In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dma: xilinx_dpdma: Fix locking There are several places where either chan->lock or chan->vchan.lock was not held. Add appropriate locking. This fixes lockdep warnings like [ 31.077578] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 31.077831] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 40 at drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dpdma.c:834 xilinx_dpdma_chan_queue_transfer+0x274/0x5e0 [ 31.077953] Modules linked in: [ 31.078019] CPU: 2 PID: 40 Comm: kworker/u12:1 Not tainted 6.6.20+ #98 [ 31.078102] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT) [ 31.078169] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func [ 31.078272] pstate: 600000c5 (nZCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 31.078377] pc : xilinx_dpdma_chan_queue_transfer+0x274/0x5e0 [ 31.078473] lr : xilinx_dpdma_chan_queue_transfer+0x270/0x5e0 [ 31.078550] sp : ffffffc083bb2e10 [ 31.078590] x29: ffffffc083bb2e10 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffffff880165a168 [ 31.078754] x26: ffffff880164e920 x25: ffffff880164eab8 x24: ffffff880164d480 [ 31.078920] x23: ffffff880165a148 x22: ffffff880164e988 x21: 0000000000000000 [ 31.079132] x20: ffffffc082aa3000 x19: ffffff880164e880 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 31.079295] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 [ 31.079453] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffffff8802263dc0 x12: 0000000000000001 [ 31.079613] x11: 0001ffc083bb2e34 x10: 0001ff880164e98f x9 : 0001ffc082aa3def [ 31.079824] x8 : 0001ffc082aa3dec x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000516 [ 31.079982] x5 : ffffffc7f8d43000 x4 : ffffff88003c9c40 x3 : ffffffffffffffff [ 31.080147] x2 : ffffffc7f8d43000 x1 : 00000000000000c0 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 31.080307] Call trace: [ 31.080340] xilinx_dpdma_chan_queue_transfer+0x274/0x5e0 [ 31.080518] xilinx_dpdma_issue_pending+0x11c/0x120 [ 31.080595] zynqmp_disp_layer_update+0x180/0x3ac [ 31.080712] zynqmp_dpsub_plane_atomic_update+0x11c/0x21c [ 31.080825] drm_atomic_helper_commit_planes+0x20c/0x684 [ 31.080951] drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail+0x5c/0xb0 [ 31.081139] commit_tail+0x234/0x294 [ 31.081246] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1f8/0x210 [ 31.081363] drm_atomic_commit+0x100/0x140 [ 31.081477] drm_client_modeset_commit_atomic+0x318/0x384 [ 31.081634] drm_client_modeset_commit_locked+0x8c/0x24c [ 31.081725] drm_client_modeset_commit+0x34/0x5c [ 31.081812] __drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked+0x104/0x168 [ 31.081899] drm_fb_helper_set_par+0x50/0x70 [ 31.081971] fbcon_init+0x538/0xc48 [ 31.082047] visual_init+0x16c/0x23c [ 31.082207] do_bind_con_driver.isra.0+0x2d0/0x634 [ 31.082320] do_take_over_console+0x24c/0x33c [ 31.082429] do_fbcon_takeover+0xbc/0x1b0 [ 31.082503] fbcon_fb_registered+0x2d0/0x34c [ 31.082663] register_framebuffer+0x27c/0x38c [ 31.082767] __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x5c0/0x91c [ 31.082939] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x50/0x74 [ 31.083012] drm_fbdev_dma_client_hotplug+0xb8/0x108 [ 31.083115] drm_client_register+0xa0/0xf4 [ 31.083195] drm_fbdev_dma_setup+0xb0/0x1cc [ 31.083293] zynqmp_dpsub_drm_init+0x45c/0x4e0 [ 31.083431] zynqmp_dpsub_probe+0x444/0x5e0 [ 31.083616] platform_probe+0x8c/0x13c [ 31.083713] really_probe+0x258/0x59c [ 31.083793] __driver_probe_device+0xc4/0x224 [ 31.083878] driver_probe_device+0x70/0x1c0 [ 31.083961] __device_attach_driver+0x108/0x1e0 [ 31.084052] bus_for_each_drv+0x9c/0x100 [ 31.084125] __device_attach+0x100/0x298 [ 31.084207] device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20 [ 31.084292] bus_probe_device+0xd8/0xdc [ 31.084368] deferred_probe_work_func+0x11c/0x180 [ 31.084451] process_one_work+0x3ac/0x988 [ 31.084643] worker_thread+0x398/0x694 [ 31.084752] kthread+0x1bc/0x1c0 [ 31.084848] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 31.084932] irq event stamp: 64549 [ 31.084970] hardirqs last enabled at (64548): [<ffffffc081adf35c>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x80/0x90 [ 31.085157] ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: idxd: Fix oops during rmmod on single-CPU platforms During the removal of the idxd driver, registered offline callback is invoked as part of the clean up process. However, on systems with only one CPU online, no valid target is available to migrate the perf context, resulting in a kernel oops: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000000002a2b8 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 1470e1067 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 20 Comm: cpuhp/0 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6-dsa+ #57 Hardware name: Intel Corporation AvenueCity/AvenueCity, BIOS BHSDCRB1.86B.2492.D03.2307181620 07/18/2023 RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x2e/0x50 ... Call Trace: <TASK> __die+0x24/0x70 page_fault_oops+0x82/0x160 do_user_addr_fault+0x65/0x6b0 __pfx___rdmsr_safe_on_cpu+0x10/0x10 exc_page_fault+0x7d/0x170 asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 mutex_lock+0x2e/0x50 mutex_lock+0x1e/0x50 perf_pmu_migrate_context+0x87/0x1f0 perf_event_cpu_offline+0x76/0x90 [idxd] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0xa2/0x4f0 __pfx_perf_event_cpu_offline+0x10/0x10 [idxd] cpuhp_thread_fun+0x98/0x150 smpboot_thread_fn+0x27/0x260 smpboot_thread_fn+0x1af/0x260 __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x103/0x140 __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 <TASK> Fix the issue by preventing the migration of the perf context to an invalid target.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: Fix TASK_SIZE on 64-bit NOMMU On NOMMU, userspace memory can come from anywhere in physical RAM. The current definition of TASK_SIZE is wrong if any RAM exists above 4G, causing spurious failures in the userspace access routines.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: Fix loading 64-bit NOMMU kernels past the start of RAM commit 3335068f8721 ("riscv: Use PUD/P4D/PGD pages for the linear mapping") added logic to allow using RAM below the kernel load address. However, this does not work for NOMMU, where PAGE_OFFSET is fixed to the kernel load address. Since that range of memory corresponds to PFNs below ARCH_PFN_OFFSET, mm initialization runs off the beginning of mem_map and corrupts adjacent kernel memory. Fix this by restoring the previous behavior for NOMMU kernels.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: phy: ti: tusb1210: Resolve charger-det crash if charger psy is unregistered The power_supply frame-work is not really designed for there to be long living in kernel references to power_supply devices. Specifically unregistering a power_supply while some other code has a reference to it triggers a WARN in power_supply_unregister(): WARN_ON(atomic_dec_return(&psy->use_cnt)); Folllowed by the power_supply still getting removed and the backing data freed anyway, leaving the tusb1210 charger-detect code with a dangling reference, resulting in a crash the next time tusb1210_get_online() is called. Fix this by only holding the reference in tusb1210_get_online() freeing it at the end of the function. Note this still leaves a theoretical race window, but it avoids the issue when manually rmmod-ing the charger chip driver during development.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/eevdf: Prevent vlag from going out of bounds in reweight_eevdf() It was possible to have pick_eevdf() return NULL, which then causes a NULL-deref. This turned out to be due to entity_eligible() returning falsely negative because of a s64 multiplcation overflow. Specifically, reweight_eevdf() computes the vlag without considering the limit placed upon vlag as update_entity_lag() does, and then the scaling multiplication (remember that weight is 20bit fixed point) can overflow. This then leads to the new vruntime being weird which then causes the above entity_eligible() to go side-ways and claim nothing is eligible. Thus limit the range of vlag accordingly. All this was quite rare, but fatal when it does happen.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: smbus: fix NULL function pointer dereference Baruch reported an OOPS when using the designware controller as target only. Target-only modes break the assumption of one transfer function always being available. Fix this by always checking the pointer in __i2c_transfer. [wsa: dropped the simplification in core-smbus to avoid theoretical regressions]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bounds: Use the right number of bits for power-of-two CONFIG_NR_CPUS bits_per() rounds up to the next power of two when passed a power of two. This causes crashes on some machines and configurations.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: Avoid infinite loop trying to resize local TT If the MTU of one of an attached interface becomes too small to transmit the local translation table then it must be resized to fit inside all fragments (when enabled) or a single packet. But if the MTU becomes too low to transmit even the header + the VLAN specific part then the resizing of the local TT will never succeed. This can for example happen when the usable space is 110 bytes and 11 VLANs are on top of batman-adv. In this case, at least 116 byte would be needed. There will just be an endless spam of batman_adv: batadv0: Forced to purge local tt entries to fit new maximum fragment MTU (110) in the log but the function will never finish. Problem here is that the timeout will be halved all the time and will then stagnate at 0 and therefore never be able to reduce the table even more. There are other scenarios possible with a similar result. The number of BATADV_TT_CLIENT_NOPURGE entries in the local TT can for example be too high to fit inside a packet. Such a scenario can therefore happen also with only a single VLAN + 7 non-purgable addresses - requiring at least 120 bytes. While this should be handled proactively when: * interface with too low MTU is added * VLAN is added * non-purgeable local mac is added * MTU of an attached interface is reduced * fragmentation setting gets disabled (which most likely requires dropping attached interfaces) not all of these scenarios can be prevented because batman-adv is only consuming events without the the possibility to prevent these actions (non-purgable MAC address added, MTU of an attached interface is reduced). It is therefore necessary to also make sure that the code is able to handle also the situations when there were already incompatible system configuration are present.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virtio_net: Do not send RSS key if it is not supported There is a bug when setting the RSS options in virtio_net that can break the whole machine, getting the kernel into an infinite loop. Running the following command in any QEMU virtual machine with virtionet will reproduce this problem: # ethtool -X eth0 hfunc toeplitz This is how the problem happens: 1) ethtool_set_rxfh() calls virtnet_set_rxfh() 2) virtnet_set_rxfh() calls virtnet_commit_rss_command() 3) virtnet_commit_rss_command() populates 4 entries for the rss scatter-gather 4) Since the command above does not have a key, then the last scatter-gatter entry will be zeroed, since rss_key_size == 0. sg_buf_size = vi->rss_key_size; 5) This buffer is passed to qemu, but qemu is not happy with a buffer with zero length, and do the following in virtqueue_map_desc() (QEMU function): if (!sz) { virtio_error(vdev, "virtio: zero sized buffers are not allowed"); 6) virtio_error() (also QEMU function) set the device as broken vdev->broken = true; 7) Qemu bails out, and do not repond this crazy kernel. 8) The kernel is waiting for the response to come back (function virtnet_send_command()) 9) The kernel is waiting doing the following : while (!virtqueue_get_buf(vi->cvq, &tmp) && !virtqueue_is_broken(vi->cvq)) cpu_relax(); 10) None of the following functions above is true, thus, the kernel loops here forever. Keeping in mind that virtqueue_is_broken() does not look at the qemu `vdev->broken`, so, it never realizes that the vitio is broken at QEMU side. Fix it by not sending RSS commands if the feature is not available in the device.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: tlb: Fix TLBI RANGE operand KVM/arm64 relies on TLBI RANGE feature to flush TLBs when the dirty pages are collected by VMM and the page table entries become write protected during live migration. Unfortunately, the operand passed to the TLBI RANGE instruction isn't correctly sorted out due to the commit 117940aa6e5f ("KVM: arm64: Define kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_range()"). It leads to crash on the destination VM after live migration because TLBs aren't flushed completely and some of the dirty pages are missed. For example, I have a VM where 8GB memory is assigned, starting from 0x40000000 (1GB). Note that the host has 4KB as the base page size. In the middile of migration, kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_range() is executed to flush TLBs. It passes MAX_TLBI_RANGE_PAGES as the argument to __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_range() and __flush_s2_tlb_range_op(). SCALE#3 and NUM#31, corresponding to MAX_TLBI_RANGE_PAGES, isn't supported by __TLBI_RANGE_NUM(). In this specific case, -1 has been returned from __TLBI_RANGE_NUM() for SCALE#3/2/1/0 and rejected by the loop in the __flush_tlb_range_op() until the variable @scale underflows and becomes -9, 0xffff708000040000 is set as the operand. The operand is wrong since it's sorted out by __TLBI_VADDR_RANGE() according to invalid @scale and @num. Fix it by extending __TLBI_RANGE_NUM() to support the combination of SCALE#3 and NUM#31. With the changes, [-1 31] instead of [-1 30] can be returned from the macro, meaning the TLBs for 0x200000 pages in the above example can be flushed in one shoot with SCALE#3 and NUM#31. The macro TLBI_RANGE_MASK is dropped since no one uses it any more. The comments are also adjusted accordingly.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: raid1: fix use-after-free for original bio in raid1_write_request() r1_bio->bios[] is used to record new bios that will be issued to underlying disks, however, in raid1_write_request(), r1_bio->bios[] will set to the original bio temporarily. Meanwhile, if blocked rdev is set, free_r1bio() will be called causing that all r1_bio->bios[] to be freed: raid1_write_request() r1_bio = alloc_r1bio(mddev, bio); -> r1_bio->bios[] is NULL for (i = 0; i < disks; i++) -> for each rdev in conf // first rdev is normal r1_bio->bios[0] = bio; -> set to original bio // second rdev is blocked if (test_bit(Blocked, &rdev->flags)) break if (blocked_rdev) free_r1bio() put_all_bios() bio_put(r1_bio->bios[0]) -> original bio is freed Test scripts: mdadm -CR /dev/md0 -l1 -n4 /dev/sd[abcd] --assume-clean fio -filename=/dev/md0 -ioengine=libaio -rw=write -bs=4k -numjobs=1 \ -iodepth=128 -name=test -direct=1 echo blocked > /sys/block/md0/md/rd2/state Test result: BUG bio-264 (Not tainted): Object already free ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Allocated in mempool_alloc_slab+0x24/0x50 age=1 cpu=1 pid=869 kmem_cache_alloc+0x324/0x480 mempool_alloc_slab+0x24/0x50 mempool_alloc+0x6e/0x220 bio_alloc_bioset+0x1af/0x4d0 blkdev_direct_IO+0x164/0x8a0 blkdev_write_iter+0x309/0x440 aio_write+0x139/0x2f0 io_submit_one+0x5ca/0xb70 __do_sys_io_submit+0x86/0x270 __x64_sys_io_submit+0x22/0x30 do_syscall_64+0xb1/0x210 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 Freed in mempool_free_slab+0x1f/0x30 age=1 cpu=1 pid=869 kmem_cache_free+0x28c/0x550 mempool_free_slab+0x1f/0x30 mempool_free+0x40/0x100 bio_free+0x59/0x80 bio_put+0xf0/0x220 free_r1bio+0x74/0xb0 raid1_make_request+0xadf/0x1150 md_handle_request+0xc7/0x3b0 md_submit_bio+0x76/0x130 __submit_bio+0xd8/0x1d0 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x1eb/0x5c0 submit_bio_noacct+0x169/0xd40 submit_bio+0xee/0x1d0 blkdev_direct_IO+0x322/0x8a0 blkdev_write_iter+0x309/0x440 aio_write+0x139/0x2f0 Since that bios for underlying disks are not allocated yet, fix this problem by using mempool_free() directly to free the r1_bio.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: Fix memory leak in hci_req_sync_complete() In 'hci_req_sync_complete()', always free the previous sync request state before assigning reference to a new one.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/chrome: cros_ec_uart: properly fix race condition The cros_ec_uart_probe() function calls devm_serdev_device_open() before it calls serdev_device_set_client_ops(). This can trigger a NULL pointer dereference: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ... ? ttyport_receive_buf A simplified version of crashing code is as follows: static inline size_t serdev_controller_receive_buf(struct serdev_controller *ctrl, const u8 *data, size_t count) { struct serdev_device *serdev = ctrl->serdev; if (!serdev || !serdev->ops->receive_buf) // CRASH! return 0; return serdev->ops->receive_buf(serdev, data, count); } It assumes that if SERPORT_ACTIVE is set and serdev exists, serdev->ops will also exist. This conflicts with the existing cros_ec_uart_probe() logic, as it first calls devm_serdev_device_open() (which sets SERPORT_ACTIVE), and only later sets serdev->ops via serdev_device_set_client_ops(). Commit 01f95d42b8f4 ("platform/chrome: cros_ec_uart: fix race condition") attempted to fix a similar race condition, but while doing so, made the window of error for this race condition to happen much wider. Attempt to fix the race condition again, making sure we fully setup before calling devm_serdev_device_open().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xsk: validate user input for XDP_{UMEM|COMPLETION}_FILL_RING syzbot reported an illegal copy in xsk_setsockopt() [1] Make sure to validate setsockopt() @optlen parameter. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xsk_setsockopt+0x909/0xa40 net/xdp/xsk.c:1420 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888028c6cde3 by task syz-executor.0/7549 CPU: 0 PID: 7549 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline] copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline] xsk_setsockopt+0x909/0xa40 net/xdp/xsk.c:1420 do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2311 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 RIP: 0033:0x7fb40587de69 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fb40665a0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb4059abf80 RCX: 00007fb40587de69 RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 000000000000011b RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 00007fb4058ca47a R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000020001980 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fb4059abf80 R15: 00007fff57ee4d08 </TASK> Allocated by task 7549: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3966 [inline] __kmalloc+0x233/0x4a0 mm/slub.c:3979 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:632 [inline] __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_setsockopt+0xd2f/0x1040 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1869 do_sock_setsockopt+0x6b4/0x720 net/socket.c:2293 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888028c6cde0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 The buggy address is located 1 bytes to the right of allocated 2-byte region [ffff888028c6cde0, ffff888028c6cde2) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea0000a31b00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888028c6c9c0 pfn:0x28c6c anon flags: 0xfff00000000800(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 00fff00000000800 ffff888014c41280 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 raw: ffff888028c6c9c0 0000000080800057 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x112cc0(GFP_USER|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 6648, tgid 6644 (syz-executor.0), ts 133906047828, free_ts 133859922223 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x1ea/0x210 mm/page_alloc.c:1533 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c: ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: octeontx2-pf: Fix transmit scheduler resource leak Inorder to support shaping and scheduling, Upon class creation Netdev driver allocates trasmit schedulers. The previous patch which added support for Round robin scheduling has a bug due to which driver is not freeing transmit schedulers post class deletion. This patch fixes the same.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: fix q->blkg_list corruption during disk rebind Multiple gendisk instances can allocated/added for single request queue in case of disk rebind. blkg may still stay in q->blkg_list when calling blkcg_init_disk() for rebind, then q->blkg_list becomes corrupted. Fix the list corruption issue by: - add blkg_init_queue() to initialize q->blkg_list & q->blkcg_mutex only - move calling blkg_init_queue() into blk_alloc_queue() The list corruption should be started since commit f1c006f1c685 ("blk-cgroup: synchronize pd_free_fn() from blkg_free_workfn() and blkcg_deactivate_policy()") which delays removing blkg from q->blkg_list into blkg_free_workfn().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: geneve: fix header validation in geneve[6]_xmit_skb syzbot is able to trigger an uninit-value in geneve_xmit() [1] Problem : While most ip tunnel helpers (like ip_tunnel_get_dsfield()) uses skb_protocol(skb, true), pskb_inet_may_pull() is only using skb->protocol. If anything else than ETH_P_IPV6 or ETH_P_IP is found in skb->protocol, pskb_inet_may_pull() does nothing at all. If a vlan tag was provided by the caller (af_packet in the syzbot case), the network header might not point to the correct location, and skb linear part could be smaller than expected. Add skb_vlan_inet_prepare() to perform a complete mac validation. Use this in geneve for the moment, I suspect we need to adopt this more broadly. v4 - Jakub reported v3 broke l2_tos_ttl_inherit.sh selftest - Only call __vlan_get_protocol() for vlan types. v2,v3 - Addressed Sabrina comments on v1 and v2 [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in geneve_xmit_skb drivers/net/geneve.c:910 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in geneve_xmit+0x302d/0x5420 drivers/net/geneve.c:1030 geneve_xmit_skb drivers/net/geneve.c:910 [inline] geneve_xmit+0x302d/0x5420 drivers/net/geneve.c:1030 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4903 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4917 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3531 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x247/0xa20 net/core/dev.c:3547 __dev_queue_xmit+0x348d/0x52c0 net/core/dev.c:4335 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3091 [inline] packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x8bb0/0x9ef0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x685/0x830 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3804 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3845 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x613/0xc50 mm/slub.c:3888 kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:577 __alloc_skb+0x35b/0x7a0 net/core/skbuff.c:668 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1318 [inline] alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbf0 net/core/skbuff.c:6504 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa81/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2795 packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2930 [inline] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3024 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x722d/0x9ef0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x685/0x830 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 CPU: 0 PID: 5033 Comm: syz-executor346 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc1-syzkaller-00005-g928a87efa423 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/29/2024

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bnxt_en: Fix possible memory leak in bnxt_rdma_aux_device_init() If ulp = kzalloc() fails, the allocated edev will leak because it is not properly assigned and the cleanup path will not be able to free it. Fix it by assigning it properly immediately after allocation.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ks8851: Handle softirqs at the end of IRQ thread to fix hang The ks8851_irq() thread may call ks8851_rx_pkts() in case there are any packets in the MAC FIFO, which calls netif_rx(). This netif_rx() implementation is guarded by local_bh_disable() and local_bh_enable(). The local_bh_enable() may call do_softirq() to run softirqs in case any are pending. One of the softirqs is net_rx_action, which ultimately reaches the driver .start_xmit callback. If that happens, the system hangs. The entire call chain is below: ks8851_start_xmit_par from netdev_start_xmit netdev_start_xmit from dev_hard_start_xmit dev_hard_start_xmit from sch_direct_xmit sch_direct_xmit from __dev_queue_xmit __dev_queue_xmit from __neigh_update __neigh_update from neigh_update neigh_update from arp_process.constprop.0 arp_process.constprop.0 from __netif_receive_skb_one_core __netif_receive_skb_one_core from process_backlog process_backlog from __napi_poll.constprop.0 __napi_poll.constprop.0 from net_rx_action net_rx_action from __do_softirq __do_softirq from call_with_stack call_with_stack from do_softirq do_softirq from __local_bh_enable_ip __local_bh_enable_ip from netif_rx netif_rx from ks8851_irq ks8851_irq from irq_thread_fn irq_thread_fn from irq_thread irq_thread from kthread kthread from ret_from_fork The hang happens because ks8851_irq() first locks a spinlock in ks8851_par.c ks8851_lock_par() spin_lock_irqsave(&ksp->lock, ...) and with that spinlock locked, calls netif_rx(). Once the execution reaches ks8851_start_xmit_par(), it calls ks8851_lock_par() again which attempts to claim the already locked spinlock again, and the hang happens. Move the do_softirq() call outside of the spinlock protected section of ks8851_irq() by disabling BHs around the entire spinlock protected section of ks8851_irq() handler. Place local_bh_enable() outside of the spinlock protected section, so that it can trigger do_softirq() without the ks8851_par.c ks8851_lock_par() spinlock being held, and safely call ks8851_start_xmit_par() without attempting to lock the already locked spinlock. Since ks8851_irq() is protected by local_bh_disable()/local_bh_enable() now, replace netif_rx() with __netif_rx() which is not duplicating the local_bh_disable()/local_bh_enable() calls.