HTML in a month value. This affects MediaWiki 1.12.0 and later.

MediaWiki before 1.35.1 blocks legitimate attempts to hide log entries in some situations. If one sets MediaWiki:Mainpage to Special:MyLanguage/Main Page, visits a log entry on Special:Log, and toggles the "Change visibility of selected log entries" checkbox (or a tags checkbox) next to it, there is a redirection to the main page's action=historysubmit (instead of the desired behavior in which a revision-deletion form appears).

In MediaWiki before 1.35.1, the messages userrights-expiry-current and userrights-expiry-none can contain raw HTML. XSS can happen when a user visits Special:UserRights but does not have rights to change all userrights, and the table on the left side has unchangeable groups in it. (The right column with the changeable groups is not affected and is escaped correctly.)

An issue was discovered in p11-kit 0.23.6 through 0.23.21. A heap-based buffer overflow has been discovered in the RPC protocol used by p11-kit server/remote commands and the client library. When the remote entity supplies a serialized byte array in a CK_ATTRIBUTE, the receiving entity may not allocate sufficient length for the buffer to store the deserialized value.

An issue was discovered in p11-kit 0.21.1 through 0.23.21. Multiple integer overflows have been discovered in the array allocations in the p11-kit library and the p11-kit list command, where overflow checks are missing before calling realloc or calloc.

XStream is a Java library to serialize objects to XML and back again. In XStream before version 1.4.15, is vulnerable to an Arbitrary File Deletion on the local host when unmarshalling. The vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to delete arbitrary know files on the host as log as the executing process has sufficient rights only by manipulating the processed input stream. If you rely on XStream's default blacklist of the Security Framework, you will have to use at least version 1.4.15. The reported vulnerability does not exist running Java 15 or higher. No user is affected, who followed the recommendation to setup XStream's Security Framework with a whitelist! Anyone relying on XStream's default blacklist can immediately switch to a whilelist for the allowed types to avoid the vulnerability. Users of XStream 1.4.14 or below who still want to use XStream default blacklist can use a workaround described in more detailed in the referenced advisories.

XStream is a Java library to serialize objects to XML and back again. In XStream before version 1.4.15, a Server-Side Forgery Request vulnerability can be activated when unmarshalling. The vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to request data from internal resources that are not publicly available only by manipulating the processed input stream. If you rely on XStream's default blacklist of the Security Framework, you will have to use at least version 1.4.15. The reported vulnerability does not exist if running Java 15 or higher. No user is affected who followed the recommendation to setup XStream's Security Framework with a whitelist! Anyone relying on XStream's default blacklist can immediately switch to a whilelist for the allowed types to avoid the vulnerability. Users of XStream 1.4.14 or below who still want to use XStream default blacklist can use a workaround described in more detailed in the referenced advisories.

An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.14.x. Nodes in xenstore have an ownership. In oxenstored, a owner could give a node away. However, node ownership has quota implications. Any guest can run another guest out of quota, or create an unbounded number of nodes owned by dom0, thus running xenstored out of memory A malicious guest administrator can cause a denial of service against a specific guest or against the whole host. All systems using oxenstored are vulnerable. Building and using oxenstored is the default in the upstream Xen distribution, if the Ocaml compiler is available. Systems using C xenstored are not vulnerable.

An issue was discovered in Xen 4.6 through 4.14.x. When acting upon a guest XS_RESET_WATCHES request, not all tracking information is freed. A guest can cause unbounded memory usage in oxenstored. This can lead to a system-wide DoS. Only systems using the Ocaml Xenstored implementation are vulnerable. Systems using the C Xenstored implementation are not vulnerable.

An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.14.x. When a Xenstore watch fires, the xenstore client that registered the watch will receive a Xenstore message containing the path of the modified Xenstore entry that triggered the watch, and the tag that was specified when registering the watch. Any communication with xenstored is done via Xenstore messages, consisting of a message header and the payload. The payload length is limited to 4096 bytes. Any request to xenstored resulting in a response with a payload longer than 4096 bytes will result in an error. When registering a watch, the payload length limit applies to the combined length of the watched path and the specified tag. Because watches for a specific path are also triggered for all nodes below that path, the payload of a watch event message can be longer than the payload needed to register the watch. A malicious guest that registers a watch using a very large tag (i.e., with a registration operation payload length close to the 4096 byte limit) can cause the generation of watch events with a payload length larger than 4096 bytes, by writing to Xenstore entries below the watched path. This will result in an error condition in xenstored. This error can result in a NULL pointer dereference, leading to a crash of xenstored. A malicious guest administrator can cause xenstored to crash, leading to a denial of service. Following a xenstored crash, domains may continue to run, but management operations will be impossible. Only C xenstored is affected, oxenstored is not affected.

An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.14.x. Xenstored and guests communicate via a shared memory page using a specific protocol. When a guest violates this protocol, xenstored will drop the connection to that guest. Unfortunately, this is done by just removing the guest from xenstored's internal management, resulting in the same actions as if the guest had been destroyed, including sending an @releaseDomain event. @releaseDomain events do not say that the guest has been removed. All watchers of this event must look at the states of all guests to find the guest that has been removed. When an @releaseDomain is generated due to a domain xenstored protocol violation, because the guest is still running, the watchers will not react. Later, when the guest is actually destroyed, xenstored will no longer have it stored in its internal data base, so no further @releaseDomain event will be sent. This can lead to a zombie domain; memory mappings of that guest's memory will not be removed, due to the missing event. This zombie domain will be cleaned up only after another domain is destroyed, as that will trigger another @releaseDomain event. If the device model of the guest that violated the Xenstore protocol is running in a stub-domain, a use-after-free case could happen in xenstored, after having removed the guest from its internal data base, possibly resulting in a crash of xenstored. A malicious guest can block resources of the host for a period after its own death. Guests with a stub domain device model can eventually crash xenstored, resulting in a more serious denial of service (the prevention of any further domain management operations). Only the C variant of Xenstore is affected; the Ocaml variant is not affected. Only HVM guests with a stubdom device model can cause a serious DoS.

An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.14.x. A guest may access xenstore paths via absolute paths containing a full pathname, or via a relative path, which implicitly includes /local/domain/$DOMID for their own domain id. Management tools must access paths in guests' namespaces, necessarily using absolute paths. oxenstored imposes a pathname limit that is applied solely to the relative or absolute path specified by the client. Therefore, a guest can create paths in its own namespace which are too long for management tools to access. Depending on the toolstack in use, a malicious guest administrator might cause some management tools and debugging operations to fail. For example, a guest administrator can cause "xenstore-ls -r" to fail. However, a guest administrator cannot prevent the host administrator from tearing down the domain. All systems using oxenstored are vulnerable. Building and using oxenstored is the default in the upstream Xen distribution, if the Ocaml compiler is available. Systems using C xenstored are not vulnerable.

An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.14.x. Access rights of Xenstore nodes are per domid. Unfortunately, existing granted access rights are not removed when a domain is being destroyed. This means that a new domain created with the same domid will inherit the access rights to Xenstore nodes from the previous domain(s) with the same domid. Because all Xenstore entries of a guest below /local/domain/<domid> are being deleted by Xen tools when a guest is destroyed, only Xenstore entries of other guests still running are affected. For example, a newly created guest domain might be able to read sensitive information that had belonged to a previously existing guest domain. Both Xenstore implementations (C and Ocaml) are vulnerable.

An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.14.x. Neither xenstore implementation does any permission checks when reporting a xenstore watch event. A guest administrator can watch the root xenstored node, which will cause notifications for every created, modified, and deleted key. A guest administrator can also use the special watches, which will cause a notification every time a domain is created and destroyed. Data may include: number, type, and domids of other VMs; existence and domids of driver domains; numbers of virtual interfaces, block devices, vcpus; existence of virtual framebuffers and their backend style (e.g., existence of VNC service); Xen VM UUIDs for other domains; timing information about domain creation and device setup; and some hints at the backend provisioning of VMs and their devices. The watch events do not contain values stored in xenstore, only key names. A guest administrator can observe non-sensitive domain and device lifecycle events relating to other guests. This information allows some insight into overall system configuration (including the number and general nature of other guests), and configuration of other guests (including the number and general nature of other guests' devices). This information might be commercially interesting or might make other attacks easier. There is not believed to be exposure of sensitive data. Specifically, there is no exposure of VNC passwords, port numbers, pathnames in host and guest filesystems, cryptographic keys, or within-guest data.