In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: jfs: fix array-index-out-of-bounds in jfs_readdir The stbl might contain some invalid values. Added a check to return error code in that case.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: jfs: add a check to prevent array-index-out-of-bounds in dbAdjTree When the value of lp is 0 at the beginning of the for loop, it will become negative in the next assignment and we should bail out.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcmfmac: Fix oops due to NULL pointer dereference in brcmf_sdiod_sglist_rw() This patch fixes a NULL pointer dereference bug in brcmfmac that occurs when a high 'sd_sgentry_align' value applies (e.g. 512) and a lot of queued SKBs are sent from the pkt queue. The problem is the number of entries in the pre-allocated sgtable, it is nents = max(rxglom_size, txglom_size) + max(rxglom_size, txglom_size) >> 4 + 1. Given the default [rt]xglom_size=32 it's actually 35 which is too small. Worst case, the pkt queue can end up with 64 SKBs. This occurs when a new SKB is added for each original SKB if tailroom isn't enough to hold tail_pad. At least one sg entry is needed for each SKB. So, eventually the "skb_queue_walk loop" in brcmf_sdiod_sglist_rw may run out of sg entries. This makes sg_next return NULL and this causes the oops. The patch sets nents to max(rxglom_size, txglom_size) * 2 to be able handle the worst-case. Btw. this requires only 64-35=29 * 16 (or 20 if CONFIG_NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH) = 464 additional bytes of memory.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: hisi_sas: Create all dump files during debugfs initialization For the current debugfs of hisi_sas, after user triggers dump, the driver allocate memory space to save the register information and create debugfs files to display the saved information. In this process, the debugfs files created after each dump. Therefore, when the dump is triggered while the driver is unbind, the following hang occurs: [67840.853907] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000a0 [67840.862947] Mem abort info: [67840.865855] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [67840.869713] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [67840.875125] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [67840.878291] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [67840.881545] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [67840.886528] Data abort info: [67840.889524] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [67840.895117] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [67840.900284] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [67840.905709] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000002803a1f000 [67840.912263] [00000000000000a0] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [67840.919177] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [67840.996435] pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [67841.003628] pc : down_write+0x30/0x98 [67841.007546] lr : start_creating.part.0+0x60/0x198 [67841.012495] sp : ffff8000b979ba20 [67841.016046] x29: ffff8000b979ba20 x28: 0000000000000010 x27: 0000000000024b40 [67841.023412] x26: 0000000000000012 x25: ffff20202b355ae8 x24: ffff20202b35a8c8 [67841.030779] x23: ffffa36877928208 x22: ffffa368b4972240 x21: ffff8000b979bb18 [67841.038147] x20: ffff00281dc1e3c0 x19: fffffffffffffffe x18: 0000000000000020 [67841.045515] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffa368b128a530 x15: ffffffffffffffff [67841.052888] x14: ffff8000b979bc18 x13: ffffffffffffffff x12: ffff8000b979bb18 [67841.060263] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffa368b1289b18 [67841.067640] x8 : 0000000000000012 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 00000000000003a9 [67841.075014] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff002818c5cb00 x3 : 0000000000000001 [67841.082388] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff002818c5cb00 x0 : 00000000000000a0 [67841.089759] Call trace: [67841.092456] down_write+0x30/0x98 [67841.096017] start_creating.part.0+0x60/0x198 [67841.100613] debugfs_create_dir+0x48/0x1f8 [67841.104950] debugfs_create_files_v3_hw+0x88/0x348 [hisi_sas_v3_hw] [67841.111447] debugfs_snapshot_regs_v3_hw+0x708/0x798 [hisi_sas_v3_hw] [67841.118111] debugfs_trigger_dump_v3_hw_write+0x9c/0x120 [hisi_sas_v3_hw] [67841.125115] full_proxy_write+0x68/0xc8 [67841.129175] vfs_write+0xd8/0x3f0 [67841.132708] ksys_write+0x70/0x108 [67841.136317] __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x38 [67841.140440] invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128 [67841.144385] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0 [67841.149273] do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 [67841.152773] el0_svc+0x38/0xd8 [67841.156009] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc0/0xc8 [67841.160361] el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 [67841.164189] Code: b9000882 d2800002 d2800023 f9800011 (c85ffc05) [67841.170443] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- To fix this issue, create all directories and files during debugfs initialization. In this way, the driver only needs to allocate memory space to save information each time the user triggers dumping.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: leds: class: Protect brightness_show() with led_cdev->led_access mutex There is NULL pointer issue observed if from Process A where hid device being added which results in adding a led_cdev addition and later a another call to access of led_cdev attribute from Process B can result in NULL pointer issue. Use mutex led_cdev->led_access to protect access to led->cdev and its attribute inside brightness_show() and max_brightness_show() and also update the comment for mutex that it should be used to protect the led class device fields. Process A Process B kthread+0x114 worker_thread+0x244 process_scheduled_works+0x248 uhid_device_add_worker+0x24 hid_add_device+0x120 device_add+0x268 bus_probe_device+0x94 device_initial_probe+0x14 __device_attach+0xfc bus_for_each_drv+0x10c __device_attach_driver+0x14c driver_probe_device+0x3c __driver_probe_device+0xa0 really_probe+0x190 hid_device_probe+0x130 ps_probe+0x990 ps_led_register+0x94 devm_led_classdev_register_ext+0x58 led_classdev_register_ext+0x1f8 device_create_with_groups+0x48 device_create_groups_vargs+0xc8 device_add+0x244 kobject_uevent+0x14 kobject_uevent_env[jt]+0x224 mutex_unlock[jt]+0xc4 __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xd4 wake_up_q+0x70 try_to_wake_up[jt]+0x48c preempt_schedule_common+0x28 __schedule+0x628 __switch_to+0x174 el0t_64_sync+0x1a8/0x1ac el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xbc el0_svc+0x38/0x68 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc_common+0x80/0xe0 invoke_syscall+0x58/0x114 __arm64_sys_read+0x1c/0x2c ksys_read+0x78/0xe8 vfs_read+0x1e0/0x2c8 kernfs_fop_read_iter+0x68/0x1b4 seq_read_iter+0x158/0x4ec kernfs_seq_show+0x44/0x54 sysfs_kf_seq_show+0xb4/0x130 dev_attr_show+0x38/0x74 brightness_show+0x20/0x4c dualshock4_led_get_brightness+0xc/0x74 [ 3313.874295][ T4013] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000060 [ 3313.874301][ T4013] Mem abort info: [ 3313.874303][ T4013] ESR = 0x0000000096000006 [ 3313.874305][ T4013] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 3313.874307][ T4013] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 3313.874309][ T4013] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 3313.874311][ T4013] FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault [ 3313.874313][ T4013] Data abort info: [ 3313.874314][ T4013] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 3313.874316][ T4013] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 3313.874318][ T4013] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 3313.874320][ T4013] user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=00000008f2b0a000 .. [ 3313.874332][ T4013] Dumping ftrace buffer: [ 3313.874334][ T4013] (ftrace buffer empty) .. .. [ dd3313.874639][ T4013] CPU: 6 PID: 4013 Comm: InputReader [ 3313.874648][ T4013] pc : dualshock4_led_get_brightness+0xc/0x74 [ 3313.874653][ T4013] lr : led_update_brightness+0x38/0x60 [ 3313.874656][ T4013] sp : ffffffc0b910bbd0 .. .. [ 3313.874685][ T4013] Call trace: [ 3313.874687][ T4013] dualshock4_led_get_brightness+0xc/0x74 [ 3313.874690][ T4013] brightness_show+0x20/0x4c [ 3313.874692][ T4013] dev_attr_show+0x38/0x74 [ 3313.874696][ T4013] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0xb4/0x130 [ 3313.874700][ T4013] kernfs_seq_show+0x44/0x54 [ 3313.874703][ T4013] seq_read_iter+0x158/0x4ec [ 3313.874705][ T4013] kernfs_fop_read_iter+0x68/0x1b4 [ 3313.874708][ T4013] vfs_read+0x1e0/0x2c8 [ 3313.874711][ T4013] ksys_read+0x78/0xe8 [ 3313.874714][ T4013] __arm64_sys_read+0x1c/0x2c [ 3313.874718][ T4013] invoke_syscall+0x58/0x114 [ 3313.874721][ T4013] el0_svc_common+0x80/0xe0 [ 3313.874724][ T4013] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 [ 3313.874727][ T4013] el0_svc+0x38/0x68 [ 3313.874730][ T4013] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xbc [ 3313.874732][ T4013] el0t_64_sync+0x1a8/0x1ac

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix use-after-free in btrfs_encoded_read_endio() Shinichiro reported the following use-after free that sometimes is happening in our CI system when running fstests' btrfs/284 on a TCMU runner device: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_release+0x708/0x780 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888106a83f18 by task kworker/u80:6/219 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 219 Comm: kworker/u80:6 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-kts+ #15 Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X11SPi-TF, BIOS 3.3 02/21/2020 Workqueue: btrfs-endio btrfs_end_bio_work [btrfs] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 print_report+0x174/0x505 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x410 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 kasan_report+0xda/0x1b0 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 ? __wake_up+0x44/0x60 lock_release+0x708/0x780 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? lock_is_held_type+0x9a/0x110 _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1f/0x60 __wake_up+0x44/0x60 btrfs_encoded_read_endio+0x14b/0x190 [btrfs] btrfs_check_read_bio+0x8d9/0x1360 [btrfs] ? lock_release+0x1b0/0x780 ? trace_lock_acquire+0x12f/0x1a0 ? __pfx_btrfs_check_read_bio+0x10/0x10 [btrfs] ? process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1460 ? lock_acquire+0x31/0xc0 ? process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1460 process_one_work+0x85c/0x1460 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 ? assign_work+0x16c/0x240 worker_thread+0x5e6/0xfc0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x2c3/0x3a0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x70 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 3661: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x16c/0x6d0 [btrfs] send_extent_data+0xf0f/0x24a0 [btrfs] process_extent+0x48a/0x1830 [btrfs] changed_cb+0x178b/0x2ea0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_send+0x3bf9/0x5c20 [btrfs] _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x117/0x330 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x184a/0x60a0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12e/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 3661: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70 __kasan_slab_free+0x4f/0x70 kfree+0x143/0x490 btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x531/0x6d0 [btrfs] send_extent_data+0xf0f/0x24a0 [btrfs] process_extent+0x48a/0x1830 [btrfs] changed_cb+0x178b/0x2ea0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_send+0x3bf9/0x5c20 [btrfs] _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x117/0x330 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x184a/0x60a0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12e/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888106a83f00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-rnd-07-96 of size 96 The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of freed 96-byte region [ffff888106a83f00, ffff888106a83f60) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888106a83800 pfn:0x106a83 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0017ffffc0000000 ffff888100053680 ffffea0004917200 0000000000000004 raw: ffff888106a83800 0000000080200019 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888106a83e00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ffff888106a83e80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc >ffff888106a83f00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ^ ffff888106a83f80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ffff888106a84000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== Further analyzing the trace and ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: ref-verify: fix use-after-free after invalid ref action At btrfs_ref_tree_mod() after we successfully inserted the new ref entry (local variable 'ref') into the respective block entry's rbtree (local variable 'be'), if we find an unexpected action of BTRFS_DROP_DELAYED_REF, we error out and free the ref entry without removing it from the block entry's rbtree. Then in the error path of btrfs_ref_tree_mod() we call btrfs_free_ref_cache(), which iterates over all block entries and then calls free_block_entry() for each one, and there we will trigger a use-after-free when we are called against the block entry to which we added the freed ref entry to its rbtree, since the rbtree still points to the block entry, as we didn't remove it from the rbtree before freeing it in the error path at btrfs_ref_tree_mod(). Fix this by removing the new ref entry from the rbtree before freeing it. Syzbot report this with the following stack traces: BTRFS error (device loop0 state EA): Ref action 2, root 5, ref_root 0, parent 8564736, owner 0, offset 0, num_refs 18446744073709551615 __btrfs_mod_ref+0x7dd/0xac0 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:2523 update_ref_for_cow+0x9cd/0x11f0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:512 btrfs_force_cow_block+0x9f6/0x1da0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:594 btrfs_cow_block+0x35e/0xa40 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:754 btrfs_search_slot+0xbdd/0x30d0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2116 btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x9c/0x1a0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4314 btrfs_insert_empty_item fs/btrfs/ctree.h:669 [inline] btrfs_insert_orphan_item+0x1f1/0x320 fs/btrfs/orphan.c:23 btrfs_orphan_add+0x6d/0x1a0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:3482 btrfs_unlink+0x267/0x350 fs/btrfs/inode.c:4293 vfs_unlink+0x365/0x650 fs/namei.c:4469 do_unlinkat+0x4ae/0x830 fs/namei.c:4533 __do_sys_unlinkat fs/namei.c:4576 [inline] __se_sys_unlinkat fs/namei.c:4569 [inline] __x64_sys_unlinkat+0xcc/0xf0 fs/namei.c:4569 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f BTRFS error (device loop0 state EA): Ref action 1, root 5, ref_root 5, parent 0, owner 260, offset 0, num_refs 1 __btrfs_mod_ref+0x76b/0xac0 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:2521 update_ref_for_cow+0x96a/0x11f0 btrfs_force_cow_block+0x9f6/0x1da0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:594 btrfs_cow_block+0x35e/0xa40 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:754 btrfs_search_slot+0xbdd/0x30d0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2116 btrfs_lookup_inode+0xdc/0x480 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:411 __btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x1e7/0xb90 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1030 btrfs_update_delayed_inode fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1114 [inline] __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0x2318/0x24a0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1137 __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x213/0x490 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1171 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x8a8/0x3740 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2313 prepare_to_relocate+0x3c4/0x4c0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3586 relocate_block_group+0x16c/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3611 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4081 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3377 __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4161 btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4538 BTRFS error (device loop0 state EA): Ref action 2, root 5, ref_root 0, parent 8564736, owner 0, offset 0, num_refs 18446744073709551615 __btrfs_mod_ref+0x7dd/0xac0 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:2523 update_ref_for_cow+0x9cd/0x11f0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:512 btrfs_force_cow_block+0x9f6/0x1da0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:594 btrfs_cow_block+0x35e/0xa40 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:754 btrfs_search_slot+0xbdd/0x30d0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2116 btrfs_lookup_inode+0xdc/0x480 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:411 __btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x1e7/0xb90 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1030 btrfs_update_delayed_i ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: amphion: Set video drvdata before register video device The video drvdata should be set before the video device is registered, otherwise video_drvdata() may return NULL in the open() file ops, and led to oops.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: imx-jpeg: Set video drvdata before register video device The video drvdata should be set before the video device is registered, otherwise video_drvdata() may return NULL in the open() file ops, and led to oops.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: mtk-jpeg: Fix null-ptr-deref during unload module The workqueue should be destroyed in mtk_jpeg_core.c since commit 09aea13ecf6f ("media: mtk-jpeg: refactor some variables"), otherwise the below calltrace can be easily triggered. [ 677.862514] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dfff800000000023 [ 677.863633] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000118-0x000000000000011f] ... [ 677.879654] CPU: 6 PID: 1071 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G O 6.8.12-mtk+gfa1a78e5d24b+ #17 ... [ 677.882838] pc : destroy_workqueue+0x3c/0x770 [ 677.883413] lr : mtk_jpegdec_destroy_workqueue+0x70/0x88 [mtk_jpeg_dec_hw] [ 677.884314] sp : ffff80008ad974f0 [ 677.884744] x29: ffff80008ad974f0 x28: ffff0000d7115580 x27: ffff0000dd691070 [ 677.885669] x26: ffff0000dd691408 x25: ffff8000844af3e0 x24: ffff80008ad97690 [ 677.886592] x23: ffff0000e051d400 x22: ffff0000dd691010 x21: dfff800000000000 [ 677.887515] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffff800085397ac0 [ 677.888438] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff8000801b87c8 x15: 1ffff000115b2e10 [ 677.889361] x14: 00000000f1f1f1f1 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffff7000115b2e4d [ 677.890285] x11: 1ffff000115b2e4c x10: ffff7000115b2e4c x9 : ffff80000aa43e90 [ 677.891208] x8 : 00008fffeea4d1b4 x7 : ffff80008ad97267 x6 : 0000000000000001 [ 677.892131] x5 : ffff80008ad97260 x4 : ffff7000115b2e4d x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 677.893054] x2 : 0000000000000023 x1 : dfff800000000000 x0 : 0000000000000118 [ 677.893977] Call trace: [ 677.894297] destroy_workqueue+0x3c/0x770 [ 677.894826] mtk_jpegdec_destroy_workqueue+0x70/0x88 [mtk_jpeg_dec_hw] [ 677.895677] devm_action_release+0x50/0x90 [ 677.896211] release_nodes+0xe8/0x170 [ 677.896688] devres_release_all+0xf8/0x178 [ 677.897219] device_unbind_cleanup+0x24/0x170 [ 677.897785] device_release_driver_internal+0x35c/0x480 [ 677.898461] device_release_driver+0x20/0x38 ... [ 677.912665] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: imx-jpeg: Ensure power suppliers be suspended before detach them The power suppliers are always requested to suspend asynchronously, dev_pm_domain_detach() requires the caller to ensure proper synchronization of this function with power management callbacks. otherwise the detach may led to kernel panic, like below: [ 1457.107934] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000040 [ 1457.116777] Mem abort info: [ 1457.119589] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 1457.123358] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 1457.128692] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 1457.131764] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 1457.134920] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 1457.139812] Data abort info: [ 1457.142707] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 1457.148196] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 1457.153256] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 1457.158563] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000001138b6000 [ 1457.165000] [0000000000000040] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 1457.171792] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 1457.178045] Modules linked in: v4l2_jpeg wave6_vpu_ctrl(-) [last unloaded: mxc_jpeg_encdec] [ 1457.186383] CPU: 0 PID: 51938 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 6.6.36-gd23d64eea511 #66 [ 1457.194112] Hardware name: NXP i.MX95 19X19 board (DT) [ 1457.199236] Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work [ 1457.203247] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 1457.210188] pc : genpd_runtime_suspend+0x20/0x290 [ 1457.214886] lr : __rpm_callback+0x48/0x1d8 [ 1457.218968] sp : ffff80008250bc50 [ 1457.222270] x29: ffff80008250bc50 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 1457.229394] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000008 x24: 00000000000f4240 [ 1457.236518] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff00008590f0e4 x21: 0000000000000008 [ 1457.243642] x20: ffff80008099c434 x19: ffff00008590f000 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 1457.250766] x17: 5300326563697665 x16: 645f676e696c6f6f x15: 63343a6d726f6674 [ 1457.257890] x14: 0000000000000004 x13: 00000000000003a4 x12: 0000000000000002 [ 1457.265014] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000a60 x9 : ffff80008250bbb0 [ 1457.272138] x8 : ffff000092937200 x7 : ffff0003fdf6af80 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 1457.279262] x5 : 00000000410fd050 x4 : 0000000000200000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 1457.286386] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff00008590f000 [ 1457.293510] Call trace: [ 1457.295946] genpd_runtime_suspend+0x20/0x290 [ 1457.300296] __rpm_callback+0x48/0x1d8 [ 1457.304038] rpm_callback+0x6c/0x78 [ 1457.307515] rpm_suspend+0x10c/0x570 [ 1457.311077] pm_runtime_work+0xc4/0xc8 [ 1457.314813] process_one_work+0x138/0x248 [ 1457.318816] worker_thread+0x320/0x438 [ 1457.322552] kthread+0x110/0x114 [ 1457.325767] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: ts2020: fix null-ptr-deref in ts2020_probe() KASAN reported a null-ptr-deref issue when executing the following command: # echo ts2020 0x20 > /sys/bus/i2c/devices/i2c-0/new_device KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] CPU: 53 UID: 0 PID: 970 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2+ #24 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009) RIP: 0010:ts2020_probe+0xad/0xe10 [ts2020] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000abbf598 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffc0714809 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffff88811550be00 RDI: 0000000000000010 RBP: ffff888109868800 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff52001577eb6 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffc9000abbff50 R12: ffffffffc0714790 R13: 1ffff92001577eb8 R14: ffffffffc07190d0 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f95f13b98c0(0000) GS:ffff888149280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000555d2634b000 CR3: 0000000152236000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ts2020_probe+0xad/0xe10 [ts2020] i2c_device_probe+0x421/0xb40 really_probe+0x266/0x850 ... The cause of the problem is that when using sysfs to dynamically register an i2c device, there is no platform data, but the probe process of ts2020 needs to use platform data, resulting in a null pointer being accessed. Solve this problem by adding checks to platform data.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: platform: allegro-dvt: Fix possible memory leak in allocate_buffers_internal() The buffer in the loop should be released under the exception path, otherwise there may be a memory leak here. To mitigate this, free the buffer when allegro_alloc_buffer fails.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ftrace: Fix regression with module command in stack_trace_filter When executing the following command: # echo "write*:mod:ext3" > /sys/kernel/tracing/stack_trace_filter The current mod command causes a null pointer dereference. While commit 0f17976568b3f ("ftrace: Fix regression with module command in stack_trace_filter") has addressed part of the issue, it left a corner case unhandled, which still results in a kernel crash.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/arm-smmu: Defer probe of clients after smmu device bound Null pointer dereference occurs due to a race between smmu driver probe and client driver probe, when of_dma_configure() for client is called after the iommu_device_register() for smmu driver probe has executed but before the driver_bound() for smmu driver has been called. Following is how the race occurs: T1:Smmu device probe T2: Client device probe really_probe() arm_smmu_device_probe() iommu_device_register() really_probe() platform_dma_configure() of_dma_configure() of_dma_configure_id() of_iommu_configure() iommu_probe_device() iommu_init_device() arm_smmu_probe_device() arm_smmu_get_by_fwnode() driver_find_device_by_fwnode() driver_find_device() next_device() klist_next() /* null ptr assigned to smmu */ /* null ptr dereference while smmu->streamid_mask */ driver_bound() klist_add_tail() When this null smmu pointer is dereferenced later in arm_smmu_probe_device, the device crashes. Fix this by deferring the probe of the client device until the smmu device has bound to the arm smmu driver. [will: Add comment]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ad7780: fix division by zero in ad7780_write_raw() In the ad7780_write_raw() , val2 can be zero, which might lead to a division by zero error in DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(). The ad7780_write_raw() is based on iio_info's write_raw. While val is explicitly declared that can be zero (in read mode), val2 is not specified to be non-zero.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: fix usage slab after free [ +0.000021] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in drm_sched_entity_flush+0x6cb/0x7a0 [gpu_sched] [ +0.000027] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881b8605f88 by task amd_pci_unplug/2147 [ +0.000023] CPU: 6 PID: 2147 Comm: amd_pci_unplug Not tainted 6.10.0+ #1 [ +0.000016] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/ROG STRIX B550-F GAMING (WI-FI), BIOS 1401 12/03/2020 [ +0.000016] Call Trace: [ +0.000008] <TASK> [ +0.000009] dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0 [ +0.000017] print_report+0xce/0x5f0 [ +0.000017] ? drm_sched_entity_flush+0x6cb/0x7a0 [gpu_sched] [ +0.000019] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000015] ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x72/0x200 [ +0.000016] ? drm_sched_entity_flush+0x6cb/0x7a0 [gpu_sched] [ +0.000019] kasan_report+0xbe/0x110 [ +0.000015] ? drm_sched_entity_flush+0x6cb/0x7a0 [gpu_sched] [ +0.000023] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x30 [ +0.000014] drm_sched_entity_flush+0x6cb/0x7a0 [gpu_sched] [ +0.000020] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000013] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 [ +0.000016] ? __pfx_drm_sched_entity_flush+0x10/0x10 [gpu_sched] [ +0.000020] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000013] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 [ +0.000013] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000013] ? enable_work+0x124/0x220 [ +0.000015] ? __pfx_enable_work+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000013] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000014] ? free_large_kmalloc+0x85/0xf0 [ +0.000016] drm_sched_entity_destroy+0x18/0x30 [gpu_sched] [ +0.000020] amdgpu_vce_sw_fini+0x55/0x170 [amdgpu] [ +0.000735] ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 [ +0.000016] vce_v4_0_sw_fini+0x80/0x110 [amdgpu] [ +0.000726] amdgpu_device_fini_sw+0x331/0xfc0 [amdgpu] [ +0.000679] ? mutex_unlock+0x80/0xe0 [ +0.000017] ? __pfx_amdgpu_device_fini_sw+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu] [ +0.000662] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000014] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 [ +0.000013] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000013] ? mutex_unlock+0x80/0xe0 [ +0.000016] amdgpu_driver_release_kms+0x16/0x80 [amdgpu] [ +0.000663] drm_minor_release+0xc9/0x140 [drm] [ +0.000081] drm_release+0x1fd/0x390 [drm] [ +0.000082] __fput+0x36c/0xad0 [ +0.000018] __fput_sync+0x3c/0x50 [ +0.000014] __x64_sys_close+0x7d/0xe0 [ +0.000014] x64_sys_call+0x1bc6/0x2680 [ +0.000014] do_syscall_64+0x70/0x130 [ +0.000014] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000014] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x60/0x190 [ +0.000015] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000014] ? irqentry_exit+0x43/0x50 [ +0.000012] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000013] ? exc_page_fault+0x7c/0x110 [ +0.000015] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ +0.000014] RIP: 0033:0x7ffff7b14f67 [ +0.000013] Code: ff e8 0d 16 02 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 73 ba f7 ff [ +0.000026] RSP: 002b:00007fffffffe378 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 [ +0.000019] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007ffff7b14f67 [ +0.000014] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffff7f6f47a RDI: 0000000000000003 [ +0.000014] RBP: 00007fffffffe3a0 R08: 0000555555569890 R09: 0000000000000000 [ +0.000014] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fffffffe5c8 [ +0.000013] R13: 00005555555552a9 R14: 0000555555557d48 R15: 00007ffff7ffd040 [ +0.000020] </TASK> [ +0.000016] Allocated by task 383 on cpu 7 at 26.880319s: [ +0.000014] kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x60 [ +0.000008] kasan_save_track+0x18/0x70 [ +0.000007] kasan_save_alloc_info+0x38/0x60 [ +0.000007] __kasan_kmalloc+0xc1/0xd0 [ +0.000007] kmalloc_trace_noprof+0x180/0x380 [ +0.000007] drm_sched_init+0x411/0xec0 [gpu_sched] [ +0.000012] amdgpu_device_init+0x695f/0xa610 [amdgpu] [ +0.000658] amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x1a/0x120 [amdgpu] [ +0.000662] amdgpu_pci_p ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: Fix NULL pointer dereference in object->file At present, the object->file has the NULL pointer dereference problem in ondemand-mode. The root cause is that the allocated fd and object->file lifetime are inconsistent, and the user-space invocation to anon_fd uses object->file. Following is the process that triggers the issue: [write fd] [umount] cachefiles_ondemand_fd_write_iter fscache_cookie_state_machine cachefiles_withdraw_cookie if (!file) return -ENOBUFS cachefiles_clean_up_object cachefiles_unmark_inode_in_use fput(object->file) object->file = NULL // file NULL pointer dereference! __cachefiles_write(..., file, ...) Fix this issue by add an additional reference count to the object->file before write/llseek, and decrement after it finished.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hfsplus: don't query the device logical block size multiple times Devices block sizes may change. One of these cases is a loop device by using ioctl LOOP_SET_BLOCK_SIZE. While this may cause other issues like IO being rejected, in the case of hfsplus, it will allocate a block by using that size and potentially write out-of-bounds when hfsplus_read_wrapper calls hfsplus_submit_bio and the latter function reads a different io_size. Using a new min_io_size initally set to sb_min_blocksize works for the purposes of the original fix, since it will be set to the max between HFSPLUS_SECTOR_SIZE and the first seen logical block size. We still use the max between HFSPLUS_SECTOR_SIZE and min_io_size in case the latter is not initialized. Tested by mounting an hfsplus filesystem with loop block sizes 512, 1024 and 4096. The produced KASAN report before the fix looks like this: [ 419.944641] ================================================================== [ 419.945655] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hfsplus_read_wrapper+0x659/0xa0a [ 419.946703] Read of size 2 at addr ffff88800721fc00 by task repro/10678 [ 419.947612] [ 419.947846] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 10678 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-00008-gdf56e0f2f3ca #84 [ 419.949007] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 419.950035] Call Trace: [ 419.950384] <TASK> [ 419.950676] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x78 [ 419.951212] ? hfsplus_read_wrapper+0x659/0xa0a [ 419.951830] print_report+0x14c/0x49e [ 419.952361] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x267/0x278 [ 419.952979] ? kmem_cache_debug_flags+0xc/0x1d [ 419.953561] ? hfsplus_read_wrapper+0x659/0xa0a [ 419.954231] kasan_report+0x89/0xb0 [ 419.954748] ? hfsplus_read_wrapper+0x659/0xa0a [ 419.955367] hfsplus_read_wrapper+0x659/0xa0a [ 419.955948] ? __pfx_hfsplus_read_wrapper+0x10/0x10 [ 419.956618] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x59/0x1a9 [ 419.957214] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1a/0x2e [ 419.957772] hfsplus_fill_super+0x348/0x1590 [ 419.958355] ? hlock_class+0x4c/0x109 [ 419.958867] ? __pfx_hfsplus_fill_super+0x10/0x10 [ 419.959499] ? __pfx_string+0x10/0x10 [ 419.960006] ? lock_acquire+0x3e2/0x454 [ 419.960532] ? bdev_name.constprop.0+0xce/0x243 [ 419.961129] ? __pfx_bdev_name.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 [ 419.961799] ? pointer+0x3f0/0x62f [ 419.962277] ? __pfx_pointer+0x10/0x10 [ 419.962761] ? vsnprintf+0x6c4/0xfba [ 419.963178] ? __pfx_vsnprintf+0x10/0x10 [ 419.963621] ? setup_bdev_super+0x376/0x3b3 [ 419.964029] ? snprintf+0x9d/0xd2 [ 419.964344] ? __pfx_snprintf+0x10/0x10 [ 419.964675] ? lock_acquired+0x45c/0x5e9 [ 419.965016] ? set_blocksize+0x139/0x1c1 [ 419.965381] ? sb_set_blocksize+0x6d/0xae [ 419.965742] ? __pfx_hfsplus_fill_super+0x10/0x10 [ 419.966179] mount_bdev+0x12f/0x1bf [ 419.966512] ? __pfx_mount_bdev+0x10/0x10 [ 419.966886] ? vfs_parse_fs_string+0xce/0x111 [ 419.967293] ? __pfx_vfs_parse_fs_string+0x10/0x10 [ 419.967702] ? __pfx_hfsplus_mount+0x10/0x10 [ 419.968073] legacy_get_tree+0x104/0x178 [ 419.968414] vfs_get_tree+0x86/0x296 [ 419.968751] path_mount+0xba3/0xd0b [ 419.969157] ? __pfx_path_mount+0x10/0x10 [ 419.969594] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1e2/0x260 [ 419.970311] do_mount+0x99/0xe0 [ 419.970630] ? __pfx_do_mount+0x10/0x10 [ 419.971008] __do_sys_mount+0x199/0x1c9 [ 419.971397] do_syscall_64+0xd0/0x135 [ 419.971761] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 419.972233] RIP: 0033:0x7c3cb812972e [ 419.972564] Code: 48 8b 0d f5 46 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d c2 46 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 419.974371] RSP: 002b:00007ffe30632548 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 419.975048] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe306328d8 RCX: 00007c3cb812972e [ 419.975701] RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000c80 RDI: ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udmabuf: change folios array from kmalloc to kvmalloc When PAGE_SIZE 4096, MAX_PAGE_ORDER 10, 64bit machine, page_alloc only support 4MB. If above this, trigger this warn and return NULL. udmabuf can change size limit, if change it to 3072(3GB), and then alloc 3GB udmabuf, will fail create. [ 4080.876581] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 4080.876843] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2015 at mm/page_alloc.c:4556 __alloc_pages+0x2c8/0x350 [ 4080.878839] RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages+0x2c8/0x350 [ 4080.879470] Call Trace: [ 4080.879473] <TASK> [ 4080.879473] ? __alloc_pages+0x2c8/0x350 [ 4080.879475] ? __warn.cold+0x8e/0xe8 [ 4080.880647] ? __alloc_pages+0x2c8/0x350 [ 4080.880909] ? report_bug+0xff/0x140 [ 4080.881175] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 [ 4080.881556] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 [ 4080.881559] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 4080.882077] ? udmabuf_create+0x131/0x400 Because MAX_PAGE_ORDER, kmalloc can max alloc 4096 * (1 << 10), 4MB memory, each array entry is pointer(8byte), so can save 524288 pages(2GB). Further more, costly order(order 3) may not be guaranteed that it can be applied for, due to fragmentation. This patch change udmabuf array use kvmalloc_array, this can fallback alloc into vmalloc, which can guarantee allocation for any size and does not affect the performance of kmalloc allocations.