Moby is an open source container framework that is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. In 26.0.0, IPv6 is not disabled on network interfaces, including those belonging to networks where `--ipv6=false`. An container with an `ipvlan` or `macvlan` interface will normally be configured to share an external network link with the host machine. Because of this direct access, (1) Containers may be able to communicate with other hosts on the local network over link-local IPv6 addresses, (2) if router advertisements are being broadcast over the local network, containers may get SLAAC-assigned addresses, and (3) the interface will be a member of IPv6 multicast groups. This means interfaces in IPv4-only networks present an unexpectedly and unnecessarily increased attack surface. The issue is patched in 26.0.2. To completely disable IPv6 in a container, use `--sysctl=net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6=1` in the `docker create` or `docker run` command. Or, in the service configuration of a `compose` file.

Moby is an open source container framework that is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. Moby's networking implementation allows for many networks, each with their own IP address range and gateway, to be defined. This feature is frequently referred to as custom networks, as each network can have a different driver, set of parameters and thus behaviors. When creating a network, the `--internal` flag is used to designate a network as _internal_. The `internal` attribute in a docker-compose.yml file may also be used to mark a network _internal_, and other API clients may specify the `internal` parameter as well. When containers with networking are created, they are assigned unique network interfaces and IP addresses. The host serves as a router for non-internal networks, with a gateway IP that provides SNAT/DNAT to/from container IPs. Containers on an internal network may communicate between each other, but are precluded from communicating with any networks the host has access to (LAN or WAN) as no default route is configured, and firewall rules are set up to drop all outgoing traffic. Communication with the gateway IP address (and thus appropriately configured host services) is possible, and the host may communicate with any container IP directly. In addition to configuring the Linux kernel's various networking features to enable container networking, `dockerd` directly provides some services to container networks. Principal among these is serving as a resolver, enabling service discovery, and resolution of names from an upstream resolver. When a DNS request for a name that does not correspond to a container is received, the request is forwarded to the configured upstream resolver. This request is made from the container's network namespace: the level of access and routing of traffic is the same as if the request was made by the container itself. As a consequence of this design, containers solely attached to an internal network will be unable to resolve names using the upstream resolver, as the container itself is unable to communicate with that nameserver. Only the names of containers also attached to the internal network are able to be resolved. Many systems run a local forwarding DNS resolver. As the host and any containers have separate loopback devices, a consequence of the design described above is that containers are unable to resolve names from the host's configured resolver, as they cannot reach these addresses on the host loopback device. To bridge this gap, and to allow containers to properly resolve names even when a local forwarding resolver is used on a loopback address, `dockerd` detects this scenario and instead forward DNS requests from the host namework namespace. The loopback resolver then forwards the requests to its configured upstream resolvers, as expected. Because `dockerd` forwards DNS requests to the host loopback device, bypassing the container network namespace's normal routing semantics entirely, internal networks can unexpectedly forward DNS requests to an external nameserver. By registering a domain for which they control the authoritative nameservers, an attacker could arrange for a compromised container to exfiltrate data by encoding it in DNS queries that will eventually be answered by their nameservers. Docker Desktop is not affected, as Docker Desktop always runs an internal resolver on a RFC 1918 address. Moby releases 26.0.0, 25.0.4, and 23.0.11 are patched to prevent forwarding any DNS requests from internal networks. As a workaround, run containers intended to be solely attached to internal networks with a custom upstream address, which will force all upstream DNS queries to be resolved from the container's network namespace.

Docker Desktop before 4.23.0 allows Access Token theft via a crafted extension icon URL. This issue affects Docker Desktop: before 4.23.0.

Docker Desktop before 4.23.0 allows an unprivileged user to bypass Enhanced Container Isolation (ECI) restrictions via the debug shell which remains accessible for a short time window after launching Docker Desktop. The affected functionality is available for Docker Business customers only and assumes an environment where users are not granted local root or Administrator privileges. This issue has been fixed in Docker Desktop 4.23.0. Affected Docker Desktop versions: from 4.13.0 before 4.23.0.

In Docker Desktop on Windows before 4.12.0 an argument injection to installer may result in local privilege escalation (LPE).This issue affects Docker Desktop: before 4.12.0.

Docker Desktop 4.11.x allows --no-windows-containers flag bypass via IPC response spoofing which may lead to Local Privilege Escalation (LPE).This issue affects Docker Desktop: 4.11.X.

Docker Desktop before 4.12.0 is vulnerable to RCE via query parameters in message-box route. This issue affects Docker Desktop: before 4.12.0.

Docker Desktop before 4.12.0 is vulnerable to RCE via a crafted extension description or changelog. This issue affects Docker Desktop: before 4.12.0.

Docker Desktop for Windows before 4.6 allows attackers to overwrite any file through the windowscontainers/start dockerBackendV2 API by controlling the data-root field inside the DaemonJSON field in the WindowsContainerStartRequest class. This allows exploiting a symlink vulnerability in ..\dataRoot\network\files\local-kv.db because of a TOCTOU race condition.

Docker Desktop for Windows before 4.6.0 allows attackers to delete (or create) any file through the dockerBackendV2 windowscontainers/start API by controlling the pidfile field inside the DaemonJSON field in the WindowsContainerStartRequest class. This can indirectly lead to privilege escalation.

Docker Desktop for Windows before 4.6.0 allows attackers to overwrite any file through a symlink attack on the hyperv/create dockerBackendV2 API by controlling the DataFolder parameter for DockerDesktop.vhdx, a similar issue to CVE-2022-31647.

Docker Desktop before 4.6.0 on Windows allows attackers to delete any file through the hyperv/destroy dockerBackendV2 API via a symlink in the DataFolder parameter, a different vulnerability than CVE-2022-26659.

In Docker Desktop 4.17.x the Artifactory Integration falls back to sending registry credentials over plain HTTP if the HTTPS health check has failed. A targeted network sniffing attack can lead to a disclosure of sensitive information. Only users who have Access Experimental Features enabled and have logged in to a private registry are affected.

Docker Desktop before 4.17.0 allows an unprivileged user to bypass Enhanced Container Isolation (ECI) restrictions by setting the Docker host to docker.raw.sock, or npipe:////.pipe/docker_engine_linux on Windows, via the -H (--host) CLI flag or the DOCKER_HOST environment variable and launch containers without the additional hardening features provided by ECI. This would not affect already running containers, nor containers launched through the usual approach (without Docker's raw socket). The affected functionality is available for Docker Business customers only and assumes an environment where users are not granted local root or Administrator privileges. This issue has been fixed in Docker Desktop 4.17.0. Affected Docker Desktop versions: from 4.13.0 before 4.17.0.

Docker Desktop before 4.17.0 allows an attacker to execute an arbitrary command inside a Dev Environments container during initialization by tricking a user to open a crafted malicious docker-desktop:// URL.

Docker Desktop 4.3.0 has Incorrect Access Control.

Docker Desktop installer on Windows in versions before 4.6.0 allows an attacker to overwrite any administrator writable files by creating a symlink in place of where the installer writes its log file. Starting from version 4.6.0, the Docker Desktop installer, when run elevated, will write its log files to a location not writable by non-administrator users.

Docker Desktop before 4.5.1 on Windows allows attackers to move arbitrary files. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2022-23774.

Docker Desktop before 4.4.4 on Windows allows attackers to move arbitrary files.

Docker Desktop version 4.3.0 and 4.3.1 has a bug that may log sensitive information (access token or password) on the user's machine during login. This only affects users if they are on Docker Desktop 4.3.0, 4.3.1 and the user has logged in while on 4.3.0, 4.3.1. Gaining access to this data would require having access to the user’s local files.