In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: Fix race condition during interface enslave Commit 5dbbbd01cbba83 ("ice: Avoid RTNL lock when re-creating auxiliary device") changes a process of re-creation of aux device so ice_plug_aux_dev() is called from ice_service_task() context. This unfortunately opens a race window that can result in dead-lock when interface has left LAG and immediately enters LAG again. Reproducer: ``` #!/bin/sh ip link add lag0 type bond mode 1 miimon 100 ip link set lag0 for n in {1..10}; do echo Cycle: $n ip link set ens7f0 master lag0 sleep 1 ip link set ens7f0 nomaster done ``` This results in: [20976.208697] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice] [20976.213422] Call Trace: [20976.215871] __schedule+0x2d1/0x830 [20976.219364] schedule+0x35/0xa0 [20976.222510] schedule_preempt_disabled+0xa/0x10 [20976.227043] __mutex_lock.isra.7+0x310/0x420 [20976.235071] enum_all_gids_of_dev_cb+0x1c/0x100 [ib_core] [20976.251215] ib_enum_roce_netdev+0xa4/0xe0 [ib_core] [20976.256192] ib_cache_setup_one+0x33/0xa0 [ib_core] [20976.261079] ib_register_device+0x40d/0x580 [ib_core] [20976.266139] irdma_ib_register_device+0x129/0x250 [irdma] [20976.281409] irdma_probe+0x2c1/0x360 [irdma] [20976.285691] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x45/0x70 [20976.289790] really_probe+0x1f2/0x480 [20976.298509] driver_probe_device+0x49/0xc0 [20976.302609] bus_for_each_drv+0x79/0xc0 [20976.306448] __device_attach+0xdc/0x160 [20976.310286] bus_probe_device+0x9d/0xb0 [20976.314128] device_add+0x43c/0x890 [20976.321287] __auxiliary_device_add+0x43/0x60 [20976.325644] ice_plug_aux_dev+0xb2/0x100 [ice] [20976.330109] ice_service_task+0xd0c/0xed0 [ice] [20976.342591] process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360 [20976.350536] worker_thread+0x30/0x390 [20976.358128] kthread+0x10a/0x120 [20976.365547] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40 ... [20976.438030] task:ip state:D stack: 0 pid:213658 ppid:213627 flags:0x00004084 [20976.446469] Call Trace: [20976.448921] __schedule+0x2d1/0x830 [20976.452414] schedule+0x35/0xa0 [20976.455559] schedule_preempt_disabled+0xa/0x10 [20976.460090] __mutex_lock.isra.7+0x310/0x420 [20976.464364] device_del+0x36/0x3c0 [20976.467772] ice_unplug_aux_dev+0x1a/0x40 [ice] [20976.472313] ice_lag_event_handler+0x2a2/0x520 [ice] [20976.477288] notifier_call_chain+0x47/0x70 [20976.481386] __netdev_upper_dev_link+0x18b/0x280 [20976.489845] bond_enslave+0xe05/0x1790 [bonding] [20976.494475] do_setlink+0x336/0xf50 [20976.502517] __rtnl_newlink+0x529/0x8b0 [20976.543441] rtnl_newlink+0x43/0x60 [20976.546934] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x2b1/0x360 [20976.559238] netlink_rcv_skb+0x4c/0x120 [20976.563079] netlink_unicast+0x196/0x230 [20976.567005] netlink_sendmsg+0x204/0x3d0 [20976.570930] sock_sendmsg+0x4c/0x50 [20976.574423] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1eb/0x250 [20976.586807] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xc0 [20976.606353] __sys_sendmsg+0x57/0xa0 [20976.609930] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1a0 [20976.613598] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca 1. Command 'ip link ... set nomaster' causes that ice_plug_aux_dev() is called from ice_service_task() context, aux device is created and associated device->lock is taken. 2. Command 'ip link ... set master...' calls ice's notifier under RTNL lock and that notifier calls ice_unplug_aux_dev(). That function tries to take aux device->lock but this is already taken by ice_plug_aux_dev() in step 1 3. Later ice_plug_aux_dev() tries to take RTNL lock but this is already taken in step 2 4. Dead-lock The patch fixes this issue by following changes: - Bit ICE_FLAG_PLUG_AUX_DEV is kept to be set during ice_plug_aux_dev() call in ice_service_task() - The bit is checked in ice_clear_rdma_cap() and only if it is not set then ice_unplug_aux_dev() is called. If it is set (in other words plugging of aux device was requested and ice_plug_aux_dev() is potentially running) then the function only clears the ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: fix NULL pointer dereference in ice_update_vsi_tx_ring_stats() It is possible to do NULL pointer dereference in routine that updates Tx ring stats. Currently only stats and bytes are updated when ring pointer is valid, but later on ring is accessed to propagate gathered Tx stats onto VSI stats. Change the existing logic to move to next ring when ring is NULL.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: v4l: async: Properly re-initialise notifier entry in unregister The notifier_entry of a notifier is not re-initialised after unregistering the notifier. This leads to dangling pointers being left there so use list_del_init() to return the notifier_entry an empty list.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked When requesting an NMI window, WARN on vNMI support being enabled if and only if NMIs are actually masked, i.e. if the vCPU is already handling an NMI. KVM's ABI for NMIs that arrive simultanesouly (from KVM's point of view) is to inject one NMI and pend the other. When using vNMI, KVM pends the second NMI simply by setting V_NMI_PENDING, and lets the CPU do the rest (hardware automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING when an NMI is injected). However, if KVM can't immediately inject an NMI, e.g. because the vCPU is in an STI shadow or is running with GIF=0, then KVM will request an NMI window and trigger the WARN (but still function correctly). Whether or not the GIF=0 case makes sense is debatable, as the intent of KVM's behavior is to provide functionality that is as close to real hardware as possible. E.g. if two NMIs are sent in quick succession, the probability of both NMIs arriving in an STI shadow is infinitesimally low on real hardware, but significantly larger in a virtual environment, e.g. if the vCPU is preempted in the STI shadow. For GIF=0, the argument isn't as clear cut, because the window where two NMIs can collide is much larger in bare metal (though still small). That said, KVM should not have divergent behavior for the GIF=0 case based on whether or not vNMI support is enabled. And KVM has allowed simultaneous NMIs with GIF=0 for over a decade, since commit 7460fb4a3400 ("KVM: Fix simultaneous NMIs"). I.e. KVM's GIF=0 handling shouldn't be modified without a *really* good reason to do so, and if KVM's behavior were to be modified, it should be done irrespective of vNMI support.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/vmalloc: fix vmalloc which may return null if called with __GFP_NOFAIL commit a421ef303008 ("mm: allow !GFP_KERNEL allocations for kvmalloc") includes support for __GFP_NOFAIL, but it presents a conflict with commit dd544141b9eb ("vmalloc: back off when the current task is OOM-killed"). A possible scenario is as follows: process-a __vmalloc_node_range(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL) __vmalloc_area_node() vm_area_alloc_pages() --> oom-killer send SIGKILL to process-a if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) break; --> return NULL; To fix this, do not check fatal_signal_pending() in vm_area_alloc_pages() if __GFP_NOFAIL set. This issue occurred during OPLUS KASAN TEST. Below is part of the log -> oom-killer sends signal to process [65731.222840] [ T1308] oom-kill:constraint=CONSTRAINT_NONE,nodemask=(null),cpuset=/,mems_allowed=0,global_oom,task_memcg=/apps/uid_10198,task=gs.intelligence,pid=32454,uid=10198 [65731.259685] [T32454] Call trace: [65731.259698] [T32454] dump_backtrace+0xf4/0x118 [65731.259734] [T32454] show_stack+0x18/0x24 [65731.259756] [T32454] dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x7c [65731.259781] [T32454] dump_stack+0x18/0x38 [65731.259800] [T32454] mrdump_common_die+0x250/0x39c [mrdump] [65731.259936] [T32454] ipanic_die+0x20/0x34 [mrdump] [65731.260019] [T32454] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xb4/0xfc [65731.260047] [T32454] notify_die+0x114/0x198 [65731.260073] [T32454] die+0xf4/0x5b4 [65731.260098] [T32454] die_kernel_fault+0x80/0x98 [65731.260124] [T32454] __do_kernel_fault+0x160/0x2a8 [65731.260146] [T32454] do_bad_area+0x68/0x148 [65731.260174] [T32454] do_mem_abort+0x151c/0x1b34 [65731.260204] [T32454] el1_abort+0x3c/0x5c [65731.260227] [T32454] el1h_64_sync_handler+0x54/0x90 [65731.260248] [T32454] el1h_64_sync+0x68/0x6c [65731.260269] [T32454] z_erofs_decompress_queue+0x7f0/0x2258 --> be->decompressed_pages = kvcalloc(be->nr_pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL); kernel panic by NULL pointer dereference. erofs assume kvmalloc with __GFP_NOFAIL never return NULL. [65731.260293] [T32454] z_erofs_runqueue+0xf30/0x104c [65731.260314] [T32454] z_erofs_readahead+0x4f0/0x968 [65731.260339] [T32454] read_pages+0x170/0xadc [65731.260364] [T32454] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x874/0xf30 [65731.260388] [T32454] page_cache_ra_order+0x24c/0x714 [65731.260411] [T32454] filemap_fault+0xbf0/0x1a74 [65731.260437] [T32454] __do_fault+0xd0/0x33c [65731.260462] [T32454] handle_mm_fault+0xf74/0x3fe0 [65731.260486] [T32454] do_mem_abort+0x54c/0x1b34 [65731.260509] [T32454] el0_da+0x44/0x94 [65731.260531] [T32454] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x98/0xb4 [65731.260553] [T32454] el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SOF: ipc4-topology: Fix input format query of process modules without base extension If a process module does not have base config extension then the same format applies to all of it's inputs and the process->base_config_ext is NULL, causing NULL dereference when specifically crafted topology and sequences used.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: fix log recovery buffer allocation for the legacy h_size fixup Commit a70f9fe52daa ("xfs: detect and handle invalid iclog size set by mkfs") added a fixup for incorrect h_size values used for the initial umount record in old xfsprogs versions. Later commit 0c771b99d6c9 ("xfs: clean up calculation of LR header blocks") cleaned up the log reover buffer calculation, but stoped using the fixed up h_size value to size the log recovery buffer, which can lead to an out of bounds access when the incorrect h_size does not come from the old mkfs tool, but a fuzzer. Fix this by open coding xlog_logrec_hblks and taking the fixed h_size into account for this calculation.

The IPv6 implementation in the Linux kernel before 6.3 has a net/ipv6/route.c max_size threshold that can be consumed easily, e.g., leading to a denial of service (network is unreachable errors) when IPv6 packets are sent in a loop via a raw socket.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Fix buffer size in gfx_v9_4_3_init_ cp_compute_microcode() and rlc_microcode() The function gfx_v9_4_3_init_microcode in gfx_v9_4_3.c was generating about potential truncation of output when using the snprintf function. The issue was due to the size of the buffer 'ucode_prefix' being too small to accommodate the maximum possible length of the string being written into it. The string being written is "amdgpu/%s_mec.bin" or "amdgpu/%s_rlc.bin", where %s is replaced by the value of 'chip_name'. The length of this string without the %s is 16 characters. The warning message indicated that 'chip_name' could be up to 29 characters long, resulting in a total of 45 characters, which exceeds the buffer size of 30 characters. To resolve this issue, the size of the 'ucode_prefix' buffer has been reduced from 30 to 15. This ensures that the maximum possible length of the string being written into the buffer will not exceed its size, thus preventing potential buffer overflow and truncation issues. Fixes the below with gcc W=1: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v9_4_3.c: In function ‘gfx_v9_4_3_early_init’: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v9_4_3.c:379:52: warning: ‘%s’ directive output may be truncated writing up to 29 bytes into a region of size 23 [-Wformat-truncation=] 379 | snprintf(fw_name, sizeof(fw_name), "amdgpu/%s_rlc.bin", chip_name); | ^~ ...... 439 | r = gfx_v9_4_3_init_rlc_microcode(adev, ucode_prefix); | ~~~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v9_4_3.c:379:9: note: ‘snprintf’ output between 16 and 45 bytes into a destination of size 30 379 | snprintf(fw_name, sizeof(fw_name), "amdgpu/%s_rlc.bin", chip_name); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v9_4_3.c:413:52: warning: ‘%s’ directive output may be truncated writing up to 29 bytes into a region of size 23 [-Wformat-truncation=] 413 | snprintf(fw_name, sizeof(fw_name), "amdgpu/%s_mec.bin", chip_name); | ^~ ...... 443 | r = gfx_v9_4_3_init_cp_compute_microcode(adev, ucode_prefix); | ~~~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v9_4_3.c:413:9: note: ‘snprintf’ output between 16 and 45 bytes into a destination of size 30 413 | snprintf(fw_name, sizeof(fw_name), "amdgpu/%s_mec.bin", chip_name); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: prevent pt_regs corruption for secondary idle threads Top of the kernel thread stack should be reserved for pt_regs. However this is not the case for the idle threads of the secondary boot harts. Their stacks overlap with their pt_regs, so both may get corrupted. Similar issue has been fixed for the primary hart, see c7cdd96eca28 ("riscv: prevent stack corruption by reserving task_pt_regs(p) early"). However that fix was not propagated to the secondary harts. The problem has been noticed in some CPU hotplug tests with V enabled. The function smp_callin stored several registers on stack, corrupting top of pt_regs structure including status field. As a result, kernel attempted to save or restore inexistent V context.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm: zynqmp_dpsub: Always register bridge We must always register the DRM bridge, since zynqmp_dp_hpd_work_func calls drm_bridge_hpd_notify, which in turn expects hpd_mutex to be initialized. We do this before zynqmp_dpsub_drm_init since that calls drm_bridge_attach. This fixes the following lockdep warning: [ 19.217084] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 19.227530] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock) [ 19.227768] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 140 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:582 __mutex_lock+0x4bc/0x550 [ 19.241696] Modules linked in: [ 19.244937] CPU: 0 PID: 140 Comm: kworker/0:4 Not tainted 6.6.20+ #96 [ 19.252046] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT) [ 19.256421] Workqueue: events zynqmp_dp_hpd_work_func [ 19.261795] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 19.269104] pc : __mutex_lock+0x4bc/0x550 [ 19.273364] lr : __mutex_lock+0x4bc/0x550 [ 19.277592] sp : ffffffc085c5bbe0 [ 19.281066] x29: ffffffc085c5bbe0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffffff88009417f8 [ 19.288624] x26: ffffff8800941788 x25: ffffff8800020008 x24: ffffffc082aa3000 [ 19.296227] x23: ffffffc080d90e3c x22: 0000000000000002 x21: 0000000000000000 [ 19.303744] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffff88002f5210 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 19.311295] x17: 6c707369642e3030 x16: 3030613464662072 x15: 0720072007200720 [ 19.318922] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 284e4f5f4e524157 x12: 0000000000000001 [ 19.326442] x11: 0001ffc085c5b940 x10: 0001ff88003f388b x9 : 0001ff88003f3888 [ 19.334003] x8 : 0001ff88003f3888 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 19.341537] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000001668 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 19.349054] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffff88003f3880 [ 19.356581] Call trace: [ 19.359160] __mutex_lock+0x4bc/0x550 [ 19.363032] mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30 [ 19.367187] drm_bridge_hpd_notify+0x2c/0x6c [ 19.371698] zynqmp_dp_hpd_work_func+0x44/0x54 [ 19.376364] process_one_work+0x3ac/0x988 [ 19.380660] worker_thread+0x398/0x694 [ 19.384736] kthread+0x1bc/0x1c0 [ 19.388241] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 19.392031] irq event stamp: 183 [ 19.395450] hardirqs last enabled at (183): [<ffffffc0800b9278>] finish_task_switch.isra.0+0xa8/0x2d4 [ 19.405140] hardirqs last disabled at (182): [<ffffffc081ad3754>] __schedule+0x714/0xd04 [ 19.413612] softirqs last enabled at (114): [<ffffffc080133de8>] srcu_invoke_callbacks+0x158/0x23c [ 19.423128] softirqs last disabled at (110): [<ffffffc080133de8>] srcu_invoke_callbacks+0x158/0x23c [ 19.432614] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- (cherry picked from commit 61ba791c4a7a09a370c45b70a81b8c7d4cf6b2ae)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dma-mapping: benchmark: handle NUMA_NO_NODE correctly cpumask_of_node() can be called for NUMA_NO_NODE inside do_map_benchmark() resulting in the following sanitizer report: UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in ./arch/x86/include/asm/topology.h:72:28 index -1 is out of range for type 'cpumask [64][1]' CPU: 1 PID: 990 Comm: dma_map_benchma Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6 #29 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:117) ubsan_epilogue (lib/ubsan.c:232) __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds (lib/ubsan.c:429) cpumask_of_node (arch/x86/include/asm/topology.h:72) [inline] do_map_benchmark (kernel/dma/map_benchmark.c:104) map_benchmark_ioctl (kernel/dma/map_benchmark.c:246) full_proxy_unlocked_ioctl (fs/debugfs/file.c:333) __x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:890) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:83) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) Use cpumask_of_node() in place when binding a kernel thread to a cpuset of a particular node. Note that the provided node id is checked inside map_benchmark_ioctl(). It's just a NUMA_NO_NODE case which is not handled properly later. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dma-buf/sw-sync: don't enable IRQ from sync_print_obj() Since commit a6aa8fca4d79 ("dma-buf/sw-sync: Reduce irqsave/irqrestore from known context") by error replaced spin_unlock_irqrestore() with spin_unlock_irq() for both sync_debugfs_show() and sync_print_obj() despite sync_print_obj() is called from sync_debugfs_show(), lockdep complains inconsistent lock state warning. Use plain spin_{lock,unlock}() for sync_print_obj(), for sync_debugfs_show() is already using spin_{lock,unlock}_irq().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing/probes: fix error check in parse_btf_field() btf_find_struct_member() might return NULL or an error via the ERR_PTR() macro. However, its caller in parse_btf_field() only checks for the NULL condition. Fix this by using IS_ERR() and returning the error up the stack.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tpm_tis_spi: Account for SPI header when allocating TPM SPI xfer buffer The TPM SPI transfer mechanism uses MAX_SPI_FRAMESIZE for computing the maximum transfer length and the size of the transfer buffer. As such, it does not account for the 4 bytes of header that prepends the SPI data frame. This can result in out-of-bounds accesses and was confirmed with KASAN. Introduce SPI_HDRSIZE to account for the header and use to allocate the transfer buffer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: Fix loop termination condition in gss_free_in_token_pages() The in_token->pages[] array is not NULL terminated. This results in the following KASAN splat: KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x04a2013400000008-0x04a201340000000f]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Fix division by zero in setup_dsc_config When slice_height is 0, the division by slice_height in the calculation of the number of slices will cause a division by zero driver crash. This leaves the kernel in a state that requires a reboot. This patch adds a check to avoid the division by zero. The stack trace below is for the 6.8.4 Kernel. I reproduced the issue on a Z16 Gen 2 Lenovo Thinkpad with a Apple Studio Display monitor connected via Thunderbolt. The amdgpu driver crashed with this exception when I rebooted the system with the monitor connected. kernel: ? die (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:421 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:434 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:447) kernel: ? do_trap (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:113 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:154) kernel: ? setup_dsc_config (drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dsc/dc_dsc.c:1053) amdgpu kernel: ? do_error_trap (./arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h:58 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:175) kernel: ? setup_dsc_config (drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dsc/dc_dsc.c:1053) amdgpu kernel: ? exc_divide_error (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:194 (discriminator 2)) kernel: ? setup_dsc_config (drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dsc/dc_dsc.c:1053) amdgpu kernel: ? asm_exc_divide_error (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:548) kernel: ? setup_dsc_config (drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dsc/dc_dsc.c:1053) amdgpu kernel: dc_dsc_compute_config (drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dsc/dc_dsc.c:1109) amdgpu After applying this patch, the driver no longer crashes when the monitor is connected and the system is rebooted. I believe this is the same issue reported for 3113.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix div-by-zero in l2cap_le_flowctl_init() l2cap_le_flowctl_init() can cause both div-by-zero and an integer overflow since hdev->le_mtu may not fall in the valid range. Move MTU from hci_dev to hci_conn to validate MTU and stop the connection process earlier if MTU is invalid. Also, add a missing validation in read_buffer_size() and make it return an error value if the validation fails. Now hci_conn_add() returns ERR_PTR() as it can fail due to the both a kzalloc failure and invalid MTU value. divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 67 Comm: kworker/u5:0 Tainted: G W 6.9.0-rc5+ #20 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work RIP: 0010:l2cap_le_flowctl_init+0x19e/0x3f0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:547 Code: e8 17 17 0c 00 66 41 89 9f 84 00 00 00 bf 01 00 00 00 41 b8 02 00 00 00 4c 89 fe 4c 89 e2 89 d9 e8 27 17 0c 00 44 89 f0 31 d2 <66> f7 f3 89 c3 ff c3 4d 8d b7 88 00 00 00 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 42 RSP: 0018:ffff88810bc0f858 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000000002a0 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: dffffc0000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88810bc0f7c0 RDI: ffffc90002dcb66f RBP: ffff88810bc0f880 R08: aa69db2dda70ff01 R09: 0000ffaaaaaaaaaa R10: 0084000000ffaaaa R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88810d65a084 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 00000000000002a0 R15: ffff88810d65a000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811ac00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020000100 CR3: 0000000103268003 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> l2cap_le_connect_req net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4902 [inline] l2cap_le_sig_cmd net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5420 [inline] l2cap_le_sig_channel net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5486 [inline] l2cap_recv_frame+0xe59d/0x11710 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6809 l2cap_recv_acldata+0x544/0x10a0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7506 hci_acldata_packet net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3939 [inline] hci_rx_work+0x5e5/0xb20 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4176 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x90f/0x1530 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x926/0xe70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2e3/0x380 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x5c/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: fib6_rules: avoid possible NULL dereference in fib6_rule_action() syzbot is able to trigger the following crash [1], caused by unsafe ip6_dst_idev() use. Indeed ip6_dst_idev() can return NULL, and must always be checked. [1] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 0 PID: 31648 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-next-20240417-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 RIP: 0010:__fib6_rule_action net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:237 [inline] RIP: 0010:fib6_rule_action+0x241/0x7b0 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:267 Code: 02 00 00 49 8d 9f d8 00 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 f9 32 bf f7 48 8b 1b 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 20 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 e0 32 bf f7 4c 8b 03 48 89 ef 4c RSP: 0018:ffffc9000fc1f2f0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 1a772f98c8186700 RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: ffffffff8bcac4e0 RDI: ffffffff8c1f9760 RBP: ffff8880673fb980 R08: ffffffff8fac15ef R09: 1ffffffff1f582bd R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1f582be R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: 0000000000000080 R14: ffff888076509000 R15: ffff88807a029a00 FS: 00007f55e82ca6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b31d23000 CR3: 0000000022b66000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> fib_rules_lookup+0x62c/0xdb0 net/core/fib_rules.c:317 fib6_rule_lookup+0x1fd/0x790 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:108 ip6_route_output_flags_noref net/ipv6/route.c:2637 [inline] ip6_route_output_flags+0x38e/0x610 net/ipv6/route.c:2649 ip6_route_output include/net/ip6_route.h:93 [inline] ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0x189/0x11a0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1120 ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0xb9/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1250 sctp_v6_get_dst+0x792/0x1e20 net/sctp/ipv6.c:326 sctp_transport_route+0x12c/0x2e0 net/sctp/transport.c:455 sctp_assoc_add_peer+0x614/0x15c0 net/sctp/associola.c:662 sctp_connect_new_asoc+0x31d/0x6c0 net/sctp/socket.c:1099 __sctp_connect+0x66d/0xe30 net/sctp/socket.c:1197 sctp_connect net/sctp/socket.c:4819 [inline] sctp_inet_connect+0x149/0x1f0 net/sctp/socket.c:4834 __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:2048 [inline] __sys_connect+0x2df/0x310 net/socket.c:2065 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2075 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2072 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:2072 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: prevent NULL dereference in ip6_output() According to syzbot, there is a chance that ip6_dst_idev() returns NULL in ip6_output(). Most places in IPv6 stack deal with a NULL idev just fine, but not here. syzbot reported: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000bc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000005e0-0x00000000000005e7] CPU: 0 PID: 9775 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00157-g6a30653b604a #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 RIP: 0010:ip6_output+0x231/0x3f0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:237 Code: 3c 1e 00 49 89 df 74 08 4c 89 ef e8 19 58 db f7 48 8b 44 24 20 49 89 45 00 49 89 c5 48 8d 9d e0 05 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 38 84 c0 4c 8b 74 24 28 0f 85 61 01 00 00 8b 1b 31 ff RSP: 0018:ffffc9000927f0d8 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 00000000000000bc RBX: 00000000000005e0 RCX: 0000000000040000 RDX: ffffc900131f9000 RSI: 0000000000004f47 RDI: 0000000000004f48 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff8a1f0b9a R09: 1ffffffff1f51fad R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1f51fae R12: ffff8880293ec8c0 R13: ffff88805d7fc000 R14: 1ffff1100527d91a R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 00007f135c6856c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020000080 CR3: 0000000064096000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] ip6_xmit+0xefe/0x17f0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:358 sctp_v6_xmit+0x9f2/0x13f0 net/sctp/ipv6.c:248 sctp_packet_transmit+0x26ad/0x2ca0 net/sctp/output.c:653 sctp_packet_singleton+0x22c/0x320 net/sctp/outqueue.c:783 sctp_outq_flush_ctrl net/sctp/outqueue.c:914 [inline] sctp_outq_flush+0x6d5/0x3e20 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1212 sctp_side_effects net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1198 [inline] sctp_do_sm+0x59cc/0x60c0 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1169 sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE+0x95/0xc0 net/sctp/primitive.c:73 __sctp_connect+0x9cd/0xe30 net/sctp/socket.c:1234 sctp_connect net/sctp/socket.c:4819 [inline] sctp_inet_connect+0x149/0x1f0 net/sctp/socket.c:4834 __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:2048 [inline] __sys_connect+0x2df/0x310 net/socket.c:2065 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2075 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2072 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:2072 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f